Ukraine Labels Russian General’s Death a ‘Legitimate Target’ in War Effort

A high-ranking general in the Russian armed forces, along with his assistant, has been killed in Moscow, according to a Ukrainian source speaking to the BBC. The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) is said to have been behind the strike, marking a significant development in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

The general, whose identity has not yet been confirmed, was reportedly targeted in a carefully planned operation. The death of such a senior military figure is seen as a high-profile blow to the Russian military leadership, and it comes amid escalating tensions as the war in Ukraine continues.

Ukrainian authorities have not officially commented on the specifics of the operation, but sources indicate that it was carried out with precision. The assistant to the general was also reportedly killed in the same attack.

This incident adds to a series of targeted strikes against high-ranking Russian officials and military leaders since the conflict began, as Ukraine continues to employ unconventional tactics to weaken Russia’s command structure.

The strike has raised concerns in Moscow, where security around key military personnel is expected to increase in the wake of this attack. The Russian government has yet to respond officially to the allegations or provide details on the incident.

Ukrainian officials, however, have justified the operation, stating that individuals involved in military operations against Ukraine are legitimate targets under international law. The Ukrainian Security Service has made clear its intention to continue targeting Russian leadership as part of its broader strategy to disrupt Russia’s military efforts.

This event is likely to further escalate tensions between the two nations and could potentially shift the dynamics of the ongoing conflict.

COURTESY: BBC News

Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, the head of Russia’s Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Defence Forces, was killed in a targeted attack outside a residential block in Moscow early on Tuesday. According to Russia’s Investigative Committee (SK), a device hidden in a scooter was remotely detonated, resulting in the death of the high-ranking general.

Kirillov, who was a prominent figure in Russia’s military leadership, was reportedly outside his residence when the explosion occurred. The attack has raised concerns about the safety of top Russian military officials, with the method of the attack indicating the involvement of sophisticated tactics.

The Russian authorities have launched an investigation into the incident, but so far, no group has claimed responsibility. However, the timing and method of the attack have led to speculations that it could be linked to Ukraine’s ongoing efforts to target key Russian military leaders.

While Ukrainian officials have not officially claimed responsibility for the attack, such targeted strikes on high-ranking Russian figures have been part of Ukraine’s broader strategy to disrupt Russia’s military command and operations. The death of Lt Gen Kirillov is seen as a significant blow to Russia’s defense capabilities, particularly in the area of chemical, biological, and nuclear defense.

As the investigation unfolds, the attack is expected to further escalate tensions between Moscow and Kyiv, with both sides accusing each other of expanding the scope of the conflict. The incident could also prompt increased security measures around Russian military personnel, especially those holding sensitive positions in the defense sector.

A source within Ukraine’s SBU (Security Service of Ukraine) claimed that Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, the head of Russia’s Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Defence Forces, was “a legitimate target” for the attack. The source further alleged that Kirillov had been involved in war crimes during Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

This claim stems from accusations that Kirillov’s role in overseeing Russia’s chemical and biological defense programs placed him at the center of operations that could have violated international laws, particularly concerning the use of prohibited weapons or the facilitation of their use. The SBU source asserted that Kirillov’s involvement in these activities made him a key figure responsible for the suffering of Ukrainian civilians and soldiers, further justifying the attack as a response to alleged war crimes.

While the SBU has not officially claimed responsibility for the assassination, Ukrainian officials have been vocal about targeting individuals they consider responsible for Russia’s military actions in Ukraine. The attack, carried out with precision using a remotely detonated device hidden in a scooter, marks a significant escalation in Ukraine’s strategy to weaken Russia’s military leadership.

COURTESY: CNN

In response to the attack, Russian officials condemned the assassination, calling it an act of terrorism. However, the Ukrainian government has yet to formally confirm or deny any involvement, leaving the incident shrouded in ambiguity. The ongoing conflict continues to see increasing attempts to neutralize high-ranking officials on both sides, with casualties among military leadership heightening the tension and complexity of the war.

On Monday, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) charged Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, 54, in absentia, accusing him of being “responsible for the mass use of banned chemical weapons” during the ongoing conflict in Ukraine. The SBU made the announcement on Telegram, asserting that Kirillov’s leadership of Russia’s Radiation, Biological, and Chemical Defence Forces implicated him in the illegal use of chemical agents against Ukrainian forces and civilians.

The charge follows Ukraine’s allegations that Russian forces, under Kirillov’s oversight, have deployed chemical weapons in violation of international law, particularly the Chemical Weapons Convention, to which both Russia and Ukraine are signatories. The SBU’s statement emphasized the gravity of Kirillov’s alleged involvement in orchestrating or enabling the use of such weapons, framing him as a key figure in what they describe as Russia’s war crimes against Ukraine.

This legal action adds to the growing list of charges Ukraine has leveled against Russian officials accused of war crimes during the invasion, underscoring the ongoing tensions and the international legal ramifications of Russia’s military actions. Kirillov’s role as head of Russia’s chemical defense forces has made him a prominent target in Ukraine’s effort to hold Russia accountable for its actions in the war.

The Ukrainian government has not yet commented on the death of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov. Despite the claims by Ukraine’s SBU security service regarding the general’s involvement in war crimes, officials in Kyiv have remained silent on the specifics of the incident. The lack of an official statement from the Ukrainian authorities leaves room for speculation about the motive and the circumstances surrounding the attack. This silence contrasts with the SBU’s earlier assertions, suggesting that the general’s killing was part of Ukraine’s broader effort to target key Russian military figures responsible for alleged war crimes.

Pictures from the scene in southeastern Moscow showed significant damage to the entrance of a residential building, with scorch marks visible on the walls and multiple windows shattered by the blast. Two body bags were seen on the street, marking the grim aftermath of the explosion. The damage suggested a powerful explosion, consistent with the claims that a remotely detonated device hidden in a scooter was responsible for the attack that killed Lt Gen Igor Kirillov and his assistant. The images underscored the targeted nature of the strike and raised further questions about the growing use of such tactics in the ongoing conflict.

The block was cordoned off on Tuesday morning as Russian investigators meticulously combed the area for evidence. Law enforcement and forensic teams were seen working at the site, gathering clues to piece together the details of the explosion. Authorities were focused on determining the specifics of the device used and any potential links to the broader conflict. The ongoing investigation underscored the seriousness of the attack and the significant implications it could have for both Russian security and the ongoing war in Ukraine.

In October, the UK imposed sanctions on Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, accusing him of overseeing the use of chemical weapons in Ukraine. The UK government also described him as a “significant mouthpiece for Kremlin disinformation.” These sanctions were part of a broader effort by the UK to hold Russian officials accountable for their roles in the ongoing conflict, particularly in relation to allegations of war crimes and violations of international law. Kirillov’s involvement in the use of chemical weapons had been a point of contention, with the UK government and other Western nations calling for accountability.

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) has claimed that Russia used chemical weapons more than 4,800 times under the leadership of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, who headed the Radiation, Biological and Chemical Defence Forces. The SBU’s statement further accuses Kirillov of being directly responsible for these alleged actions, which it says were carried out in violation of international law. These claims add to the controversy surrounding Kirillov’s role in the ongoing conflict, with Ukraine and other nations accusing Russia of engaging in war crimes.

COURTESY: DW News

Moscow has strongly denied the allegations made by Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) regarding the use of chemical weapons. The Russian government has consistently rejected claims that it used such weapons during the ongoing conflict, and it maintains that all its military operations comply with international law. Moscow has also dismissed the accusations against Lt Gen Igor Kirillov, accusing the West and Ukraine of spreading disinformation. Despite these denials, the allegations have further intensified tensions between Russia and Ukraine, with the international community closely monitoring the situation.

Russia’s Investigative Committee (SK) has confirmed that it has “opened a criminal case into the murder of two servicemen” following the explosion that killed Lt Gen Igor Kirillov and his assistant in Moscow. The SK’s statement suggested that the attack was a targeted assassination, and investigations are ongoing to identify those responsible for the remote detonation of the explosive device. The case is being treated as a serious criminal matter, with the Russian authorities working to determine the full circumstances surrounding the deaths of the high-ranking military officials.

The Russian Investigative Committee (SK) confirmed that “investigators, forensic experts, and operational services are working at the scene,” continuing their efforts to determine the circumstances of the attack. This work includes collecting evidence, analyzing the blast site, and seeking to identify those responsible for the assassination of Lt Gen Igor Kirillov and his assistant. The ongoing investigation reflects the gravity of the situation, as the incident has drawn significant attention both in Russia and internationally.

The Russian Investigative Committee (SK) stated, “Investigative actions and operational search activities are being carried out aimed at establishing all the circumstances of the crime.” This indicates that authorities are thoroughly probing the assassination, seeking to uncover all details surrounding the attack and identify those responsible. The continued investigation highlights Russia’s commitment to addressing the incident, which has raised significant concerns both domestically and internationally.

Russian state news agencies reported that the explosive device, which killed General Igor Kirillov and his aide on Ryazansky Avenue, had an explosive force equivalent to 300g (0.7lb) of TNT. This indicates that the attack was carried out with a relatively small but potent bomb, designed for precision targeting. The relatively low weight of the explosive suggests that the perpetrators may have aimed for a discreet and focused attack, minimizing collateral damage while ensuring the target was hit. The use of such a device raises questions about the method and the possible involvement of advanced tactics or resources behind the assassination.

Russian state news agencies added that bomb experts and specialist search dogs had inspected the surrounding area after the explosion and found no other explosives. This suggests that the attack was carefully planned and executed, likely targeting only the intended victims without aiming for broader destruction. The absence of additional explosives may also indicate that the perpetrators sought to avoid further risks to civilians or draw unnecessary attention to the area. However, the methodical search and investigation by authorities underscore the seriousness of the incident and the ongoing efforts to determine the full scope of the attack.

Experts have told BBC Verify that based on images of the scene, the explosion appears to have been caused by an Improvised Explosive Device (IED). These types of homemade bombs are typically made from easily obtainable components, such as nails, glass, or other materials that can maximize damage upon detonation. IEDs are commonly used in asymmetric warfare because they can be constructed covertly and deployed with relative ease. The use of such an explosive in this attack suggests that the perpetrators had specific knowledge of targeting high-ranking officials while minimizing collateral damage to the surrounding area. This kind of attack aligns with methods often employed by groups aiming to create disruption while maintaining a degree of operational secrecy.

Assassinations of senior officials have occurred in Russia before, but attacks within Moscow itself are relatively rare. The capital, being the heart of the Russian government and military, is highly protected, making such targeted killings unusual. However, high-profile incidents have occurred in the past, often linked to political rivalries, internal power struggles, or actions in the broader geopolitical context.

The killing of Lt. Gen. Igor Kirillov, who played a significant role in Russia’s military operations, particularly in relation to chemical weapons, marks a rare instance of such an attack happening in Moscow. The use of a remotely detonated IED further suggests a sophisticated operation, possibly carried out by intelligence agencies or organized groups with the means to execute such high-risk missions within a heavily secured city. This type of event signals a potential shift in tactics used by adversaries to target Russian officials in the heart of their government, which could have significant political and security implications for Moscow.

Liza, a resident who lives just one building away from the site of the blast, told the BBC that although she was not entirely surprised by the incident, the killing of Igor Kirillov was still a “shocking” development. Living so close to the scene of such a high-profile assassination, she expressed her astonishment at the scale of the attack in the heart of Moscow. The targeted killing of a senior military figure, especially someone involved in sensitive military operations like chemical weapons, sent shockwaves through the local community. For many, such incidents serve as a stark reminder of the escalating tensions and the dangers faced by top officials in the ongoing geopolitical conflict.

“It’s one thing reading about it in the news, it feels far, but when it happens next door, that’s completely different and frightening,” Liza told the BBC. The proximity of such a violent event has left many residents in the area shaken, as the line between global conflicts and local safety blurs. For Liza, the attack on a high-ranking Russian military official right in her neighborhood underscored the very real dangers of living in a city at the center of an ongoing international crisis. The feeling of security that many once took for granted has been deeply shaken by the shocking turn of events.

“Until now, [the war] felt as if it was happening a long way off – now someone is dead, here, you can feel the consequences,” Liza said. “Unfortunately, I don’t think things will calm down any time soon.” Her words reflect the growing anxiety felt by many Moscow residents as the war’s reach appears to be closing in on their daily lives. What once seemed like distant conflict now has a tangible presence, with deadly consequences occurring within the city itself. As tensions escalate, there are fears that such attacks may become more frequent, further destabilizing the region.

Several other local residents said they initially thought the loud noise they heard had come from a construction site. “It was only later that we realized it was something much more serious,” one neighbor remarked. “The explosion was so sudden and forceful, it shook the whole building.” The residents expressed shock and concern, as the blast, which had initially seemed like a routine noise, quickly became a stark reminder of the ongoing violence linked to the war. The proximity of the attack left many feeling vulnerable, wondering whether further incidents could follow in the heart of Moscow.

Student Mikhail Mashkov, who lives in the building next door, told the AFP news agency he was woken up by a “very loud explosion noise,” initially thinking “something fell at the construction site.” However, upon looking outside, he quickly realized the gravity of the situation. “When I saw the emergency vehicles and police cordoning off the area, I understood that something much worse had happened,” Mashkov added. His account reflects the shock and confusion experienced by many residents, who were unaware of the blast’s true nature until they saw the authorities respond.

Olga Bogomolova, another local resident, shared a similar experience, initially believing a container had fallen at the construction site nearby. However, she quickly realized that it was “a very strong explosion” when she noticed “broken windows” and the intensity of the blast. “That’s when I understood it was something else,” she said. Her account, like others in the area, highlights the sudden and alarming nature of the attack, leaving residents shaken as they grasped the severity of the situation unfolding just outside their homes.

People living in the area expressed a deep sense of shock and disbelief following the explosion that killed General Igor Kirillov and his aide. Many were startled by the loud blast, initially mistaking it for a construction accident, only to realize its deadly nature moments later. Local residents described the incident as unsettling, with some saying that while the war had felt distant before, the attack brought its harsh realities closer to home. “Until now, it felt like it was happening far away – now someone is dead, here, you can feel the consequences,” one resident said. The blast left the community reeling, underscoring the profound impact of the war on ordinary lives, even within the Russian capital.

Even after nearly three years since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine, for many Muscovites, the war still feels like something distant — a reality they experience through news reports, television broadcasts, or phone updates. Despite the ongoing conflict, daily life in the Russian capital has largely continued as normal for most residents. The death of a high-ranking military official in such a direct and violent manner has suddenly brought the war much closer to home. For many, this event shatters the perception of safety and distance, forcing them to confront the escalating risks and consequences of the war in a way they never had before. The attack on Kirillov serves as a stark reminder that the conflict is not just an abstraction or a headline, but a violent and personal reality with far-reaching consequences.

The killing of a Russian general in Moscow is a stark reminder that the war in Ukraine is not just a distant conflict but one with tangible, immediate consequences that are increasingly felt on Russian soil. This high-profile assassination signals that the repercussions of the war are no longer confined to battlefields far away; they are now reaching the heart of Russia itself. For many in Moscow, this tragic event brings home the brutal reality of the conflict, challenging the perception that it is something happening “over there.” The attack on General Kirillov, a high-ranking and controversial military figure, highlights the intensifying risks and the potential for further escalation, making it clear that the war’s impact is much closer to home than ever before.

Under UK sanctions, General Kirillov faced an assets freeze and a travel ban due to his involvement in overseeing Russia’s chemical weapons programs. In May, the US State Department accused Russia of using chemical weapons as a method of warfare in Ukraine, citing violations of international laws prohibiting such tactics. US officials specifically pointed to the use of chloropicrin, a choking agent, which was allegedly deployed to gain “battlefield advantages” over Ukrainian forces.

Ukraine’s Security Service (SBU) has also claimed that Russian forces utilized drones to drop chemical weapons on Ukrainian soldiers, exacerbating the toll of the war. Ukrainian Colonel Artem Vlasiuk reported that over 2,000 Ukrainian service members were treated in hospitals for chemical poisoning, with three fatalities attributed to the attacks.

Despite these claims, the Kremlin has repeatedly dismissed the accusations as “baseless,” continuing to deny any use of chemical warfare on Ukrainian soil. These developments add another layer of complexity and severity to the ongoing conflict, further highlighting the brutal tactics employed in this war.

Kirillov, who served in various roles within Russia’s military related to hazardous materials, was notably appointed as the head of the Directorate of the Chief of the Radiation, Chemical and Biological Defence Troops in 2017. His unit was responsible for overseeing Russia’s chemical and biological defense operations. Given his leadership position in this area, his death is seen as a significant blow to Russia’s military capabilities.

In response to his assassination, a spokesman for UK Prime Minister Sir Keir Starmer remarked that the UK would not mourn the death of an individual who had been involved in “propagating an illegal invasion” and “imposing suffering and death” on the Ukrainian people. This reflects the broader international sentiment, particularly in countries that have strongly opposed Russia’s actions in Ukraine.

Kirillov’s death is part of a broader pattern of escalating targeting of senior Russian officials by Ukraine. With nearly three years of conflict, Ukraine’s Security Services seem to have increased their efforts to target high-ranking Russian individuals, signaling a shift towards more direct forms of retaliation. The killing follows the assassination of prominent Russian weapons expert Mikhail Shatsky, reportedly carried out by Ukraine’s military intelligence service, and the deaths of senior Russian naval officer Valery Trankovsky and Russian prison boss Sergei Yevsyukov, who died in recent weeks from car bomb explosions in Russian-occupied Ukraine. These incidents underscore the growing intensity of the conflict as both sides continue to strike at each other’s leadership and military infrastructure.

References

  1. ^ “Law of Ukraine “On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language”: The status of Ukrainian and minority languages”. 20 October 2020.
  2. Jump up to:a b “Population by ethnic nationality, 1 January, year”ukrcensus.gov.ua. Ukrainian Office of Statistics. Archived from the original on 17 December 2011. Retrieved 17 April 2010.
  3. ^ Особливості Релігійного І Церковно-Релігійного Самовизначення Українських Громадян: Тенденції 2010–2018 [Features of Religious and Church – Religious Self-Determination of Ukrainian Citizens: Trends 2010–2018] (PDF) (in Ukrainian), Kyiv: Razumkov Center in collaboration with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches, 22 April 2018, pp. 12, 13, 16, 31, archived (PDF) from the original on 26 April 2018
    Sample of 2,018 respondents aged 18 years and over, interviewed 23–28 March 2018 in all regions of Ukraine except Crimea and the occupied territories of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions.
  4. ^ “Ukraine”The World Factbook. Central Intelligence Agency. 23 March 2022.
  5. ^ Jhariya, M.K.; Meena, R.S.; Banerjee, A. (2021). Ecological Intensification of Natural Resources for Sustainable Agriculture. Springer Singapore. p. 40. ISBN 978-981-334-203-3. Retrieved 31 March 2022.
  6. Jump up to:a b c d e “World Economic Outlook Database, October 2024 Edition. (Ukraine)”www.imf.orgInternational Monetary Fund. 22 October 2024. Retrieved 26 October 2024.
  7. ^ “GINI index (World Bank estimate) – Ukraine”data.worldbank.orgWorld Bank. Retrieved 12 August 2021.
  8. ^ “Human Development Report 2023/24” (PDF). United Nations Development Programme. 13 March 2024. Retrieved 13 March 2024.
  9. ^ Net, Korrespondent (18 October 2011). Рішення Ради: Україна 30 жовтня перейде на зимовий час [Rada Decision: Ukraine will change to winter time on 30 October] (in Ukrainian). korrespondent.net. Retrieved 31 October 2011.
  10. ^ “Ukraine country profile”BBC News. 1 March 2022. Retrieved 25 March 2022.
  11. Jump up to:a b “Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine”Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. Archived from the original on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  12. Jump up to:a b Beliakova, Polina; Tecott Metz, Rachel (17 March 2023). “The Surprising Success of U.S. Military Aid to Ukraine”Foreign Affairs. Retrieved 13 April 2023.
  13. Jump up to:a b Dorfman, Zach (28 April 2022). “In closer ties to Ukraine, U.S. officials long saw promise and peril”Yahoo News. Retrieved 13 April 2023.
  14. ^ “Ukraine – Trade – European Commission”ec.europa.eu. 2 May 2023.
  15. ^ “What is wrong with the Ukrainian economy?”Atlantic Council. 26 April 2019. Retrieved 23 August 2020.
  16. ^ Dlugy, Yana (1 July 2022). “Corruption in Ukraine”New York Times. Retrieved 15 September 2022.
  17. ^ “Ukraine becomes world’s third biggest grain exporter in 2011 – minister” (Press release). Black Sea Grain. 20 January 2012. Archived from the original on 31 December 2013. Retrieved 31 December 2013.
  18. ^ “World Trade Report 2013”. World Trade Organization. 2013. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
  19. ^ Kramer, Andrew E.; Bilefsky, Dan (30 September 2022). “Ukraine submits an application to join NATO, with big hurdles ahead”The New York TimesISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 1 October 2022.
  20. ^ “Linguistic divides: Johnson: Is there a single Ukraine?”The Economist. 5 February 2014. Retrieved 12 May 2014.
  21. ^ “Ukraine – Definition”. Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Retrieved 4 May 2012.
  22. ^ “Why Did “The Ukraine” Become Just “Ukraine”?”www.mentalfloss.com. 3 January 2013.
  23. ^ “Ukraine or the Ukraine: Why do some country names have ‘the’?”BBC News. 7 June 2012.
  24. ^ “The “the” is gone”The Ukrainian Weekly. 8 December 1991. Archived from the original on 14 October 2017. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  25. ^ Adam Taylor (9 December 2013). “Why Ukraine Isn’t ‘The Ukraine,’ And Why That Matters Now”Business Insider. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  26. ^ “‘Ukraine’ or ‘the Ukraine’? It’s more controversial than you think”Washington Post. 25 March 2014. Retrieved 11 August 2016.
  27. ^ Geoghegan, Tom (7 June 2012). “Ukraine or the Ukraine: Why do some country names have ‘the’?”BBC News MagazineBBC.
  28. Jump up to:a b “Національний перелік елементів нематеріальної культурної спадщини України”mcip.gov.ua (in Ukrainian). 24 July 2024. Retrieved 28 July 2024.
  29. ^ Gibbons, Ann (10 June 2015). “Nomadic herders left a strong genetic mark on Europeans and Asians”Science. AAAS.
  30. ^ R. Garba, V. Usyk, L. Ylä-Mella, J. Kameník, K. Stübner, J. Lachner, G. Rugel, F. Veselovský, N. Gerasimenko, A. I. R. Herries, J. Kučera, M. F. Knudsen, J. D. Jansen (6 March 2024). “East-to-west human dispersal into Europe 1.4 million years ago”Nature627 (8005): 805–810. Bibcode:2024Natur.627..805Gdoi:10.1038/s41586-024-07151-3ISSN 0028-0836PMID 38448591S2CID 268262450.
  31. ^ Prat, Sandrine; Péan, Stéphane C.; Crépin, Laurent; Drucker, Dorothée G.; Puaud, Simon J.; Valladas, Hélène; Lázničková-Galetová, Martina; Plicht, Johannes van der; Yanevich, Alexander (17 June 2011). “The Oldest Anatomically Modern Humans from Far Southeast Europe: Direct Dating, Culture and Behavior”PLOS ONE6 (6): e20834. Bibcode:2011PLoSO…620834Pdoi:10.1371/journal.pone.0020834PMC 3117838PMID 21698105.
  32. ^ Jennifer Carpenter (20 June 2011). “Early human fossils unearthed in Ukraine”. BBC. Retrieved 21 June 2011.
  33. ^ “Mystery of the domestication of the horse solved: Competing theories reconciled”. sciencedaily (sourced from the University of Cambridge). 7 May 2012. Retrieved 12 June 2014.
  34. ^ Matossian, Mary Kilbourne (8 May 1997). Shaping World HistoryRoutledge. p. 43. ISBN 9780765600622.
  35. ^ “What We Theorize – When and Where Did Domestication Occur”International Museum of the Horse. Archived from the original on 23 July 2013. Retrieved 12 December 2010.
  36. ^ “Horsey-aeology, Binary Black Holes, Tracking Red Tides, Fish Re-evolution, Walk Like a Man, Fact or Fiction”Quirks and Quarks Podcast with Bob Macdonald. CBC Radio. 7 March 2009. Archived from the original on 7 October 2014. Retrieved 18 September 2010.
  37. ^ Balter, Michael (13 February 2015). “Mysterious Indo-European homeland may have been in the steppes of Ukraine and Russia”Science.
  38. ^ Haak, Wolfgang; Lazaridis, Iosif; Patterson, Nick; Rohland, Nadin; Mallick, Swapan; Llamas, Bastien; Brandt, Guido; Nordenfelt, Susanne; Harney, Eadaoin; Stewardson, Kristin; Fu, Qiaomei (11 June 2015). “Massive migration from the steppe was a source for Indo-European languages in Europe”Nature522 (7555): 207–211. arXiv:1502.02783Bibcode:2015Natur.522..207Hdoi:10.1038/nature14317ISSN 0028-0836PMC 5048219PMID 25731166.
  39. ^ “Scythian”Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  40. ^ “Scythian: Ancient People”Online Britannica. 20 July 1998. Archived from the original on 27 March 2017. Retrieved 26 October 2017.
  41. ^ “Khazar | Origin, History, Religion, & Facts”Encyclopædia Britannica. 12 May 2023.
  42. ^ Magocsi, Paul Robert (16 July 1996). A History of UkraineUniversity of Toronto Press. pp. 39–42. ISBN 9780802078209. Retrieved 16 July 2018 – via Google Books. Whether the Antes created a state structure or existed simply as tribal groupings, their influence was broken after the arrival of the Avars during the second half of the sixth century. With the Avar presence, the Antes disappeared; they are last mentioned in historical sources at the beginning of the seventh century (602).
  43. ^ Belyaev, A. (13 September 2012). “Русь и варяги. Евразийский исторический взгляд”Центр Льва Гумилёва (in Russian). Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  44. Jump up to:a b c “Kievan Rus”. The Columbia Encyclopedia (6 ed.). 2001–2007. Archived from the original on 19 August 2000. Retrieved 8 January 2014.
  45. ^ A Geography of Russia and Its Neighbors ISBN 978-1-606-23920-9 p. 69
  46. ^ Kubicek, Paul (2008). The History of Ukraine. Westport: Greenwood Press. pp. 20–22. ISBN 9780313349201.
  47. ^ Martin, Janet (6 April 2009). Gleason, Abbott (ed.). A Companion to Russian HistoryJohn Wiley & Sons. pp. 37–40. ISBN 978-1-4443-0842-6.
  48. ^ The Dynasty of Chernigov, 1146–1246 ISBN 978-0-521-82442-2 pp. 117–118
  49. Jump up to:a b c “Ukraine”CIA World Factbook. 13 December 2007. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  50. ^ Power Politics in Kievan Rus’: Vladimir Monomakh and His Dynasty, 1054–1246 ISBN 0-888-44202-5 pp. 195–196
  51. ^ Carter V. Findley, The Turks in World History (Oxford University Press, October 2004) ISBN 0-19-517726-6
  52. ^ “The Destruction of Kiev”University of Toronto’s Research Repository. Archived from the original on 19 August 2016. Retrieved 3 January 2008.
  53. ^ “Roman Mstyslavych”encyclopediaofukraine.com.
  54. ^ Ougrin, Dennis; Ougrin, Anastasia (2020). One Hundred Years in Galicia: Events That Shaped Ukraine and Eastern Europe. Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. p. 11. ISBN 9781527558816.
  55. ^ Rowell, C. S. (1994). Lithuania Ascending: A Pagan Empire Within East-Central Europe, 1295–1345. Cambridge Studies in Medieval Life and Thought: Fourth Series. Cambridge University PressISBN 9780521450119.
  56. ^ “Genuezskiye kolonii v Odesskoy oblasti – Biznes-portal Izmaila” Генуэзские колонии в Одесской области – Бизнес-портал Измаила [Genoese colonies in the Odesa region – Izmail’s business portal] (in Russian). 5 February 2018. Archived from the original on 5 February 2018. Retrieved 17 November 2020.
  57. ^ Plokhy, Serhii (2017). The Gates of Europe: A History of Ukraine. New York: Basic BooksISBN 9780465050918.
  58. ^ Radio Lemberg. “A History of Ukraine. Episode 33. The Crimean Khanate and Its Permanent Invasions of Ukraine”radiolemberg.com. Archived from the original on 12 May 2020. Retrieved 26 September 2019.
  59. ^ Kizilov, Mikhail (2007). “Slaves, Money Lenders, and Prisoner Guards: The Jews and the Trade in Slaves and Captives in the Crimean Khanate”Journal of Jewish Studies58 (2): 189–210. doi:10.18647/2730/JJS-2007ISSN 0022-2097.
  60. ^ İnalcik, Halil (1979). “Servile Labour in the Ottoman Empire”. In Ascher, Abraham; Király, Béla K.; Halasi-Kun, Tibor (eds.). The Mutual Effects of the Islamic and Judeo-Christian Worlds: The East European Pattern. New York, NY: Brooklyn College Press. pp. 25–43. ISBN 978-0-93088800-8. Archived from the original on 4 May 2017.
  61. ^ Subtelny, pp. 92–93
  62. ^ Krupnytsky B. and Zhukovsky A. “Zaporizhia, The”Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  63. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine – The Cossacks”Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 21 October 2015.
  64. ^ Matsuki, Eizo (2009). “The Crimean Tatars and their Russian-Captive Slaves” (PDF). econ.hit-u.ac.jpHitotsubashi University (Mediterranean Studies Group). Archived from the original (PDF) on 5 June 2013.
  65. ^ “Poland”Encyclopædia Britannica (fee required). Archived from the original on 11 October 2007. Retrieved 12 September 2007.
  66. ^ Subtelny, pp. 123–124
  67. ^ Okinshevych, Lev; Arkadii Zhukovsky (1989). “Hetman state”Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Vol. 2.
  68. Jump up to:a b Magocsi, Paul Robert (2010). A History of Ukraine: The Land and Its Peoples, Second Edition. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. pp. 255–263. ISBN 9781442640856.
  69. ^ Bondar, Andriy (7 August 2023). “Baturyn, a Small Town With a Grand History”Kyiv Post.
  70. ^ Hardaway, Ashley (2011). Ukraine. US: Other Places Publishing. p. 98. ISBN 9781935850045.
  71. ^ Makuch, Andrij; Zasenko, Oleksa Eliseyovich; Yerofeyev, Ivan Alekseyevich; Hajda, Lubomyr A.; Stebelsky, Ihor; Kryzhanivsky, Stepan Andriyovich (13 December 2023). “Ukraine under direct imperial Russian rule”Encyclopædia Britannica Online. Retrieved 11 December 2023.
  72. Jump up to:a b Remy, Johannes (March–June 2007). “The Valuev Circular and Censorship of Ukrainian Publications in the Russian Empire (1863–1876): Intention and Practice”. Canadian Slavonic Papers47 (1/2): 87–110. doi:10.1080/00085006.2007.11092432JSTOR 40871165S2CID 128680044.
  73. ^ “The First Ukrainian Political Program: Mykhailo Drahomanov’s Introduction to Hromadaurl”www.ditext.com. Retrieved 26 March 2021.
  74. ^ “Shevchenko, Taras”encyclopediaofukraine.com. Retrieved 1 November 2017.
  75. ^ Magocsi, Paul Robert (16 July 2018). The Roots of Ukrainian Nationalism: Galicia as Ukraine’s PiedmontUniversity of Toronto Pressdoi:10.3138/9781442682252ISBN 9781442682252S2CID 128063569.
  76. ^ Kravčenko, Volodymyr Vasylʹovyč (2022). The Ukrainian-Russian borderland: history versus geography. Montreal & Kingston London Chicago: McGill-Queen’s University Press. pp. 26–35. ISBN 978-0-2280-1199-6.
  77. ^ “Industrial Revolution | Key Facts”Encyclopedia Britannica. Retrieved 30 July 2022.
  78. ^ “On the industrial history of Ukraine”European Route of Industrial Heritage. Retrieved 30 July 2022.
  79. ^ Satzewich, Vic (2002). The Ukrainian diaspora. London: Routledge. pp. 26–48. ISBN 0-415-29658-7OCLC 252946784.
  80. ^ Münz, Rainer; Ohliger, Rainer (2003). Diasporas and Ethnic Migrants: German, Israel, and Post-Soviet Successor States in Comparative PerspectiveRoutledge. p. 164. ISBN 0-7146-5232-6 – via Google Books.
  81. ^ Subtelny, Orest (2000). Ukraine: a historyUniversity of Toronto Press. p. 262. ISBN 0-8020-8390-0 – via Google Books.
  82. ^ Smele, Jonathan D. (2015). Historical Dictionary of the Russian Civil Wars, 1916–1926Rowman & Littlefield. p. 476. ISBN 978-1-4422-5281-3 – via Google Books.
  83. ^ Subtelny, Orest (2000). Ukraine: A HistoryUniversity of Toronto Press. pp. 340–344ISBN 978-0-8020-8390-6.
  84. ^ Nahylo, Bohdan (1999). The Ukrainian Resurgence. London: Hurst. p. 8. ISBN 9781850651680OCLC 902410832.
  85. ^ “Ukraine – World War I and the struggle for independence”Encyclopædia Britannica. 20 May 2023.
  86. ^ “The Famine of 1920–1924”The Norka – a German Colony in Russia. Archived from the original on 13 January 2015. Retrieved 4 March 2015.
  87. ^ “Famine of 1921–3”Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 3 March 2015.
  88. ^ Timothy Snyder. (2003)The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943, The Past and Present Society: Oxford University Press. p. 202
  89. ^ Timothy Snyder. (2005). Sketches from a Secret War: A Polish Artist’s Mission to Liberate Soviet Ukraine. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 32–33, 152–162
  90. ^ Revyuk, Emil (8 July 1931). “Polish Atrocities in Ukraine”Svoboda Press – via Google Books.
  91. ^ Skalmowski, Wojciech (8 July 2003). For East is East: Liber Amicorum Wojciech Skalmowski. Peeters Publishers. ISBN 9789042912984 – via Google Books.
  92. ^ Subtelny, p. 380
  93. ^ Service, Robert (1997). A History of Twentieth-Century Russia. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. pp. 124–125. ISBN 0674403487.
  94. ^ Christopher Gilley, ‘The “Change of Signposts” in the Ukrainian emigration: Mykhailo Hrushevskyi and the Foreign Delegation of the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries’, Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Vol. 54, 2006, No. 3, pp. 345–74
  95. ^ “Ukraine remembers famine horror”BBC News. 24 November 2007.
  96. ^ Wheatcroft, Stephen G. (2007). “Agency and Terror: Yevdokimov and Mass Killing in Stalin’s Great Terror”. Australian Journal of Politics and History53 (1): 20–43. doi:10.1111/j.1467-8497.2007.00440.xISSN 0004-9522. Full text in Ebsco. See also Robert Conquest, The Harvest of Sorrow: Soviet collectivization and the terror-famine (1986). Mark B. Tauger, “The 1932 Harvest and the Famine of 1933” Slavic Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 (Spring, 1991), pp. 70–89, notes the harvest was unusually poor. online in JSTORR. W. Davies, Mark B. Tauger, S. G. Wheatcroft, “Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932–1933”, Slavic Review, Vol. 54, No. 3 (Autumn, 1995), pp. 642–657 online in JSTOR; Michael Ellman. “Stalin and the Soviet famine of 1932–33 Revisited”, Europe-Asia Studies, Volume 59, Issue 4 June 2007, pages 663–693.
  97. ^ Wilson, p. 17
  98. ^ Subtelny, p. 487
  99. ^ “Treaty of Peace with Romania : February 10, 1947”Avalon Project. Retrieved 25 September 2022.
  100. ^ Roberts, p. 102
  101. ^ Boshyk, p. 89
  102. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine – World War II and its aftermath”Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 27 February 2010. Retrieved 28 December 2007.
  103. ^ Berkhoff, Karel Cornelis (April 2004). Harvest of despair: life and death in Ukraine under Nazi ruleHarvard University Press. p. 164.
  104. Jump up to:a b “World wars”Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
  105. ^ Subtelny, Orest (1988). Ukraine: A History. University of Toronto Press. p. 410. ISBN 9781442609914 – via Google Books.
  106. ^ Vedeneev, Dmitry (7 March 2015). “Військово-польова жандармерія – спеціальний орган Української повстанської армії” [Military Field Gendarmerie – special body of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army]. Archived from the original on 7 March 2015. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  107. ^ Snyder, Timothy (24 February 2010). “A Fascist Hero in Democratic Kiev”The New York Review of Books. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  108. ^ Motyka, Grzegorz (2002). “Polska reakcja na działania UPA – skala i przebieg akcji odwetowych” [Polish reaction to the actions of the UPA – the scale and course of retaliation]. In Motyka, GrzegorzLibionka, Dariusz (eds.). Antypolska Akcja OUN-UPA, 1943–1944, Fakty i Interpretacje [Anti-Polish Action OUN-UPA, 1943–1944, Facts and Interpretations] (PDF). Warsaw: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 August 2014.
  109. ^ Snyder, Timothy (2003). “The Causes of Ukrainian-Polish Ethnic Cleansing 1943”Past & Present (179): 197–234. doi:10.1093/past/179.1.197ISSN 0031-2746JSTOR 3600827.
  110. ^ Piotrowski pp. 352–354
  111. ^ Weiner pp. 127–237
  112. ^ Kalb, Marvin (21 September 2015). Imperial Gamble: Putin, Ukraine, and the New Cold War. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 978-0-8157-2665-4OCLC 1058866168.
  113. ^ “Losses of the Ukrainian Nation, p. 2”Peremoga.gov.ua (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 15 May 2005. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  114. ^ Subtelny, p. 476
  115. ^ Magocsi, p. 635
  116. ^ “Ukrainian Insurgent Army”Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 20 December 2007.
  117. ^ Weinberg, p. 264
  118. ^ “Losses of the Ukrainian Nation”Peremoga.gov.ua (in Ukrainian). p. 1. Archived from the original on 25 October 2007. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  119. Jump up to:a b Stanislav Kulchytskyi (1 October 2004). “Demohrafichni vtraty Ukrayiny v khkh stolitti” Демографічні втрати України в хх столітті [Demographic losses of Ukraine in the 20 century] (in Ukrainian). Kyiv, Ukraine: Dzerkalo Tyzhnia. Retrieved 20 January 2021.[permanent dead link]
  120. ^ Smale, Alison (27 January 2014). “Shedding Light on a Vast Toll of Jews Killed Away From the Death Camps”The New York Times. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
  121. Jump up to:a b “Losses of the Ukrainian Nation, p. 7”Peremoga.gov.ua (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 15 May 2005. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  122. ^ Overy, p. 518
  123. Jump up to:a b Кривошеев Г. Ф., Россия и СССР в войнах XX века: потери вооруженных сил. Статистическое исследование (Krivosheev G. F., Russia and the USSR in the wars of the 20th century: losses of the Armed Forces. A Statistical Study) (in Russian)
  124. ^ “Вихідні та святкові дні 2022 року в Україні/Holidays 2022 in Ukraine”Consulate General of Ukraine in New York (in Ukrainian). 29 December 2021. Archived from the original on 4 August 2022. Retrieved 31 July 2022.
  125. ^ “Ukraine: World War II and its aftermath”Encyclopædia Britannica (fee required). Archived from the original on 29 September 2007. Retrieved 12 September 2007.
  126. ^ “Activities of the Member States – Ukraine”. United Nations. Retrieved 17 January 2011.
  127. ^ “United Nations”. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 22 September 2014. Voting procedures and the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council were finalized at the Yalta Conference in 1945 when Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that the veto would not prevent discussions by the Security Council. Roosevelt agreed to General Assembly membership for Ukraine and Byelorussia while reserving the right, which was never exercised, to seek two more votes for the United States.
  128. ^ “United Nations”. U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 22 September 2014. Voting procedures and the veto power of permanent members of the Security Council were finalized at the Yalta Conference in 1945 when Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that the veto would not prevent discussions by the Security Council. In April 1945, new U.S. President Truman agreed to General Assembly membership for Ukraine and Byelorussia while reserving the right, which was never exercised, to seek two more votes for the United States.
  129. ^ Malynovska, Olena (14 June 2006). “Migration and migration policy in Ukraine”. Archived from the original on 23 September 2013.
  130. ^ “The Transfer of Crimea to Ukraine”. International Committee for Crimea. July 2005. Retrieved 25 March 2007.
  131. ^ Cook, Bernard A.; Cook, Bernard Anthony (2001). Europe Since 1945: An Encyclopedia. Taylor & Francis. ISBN 978-0-8153-4058-4.
  132. ^ “Ukraine – The last years of Stalin’s rule”Encyclopædia Britannica (fee required). Archived from the original on 15 January 2008. Retrieved 28 December 2007.
  133. ^ Magocsi, p. 644
  134. ^ Magocsi, 1996, p. 704
  135. ^ Remy, Johannes (1996). “‘Sombre anniversary’ of worst nuclear disaster in history – Chernobyl: 10th anniversary”UN Chronicle. Find articles. Archived from the original on 28 June 2012. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  136. ^ Geller, Mikhail (1991). Седьмой секретарь: Блеск и нищета Михаила Горбачева (1st Russian ed.). London. p. 352=356. ISBN 1-870128-72-9OCLC 24243579.
  137. ^ “Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine”Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 16 July 1990. Archived from the original on 27 September 2007. Retrieved 12 September 2007.
  138. ^ “Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Resolution On Declaration of Independence of Ukraine”Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. 24 August 1991. Archived from the original on 30 September 2007. Retrieved 12 September 2007.
  139. ^ Nohlen & Stöver, p1985
  140. ^ “Soviet Leaders Recall ‘Inevitable’ Breakup Of Soviet Union”RadioFreeEurope. 8 December 2006. Retrieved 12 September 2007.
  141. ^ Лащенко, Олександр (26 November 2020). “”Україні не потрібно виходити із СНД – вона ніколи не була і не є зараз членом цієї структури””Радіо Свобода.
  142. ^ Solodkov, Artem (27 December 2021). “Период распада: последний декабрь Союза. 26 декабря 1991 года”РБК (in Russian). Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  143. ^ Shen, p. 41
  144. Jump up to:a b c Sutela, Pekka. “The Underachiever: Ukraine’s Economy Since 1991”Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Retrieved 3 August 2022.
  145. ^ “Ukrainian GDP (PPP)”World Economic Outlook Database, October 2007International Monetary Fund (IMF). Retrieved 10 March 2008.
  146. ^ “Can Ukraine Avert a Financial Meltdown?”World Bank. June 1998. Archived from the original on 12 July 2000. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  147. ^ Figliuoli, Lorenzo; Lissovolik, Bogdan (31 August 2002). “The IMF and Ukraine: What Really Happened”International Monetary Fund. Archived from the original on 17 October 2002. Retrieved 16 December 2007.
  148. ^ “Дефолт 1998 года: 10 лет спустя”ukraine.segodnya.ua (in Russian). 11 July 2022. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  149. ^ “The stable crisis. Ukraine’s economy three years after the Euromaidan”OSW Centre for Eastern Studies. 5 April 2017. Retrieved 3 August 2022.
  150. ^ “War to cause Ukraine economy to shrink nearly a third this year – EBRD report – Ukraine”ReliefWeb. 10 May 2022. Retrieved 3 August 2022.
  151. ^ Dickinson, Peter (19 June 2021). “Ukraine’s choice: corruption or growth”Atlantic Council. Retrieved 3 August 2022.
  152. ^ Aslund, Anders; Aslund, Anders (Autumn 1995). “Eurasia Letter: Ukraine’s Turnaround”. Foreign Policy100 (100): 125–143. doi:10.2307/1149308JSTOR 1149308.
  153. ^ Mykhnenko, Vlad (15 March 2020). “Causes and Consequences of the War in Eastern Ukraine: An Economic Geography Perspective”Europe-Asia Studies72 (3): 528–560. doi:10.1080/09668136.2019.1684447ISSN 0966-8136S2CID 214438848.
  154. ^ Ludvigsson, Jonas F.; Loboda, Andrii (July 2022). “Systematic review of health and disease in Ukrainian children highlights poor child health and challenges for those treating refugees”Acta Paediatrica111 (7): 1341–1353. doi:10.1111/apa.16370ISSN 0803-5253PMC 9324783PMID 35466444.
  155. ^ “Impact of war on the dynamics of COVID-19 in Ukraine – Ukraine”reliefweb.int. 17 April 2022. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  156. ^ Shevel, Oxana (1 September 2015). “The parliamentary elections in Ukraine, October 2014”Electoral Studies39: 159–163. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.03.015ISSN 0261-3794.
  157. ^ Kuzio, Taras (1 October 2005). “Neither East Nor West: Ukraine’s Security Policy Under Kuchma”Problems of Post-Communism52 (5): 59–68. doi:10.1080/10758216.2005.11052215ISSN 1075-8216S2CID 157151441.
  158. ^ “”Хунта” и “террористы”: война слов Москвы и Киева”BBC News Русская служба (in Russian). 25 April 2014. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  159. ^ “Putin accuses US of orchestrating 2014 ‘coup’ in Ukraine”Al Jazeera. 22 June 2021. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  160. ^ “The Maidan in 2014 is a coup d’etat: a review of Italian and German pro-Russian media”. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  161. ^ Kuzio, Taras (4 May 2018). “Euromaidan revolution, Crimea and Russia–Ukraine war: why it is time for a review of Ukrainian–Russian studies”Eurasian Geography and Economics59 (3–4): 529–553. doi:10.1080/15387216.2019.1571428ISSN 1538-7216S2CID 159414642.
  162. ^ Hosaka, Sanshiro (3 July 2019). “Putin the ‘Peacemaker’?—Russian Reflexive Control During the 2014 August Invasion of Ukraine”The Journal of Slavic Military Studies32 (3): 324–346. doi:10.1080/13518046.2019.1646950ISSN 1351-8046S2CID 210591255.
  163. ^ Potočňák, Adam; Mares, Miroslav (16 May 2022). “Donbas Conflict: How Russia’s Trojan Horse Failed and Forced Moscow to Alter Its Strategy”Problems of Post-Communism70 (4): 341–351. doi:10.1080/10758216.2022.2066005ISSN 1075-8216S2CID 248838806.
  164. ^ Lock, Samantha; Singh, Maanvi; Oladipo, Gloria; Michael, Chris; Jones, Sam (24 February 2022). “Ukraine-Russia crisis live news: Putin declares operation to ‘demilitarise’ Ukraine – latest updates”The GuardianISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 24 February 2022.
  165. ^ Gutiérrez, Pablo; Kirk, Ashley (21 February 2023). “A year of war: how Russian forces have been pushed back in Ukraine”the Guardian.
  166. ^ Lonas, Lexi (12 May 2022). “5 ways Russia has failed in its invasion”The Hill. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  167. ^ “Ukraine Country Report”EU-LISTCO. 11 December 2019. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  168. Jump up to:a b “EU awards Ukraine and Moldova candidate status”BBC News. 23 June 2022. Retrieved 4 August 2022.
  169. ^ “Top Ukrainian officials quit in anti-corruption drive”BBC News. 24 January 2023. Retrieved 25 January 2023.
  170. ^ “Ukraine – Relief”Encyclopædia Britannica (fee required). Archived from the original on 15 January 2008. Retrieved 27 December 2007.
  171. ^ Tabuchi, Hiroko (2 March 2022). “Before Invasion, Ukraine’s Lithium Wealth Was Drawing Global Attention”The New York TimesISSN 0362-4331. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  172. Jump up to:a b c d “Mining – UkraineInvest”. 8 May 2020. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  173. ^ Nature, Preferred by. “Ukraine Timber Risk Profile”NEPCon – Preferred by Nature. Archived from the original on 26 November 2020. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  174. ^ Overview of soil conditions of arable land in Ukraine – Study case for steppe and forest-steppe zonesFood and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations. 2020. doi:10.4060/ca7761enISBN 978-92-5-132215-4S2CID 242588829. Retrieved 7 March 2022.
  175. ^ “Ukraine invasion: rapid overview of environmental issues”CEOBS. 25 February 2022. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  176. ^ Bank, World (January 2016). “Ukraine Country Environmental Analysis”World Bankdoi:10.1596/24971hdl:10986/24971.
  177. ^ “Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)”www.unicef.org. Archived from the original on 3 March 2022. Retrieved 3 March 2022.
  178. ^ “Environmental issues in Ukraine”. Naturvernforbundet. 16 July 2017. Archived from the original on 6 March 2022. Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  179. ^ “Ukrainians hope to rebuild greener country after Russia’s war causes ‘ecocide'”The Independent. 19 March 2022. Retrieved 7 June 2023.
  180. ^ “Ten-Step plan to address environmental impact of war in Ukraine” PAX for Peace. 24 February 2023. Accessed 30 April 2023.
  181. ^ “One Year In, Russia’s War on Ukraine Has Inflicted $51 Billion in Environmental Damage” e360.yale.edu. 22 February 2023. Accessed 30 April 2023.
  182. ^ “The Environmental Cost of the War in Ukraine”International Relations Review. 2 June 2023. Retrieved 7 June 2023.
  183. ^ Graham-Harrison, Emma (27 August 2022). “Toxins in soil, blasted forests – Ukraine counts cost of Putin’s ‘ecocide'”The ObserverISSN 0029-7712. Retrieved 7 June 2023.
  184. ^ “One Year In, Russia’s War on Ukraine Has Inflicted $51 Billion in Environmental Damage”Yale E360. Retrieved 1 July 2023.
  185. ^ “Ukraine”Country Pasture/Forage Resource ProfilesFood and Agriculture Organization. Archived from the original on 6 October 2016. Retrieved 8 August 2016.
  186. Jump up to:a b c “Ukraine – Climate”Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 20 October 2015.
  187. ^ Didovets, Iulii; Krysanova, Valentina; Hattermann, Fred Fokko; del Rocío Rivas López, María; Snizhko, Sergiy; Müller Schmied, Hannes (1 December 2020). “Climate change impact on water availability of main river basins in Ukraine”Journal of Hydrology: Regional Studies32: 100761. Bibcode:2020JHyRS..3200761Ddoi:10.1016/j.ejrh.2020.100761ISSN 2214-5818S2CID 230613418.
  188. ^ Skrypnyk, Andriy; Zhemoyda, Oleksandr; Klymenko, Nataliia; Galaieva, Liudmyla; Koval, Tatiana (1 March 2021). “Econometric Analysis of the Impact of Climate Change on the Sustainability of Agricultural Production in Ukraine”Journal of Ecological Engineering22 (3): 275–288. doi:10.12911/22998993/132945ISSN 2299-8993S2CID 233801987.
  189. ^ “World Bank Climate Change Knowledge Portal”climateknowledgeportal.worldbank.org.
  190. ^ Dinerstein, Eric; et al. (2017). “An Ecoregion-Based Approach to Protecting Half the Terrestrial Realm”BioScience67 (6): 534–545. doi:10.1093/biosci/bix014ISSN 0006-3568PMC 5451287PMID 28608869.
  191. Jump up to:a b Shvidenko, Anatoly; Buksha, Igor; Krakovska, Svitlana; Lakyda, Petro (30 June 2017). “Vulnerability of Ukrainian Forests to Climate Change”Sustainability9 (7): 1152. doi:10.3390/su9071152eISSN 2071-1050.
  192. ^ Council of Europe. Conference (1 January 2001). Conference Sur la Conservation Et Le Suivi de la Diversite Biologique Et Paysagere en Ukraine [Conference on the Conservation and Monitoring of Biological and Landscape Diversity in Ukraine] (in French). Council of Europe. pp. 78–. ISBN 9789287146458OCLC 1056440382.
  193. ^ “Welcome to State of The Environment in Ukraine”. The Ministry for Environmental Protection and Nuclear Safety of Ukraine. Archived from the original on 7 July 2009. Retrieved 21 October 2013.
  194. ^ “The List of Wetlands of International Importance” (PDF). Ukraine. Ramsar Organization. 11 October 2013. Retrieved 21 October 2013.
  195. ^ “National planning tool for the implementation of the Ramsar Convention on Wetlands” (PDF). Ramsar organization. 2002. Retrieved 21 October 2013.
  196. ^ “Regions of Ukraine and their divisions”Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Official Web-site (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 31 December 2007. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  197. ^ “Number of Present Population of Ukraine, as of January 1” (PDF). ukrstat.gov.ua. Archived from the original (PDF) on 4 July 2022.
  198. ^ Choudhry, Sujit (2018). Semi-presidentialism and Inclusive Governance in Ukraine Reflections for Constitutional Reform (PDF). Stockholm: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. p. 16. ISBN 978-91-7671-154-5OCLC 1038616889.
  199. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine celebrating 20th anniversary of Constitution”www.unian.info. 16 June 2016. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  200. ^ Yulia Tymoshenko Goes On Trial A Day Before Constitution DayEurasia Daily Monitor (30 July 2011)
  201. ^ 1996: the year in review Archived 3 March 2016 at the Wayback MachineThe Ukrainian Weekly (29 December 1996)
  202. ^ “Ukraine’s parliament backs changes to Constitution confirming Ukraine’s path toward EU, NATO”www.unian.info. Retrieved 7 February 2019.
  203. ^ “General Articles about Ukraine”Government Portal. Archived from the original on 20 January 2008. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  204. ^ “Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine”Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine Official Web-site. Archived from the original on 23 December 2007. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  205. ^ “Constitution of Ukraine”Wikisource. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  206. ^ Черноватий Л. М. Практичний курс англійської мови. 4-й курс.: Підручник для ВНЗ. Нова Книга. pp. 24–. ISBN 9789663821757.
  207. ^ Freedom House (13 September 2004). Nations in Transit 2004: Democratization in East Central Europe and Eurasia. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 639–. ISBN 978-1-4617-3141-2OCLC 828424860.
  208. ^ “Ukraine’s president declared martial law after Russia’s attack. But what is it?”USA Today.
  209. ^ “Ukraine President Submits Bill Extending Martial Law Until Late April”NDTV.com. Retrieved 31 March 2022.
  210. ^ “Ukrainian Parliament Extends Martial Law For 90 Days”Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 22 May 2022. Retrieved 17 June 2022.
  211. ^ “WJP Rule of Law Index® 2018–2019”data.worldjusticeproject.org. Archived from the original on 29 April 2015. Retrieved 28 April 2014.
  212. ^ Byrne, Peter (25 March 2010). “Prosecutors fail to solve biggest criminal cases”Kyiv PostArchived from the original on 31 March 2010. Retrieved 19 January 2023.
  213. ^ “Українські суди майже не виносять виправдувальних вироків”Ukrainska Pravda (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 6 July 2023.
  214. Jump up to:a b c Byrne, Peter (25 March 2010). “Jackpot”Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 29 March 2010. Retrieved 31 March 2010.
  215. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine”United States Department of State. 4 November 2021. Retrieved 31 March 2022.
  216. ^ Interfax-Ukraine (15 December 2011). “Constitutional Court rules Russian, other languages can be used in Ukrainian courts – Dec. 15, 2011”Kyiv Post. Retrieved 6 July 2023.
    “З подачі “Регіонів” Рада дозволила російську у судах”Ukrainska Pravda (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 6 July 2023.
  217. ^ “Російська мова стала офіційною в українських судах”for-ua.com.
  218. ^ Chivers, C. J. (17 January 2005). “How Top Spies in Ukraine Changed the Nation’s Path”The New York Times. Retrieved 15 June 2018.
  219. ^ Background Notes, UkraineU.S. Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, Office of Public Communication, Editorial Division. 2000. pp. 9–. OCLC 40350408.
  220. ^ NATO ReviewUniversity of Wisconsin – NATO Information Service. pp. 49–. OCLC 1387966.
  221. Jump up to:a b c “Ukraine has no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration – Ukraine has no alternative to Euro-Atlantic integration – Poroshenko”Interfax-Ukraine. 23 December 2014.
    “Ukraine abolishes its non-aligned status – law”Interfax-Ukraine. 23 December 2014.
    “Ukraine’s complicated path to NATO membership”Euronews. 23 December 2014.
    “Ukraine Takes Step Toward Joining NATO”The New York Times. 23 December 2014.
    “Ukraine Ends ‘Nonaligned’ Status, Earning Quick Rebuke From Russia”The Wall Street Journal. 23 December 2014.
  222. ^ “Teixeira: Ukraine’s EU integration suspended, association agreement unlikely to be signed”Interfax. 31 August 2012. Retrieved 6 September 2012.
  223. ^ “EU, Ukraine to sign remaining part of Association Agreement on June 27 – European Council”. Retrieved 25 June 2016.
  224. ^ “EU-Ukraine Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” (PDF). European Union. Retrieved 21 June 2021.
  225. ^ “The EU-Ukraine Association Agreement and Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area” (PDF). European Union. Retrieved 21 June 2021.
  226. ^ Patricolo, Claudia (29 July 2018). “Ukraine looks to revive V4 membership hopes as Slovakia takes over presidency”Emerging Europe. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  227. ^ “Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine Inaugurate ‘Lublin Triangle'”Jamestown.
  228. ^ “Україна, Грузія та Молдова створили новий формат співпраці для спільного руху в ЄС”www.eurointegration.com.ua.
  229. ^ “У 2024 році Україна подасть заявку на вступ до ЄС”www.ukrinform.ua. 29 January 2019.
  230. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine International Airlines launches direct Kyiv–New York flights”KyivPost. 6 June 2014. Retrieved 24 April 2015.
  231. Jump up to:a b “The history of the Armed Forces of Ukraine”Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Retrieved 5 July 2008.
  232. ^ Kelly, Mary Louise; Lonsdorf, Kat (21 February 2022). “Why Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons – and what that means in an invasion by Russia”NPR.org. Retrieved 9 November 2022.
  233. Jump up to:a b “White Book 2006” (PDF). Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Archived from the original (PDF) on 8 November 2007. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  234. ^ Walters, Alex (24 February 2022). “In numbers: How does Ukraine’s military stack up against Russia?”Forces Network.
  235. ^ “Ukrainian Navy Warship Hetman Sagaidachniy Joins EU Naval Force Counter Piracy Operation Atalanta”. Eunavfor.eu. 6 January 2014. Archived from the original on 28 February 2021. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
  236. ^ “Multinational Peacekeeping Forces in Kosovo, KFOR”. Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  237. ^ “Peacekeeping”. Ministry of Defence of Ukraine. Retrieved 2 May 2008.
  238. ^ “Kyiv Post. Independence. Community. Trust – Politics – Parliament approves admission of military units of foreign states to Ukraine for exercises”. 22 May 2010. Archived from the original on 22 May 2010.
  239. ^ Collins, Liam (8 March 2022). “In 2014, the ‘decrepit’ Ukrainian army hit the refresh button. Eight years later, it’s paying off”The Conversation. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
  240. ^ Al Jazeera Staff. “What’s in the new US military aid package to Ukraine?”www.aljazeera.com. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
  241. ^ “Is an outright Russian military victory in Ukraine possible?”The Guardian. 17 March 2022. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
  242. ^ “Troop Deaths and Injuries in Ukraine War Near 500,000, U.S. Officials Say”The New York Times. 18 August 2023.
  243. ^ “The council reduced the number of districts in Ukraine: 136 instead of 490”Ukrainska Pravda (in Ukrainian). 17 July 2020.
  244. ^ Bohdan Ben (25 September 2020). “Why Is Ukraine Poor? Look To The Culture Of Poverty”VoxUkraine. Retrieved 4 March 2021.
  245. ^ “CPI 2023 for Eastern Europe & Central Asia: Autocracy & weak justice…”Transparency.org. 30 January 2024. Retrieved 31 January 2024.
  246. ^ “World Economic Outlook Database, April 2021”IMF.orgInternational Monetary Fund. Retrieved 17 April 2020.
  247. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine economy could shrink by up to 35% in 2022, says IMF”The Guardian. 14 March 2022. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  248. ^ “What will it cost to rebuild Ukraine?”The EconomistISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 24 May 2022.
  249. ^ Jaroslav Romanchuk (29 December 2021). “Ukrainian Economy in 2021: Procrastination Without Innovation”Get the Latest Ukraine News Today – KyivpostKyiv Post. Retrieved 27 January 2022.
  250. ^ “Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (% of population) – Ukraine | Data”data.worldbank.org. Retrieved 17 April 2021.
  251. ^ “Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (national estimate) – Ukraine | Data”data.worldbank.org. Retrieved 17 April 2021.
  252. ^ Lyubomyr Shavalyuk (10 October 2019). “Where Ukraine’s middle class is and how it can develop”The Ukrainian Week. Retrieved 6 November 2020.
  253. ^ “Ukraine Government Debt: % of GDP”CEIC. Retrieved 17 April 2021.
  254. Jump up to:a b c “Ukraine’s economy is more than just wheat and commodities | DW | 15 March 2022”DW.COM. Retrieved 24 March 2022.
  255. ^ “Statistics of Launches of Ukrainian LV”www.nkau.gov.uaState Space Agency of Ukraine. Archived from the original on 10 December 2018. Retrieved 24 December 2007.
  256. ^ “Missile defence, NATO: Ukraine’s tough call”. Business Ukraine. Archived from the original on 21 November 2008. Retrieved 5 July 2008.
  257. ^ “Ukraine Special Weapons”The Nuclear Information Project. Retrieved 5 July 2008.
  258. Jump up to:a b c FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS (2022). FOOD OUTLOOK – BIANNUAL REPORT ON GLOBAL FOOD MARKETS : november 2021. [S.l.]: FOOD & AGRICULTURE ORG. ISBN 978-92-5-135248-9OCLC 1291390883.
  259. ^ “FAO Information Note: The importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for global agricultural markets and the risks associated with the current conflict, 25 March 2022 Update” (PDF). Food and Agriculture Organization.
  260. ^ “LDCs at a Glance | Department of Economic and Social Affairs”www.un.org. Retrieved 15 April 2022.
  261. ^ “FAO Country Profiles”www.fao.org. Retrieved 15 April 2022.
  262. ^ “UNWTO World Tourism Barometer” (PDF). UNWTO World Tourism Barometer6 (2). June 2008. ISSN 1728-9246. Archived from the original (PDF) on 19 August 2008.
  263. ^ Ash, Lucy (8 August 2014). “Tourism takes a nosedive in Crimea”BBC News. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  264. ^ “Судоходная компания Укрферри. Морские паромные перевозки на Черном Море между Украиной, Грузией, Турцией и Болгарией”. Ukrferry.com. Retrieved 30 December 2010.
  265. ^ “Киевскую дамбу может разрушить только метеорит или война — Эксперт”www.segodnya.ua. Archived from the original on 19 February 2012. Retrieved 15 June 2022.
  266. ^ “Ukraine – Resources and power | Britannica”www.britannica.com.
  267. ^ “Transportation in Ukraine”U.S. Government Printing Office. Retrieved 22 December 2007.
  268. ^ “UIA Contacts”FlyUIA. Archived from the original on 9 February 2017. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  269. ^ Liu, Jim (29 November 2017). “Ukraine International plans Toronto launch in June 2018”Routesonline. Retrieved 29 November 2017.
  270. ^ “The paradox threatening Ukraine’s post-coal future”openDemocracy. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
  271. ^ “Ukraine – Countries & Regions”IEA. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
  272. ^ “Fossil-Fuel Subsidies in the EU’s Eastern Partner Countries : Estimates and Recent Policy Developments”OECD. Retrieved 1 March 2022.
  273. ^ “Westinghouse and Ukraine’s Energoatom Extend Long-term Nuclear Fuel Contract”11 April 2014. Westinghouse. Archived from the original on 11 April 2014. Retrieved 15 April 2014.
  274. ^ Lock, Samantha (27 February 2022). “Russia-Ukraine latest news: missile strikes on oil facilities reported as some Russian banks cut off from Swift system – live”The GuardianISSN 0261-3077. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
  275. ^ Taylor, Kira (26 February 2022). “Ukraine’s energy system coping but risks major damage as war continues”www.euractiv.com. Retrieved 27 February 2022.
  276. ^ “Ukraine plans to end Russian gas transit contract in 2024 – interview for Deutsche Welle | Naftogaz Ukraine”www.naftogaz.com. 24 October 2023. Retrieved 30 December 2023.
  277. ^ “Ukraine joins European power grid, ending its dependence on Russia”CBS News. No. 16 March 2022. Associated Press. Archived from the original on 16 March 2022. Retrieved 23 March 2022.
  278. ^ “Continental Europe successful synchronisation with Ukraine and Moldova power systems”ENTSO-E. 16 March 2022. Retrieved 17 March 2022.
  279. ^ “Could Russia shut down the internet in Ukraine?”The Guardian. 1 March 2022. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
  280. ^ Davies, Pascale (11 March 2022). “Ukraine’s tech companies are finding ways to help those fleeing war”euronews. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
  281. ^ Journal, Sam Schechner | Photographs by Justyna Mielnikiewicz/MAPS for The Wall Street (2 March 2022). “Ukraine’s Vital Tech Industry Carries On Amid Russian Invasion”The Wall Street JournalISSN 0099-9660. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
  282. ^ “Ukraine – Statistics”United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF). Archived from the original on 3 April 2019. Retrieved 7 January 2008.
  283. ^ “Life expectancy and Healthy life expectancy, data by country”. World Health Organization. 2020. Retrieved 19 April 2021.
  284. ^ Peterson, Nolan (26 February 2017). “Why Is Ukraine’s Population Shrinking?”Newsweek. Retrieved 9 July 2019.
  285. ^ “Population”. State Statistics Service of Ukraine. Retrieved 9 July 2019.
  286. ^ “Koreans of Ukraine. Who are they?”Ukrainer. 30 October 2019. Retrieved 19 April 2021.
  287. ^ Alina Sandulyak (18 July 2017). “Phantom Syndrome: Ethnic Koreans in Ukraine”Bird In Flight. Retrieved 15 April 2019.
  288. ^ “Ukraine – World Directory of Minorities & Indigenous Peoples”Minority Rights Group. 19 June 2015.
  289. ^ “Caught Between East and West, Ukraine Struggles with Its Migration Policy”. Migration Policy Institute. January 2006.
  290. ^ “National Monitoring System Report on the Situation of Internally Displaced Persons – March 2020 – Ukraine”ReliefWeb. 21 January 2021.
  291. ^ Hatoum, Bassam; Keaten, Jamey (30 March 2022). “Number of Ukraine refugees passes worst-case U.N. estimate”Associated Press. Medyka. Retrieved 30 March 2022.
  292. ^ Kramer, Andrew (3 April 2024). “Zelensky Lowers Ukraine’s Draft Age, Risking Political Backlash”New York Times.
  293. ^ Pancevski, Bojan (17 September 2024). “One Million Are Now Dead or Injured in the Russia-Ukraine War”The Wall Street Journal.
  294. Jump up to:a b c d e Serhy Yekelchyk Ukraine: Birth of a Modern NationOxford University Press (2007), ISBN 978-0-19-530546-3
  295. ^ Armitage, Susie (8 April 2022). “‘Ukrainian has become a symbol’: interest in language spikes amid Russia invasion”The Guardian. Retrieved 18 April 2022. Like most Ukrainians, Sophia Reshetniak, 20, is fluent in both Ukrainian and Russian.
  296. ^ L.A. Grenoble (2003). Language Policy in the Soviet Union. Springer Science & Business Media. p. 1. ISBN 978-1-4020-1298-3.
  297. ^ “Yanukovych signs language bill into law”. Kyivpost.com. 8 August 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
  298. ^ “Russian spreads like wildfires in dry Ukrainian forest”. Kyivpost.com. 23 August 2012. Retrieved 26 January 2014.
  299. ^ “Romanian becomes regional language in Bila Tserkva in Zakarpattia region”Kyiv Post. Interfax-Ukraine. 24 September 2012. Retrieved 20 October 2015.
  300. ^ Michael Schwirtz (5 July 2012). “Ukraine”The New York Times.
  301. ^ Проект Закону про визнання таким, що втратив чинність, Закону України “Про засади державної мовної політики” [Draft Law on the recognition of the void Law of Ukraine “On the basic principles of State Language Policy”] (in Ukrainian). Ukrainian Parliament. Retrieved 12 March 2015.
  302. ^ Ian Traynor (24 February 2014). “Western nations scramble to contain fallout from Ukraine crisis”The Guardian.
  303. ^ Andrew Kramer (2 March 2014). “Ukraine Turns to Its Oligarchs for Political Help”New York Times. Retrieved 2 March 2014.
  304. ^ “Constitutional Court Declares Law On Language Policy Unconstitutional”ukranews.com. 28 February 2018.
  305. ^ “New Language Requirement Raises Concerns in Ukraine”Human Rights Watch. 19 January 2022.
  306. ^ “Language data for Ukraine”Translators without Borders. March 2022. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  307. ^ “Hungary plays ethnic card in all neighboring countries: experts explain “language row” with Ukraine”Unian. 7 December 2017.
  308. ^ Moser, Michael A. (2016). “Rusyn: A New-Old Language In-between Nations and States”The Palgrave Handbook of Slavic Languages, Identities and Borders. London: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 124–139. doi:10.1007/978-1-137-34839-5_7ISBN 978-1-349-57703-3Archived from the original on 14 January 2020. Retrieved 16 October 2019.
  309. ^ Encyclopedia of Rusyn history and culture. Toronto, Ont.: University of Toronto Press. 2002. ISBN 0802035663.
  310. ^ Shamshur, pp. 159–168
  311. ^ “Світова преса про вибори в Україні-2004 (Ukrainian Elections-2004 as mirrored in the World Press)”Архіви України (National Archives of Ukraine). Archived from the original on 8 January 2009. Retrieved 7 January 2008.
  312. ^ “Criticism of Ukraine’s language law justified: rights body”Reuters. 7 December 2017.
  313. ^ “New language law could kill independent media ahead of 2019 elections”Kyiv Post. 19 October 2018.
  314. ^ “Ukrainian Language Bill Facing Barrage Of Criticism From Minorities, Foreign Capitals”Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 24 September 2017.
  315. ^ “Ukraine defends education reform as Hungary promises ‘pain'”The Irish Times. 27 September 2017.
  316. ^ Vic Satzewich, The Ukrainian Diaspora (Routledge, 2003).
  317. ^ Cecco, Leyland (3 March 2022). “In Canada, world’s second largest Ukrainian diaspora grieves invasion”the Guardian. Retrieved 3 September 2023.
  318. ^ “How many refugees have fled Ukraine and where are they going?”BBC News. 15 March 2022. Retrieved 16 March 2022.
  319. ^ “‘Lot of determination’: Ukrainian Americans rally for their country”The Guardian. 25 February 2022. Retrieved 16 March 2022.
  320. ^ “Ukrainian refugees are now living in the UK – so how is it going?”BBC News. 28 May 2022.
  321. ^ “Hosts of Ukrainians in UK to receive government praise for generosity”. 30 July 2022.
  322. ^ “Canada has opened its doors for war-ravaged Ukrainians. Does it have the capacity? – National | Globalnews.ca”Global News. Retrieved 16 March 2022.
  323. ^ UNHCR (11 March 2022). “UNHCR scales up for those displaced by war in Ukraine, deploys cash assistance”Unhcr.
  324. ^ “Kyiv Saint Sophia Cathedral”United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). UN. Retrieved 8 July 2008.
  325. ^ “Religious Belief and National Belonging in Central and Eastern Europe”Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. 10 May 2017.
  326. ^ “Orthodox Christianity in the 21st Century”Pew Research Center’s Religion & Public Life Project. 10 November 2017.
  327. ^ “Press releases and reports – Religious self-identification of the population and attitude to the main Churches of Ukraine: June 2021 (kiis.com.ua)”.
  328. ^ Релігія, Церква, суспільство і держава: два роки після Майдану [Religion, Church, Society and State: Two Years after Maidan] (PDF) (in Ukrainian), Kyiv: Razumkov Center in collaboration with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches, 26 May 2016, pp. 22, 27, archived from the original (PDF) on 22 April 2017, retrieved 7 January 2019
  329. ^ “ПРЕС-РЕЛІЗ ЗА РЕЗУЛЬТАТАМИ СОЦІОЛОГІЧНОГО ДОСЛІДЖЕННЯ «УКРАЇНА НАПЕРЕДОДНІ ПРЕЗИДЕНТСЬКИХ ВИБОРІВ 2019»”socis.kiev.ua (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 22 August 2021.
  330. ^ Релігія, Церква, суспільство і держава: два роки після Майдану [Religion, Church, Society and State: Two Years after Maidan] (PDF) (in Ukrainian), Kyiv: Razumkov Center in collaboration with the All-Ukrainian Council of Churches (sample of 2,018 people), 26 May 2016, pp. 22, 29, archived from the original (PDF) on 22 April 2017, retrieved 7 January 2019
  331. ^ “Medical Care in Ukraine. Health system, hospitals and clinics”. BestOfUkraine.com. 1 May 2010. Archived from the original on 9 December 2010. Retrieved 30 December 2010.
  332. ^ Romaniuk, Piotr; Semigina, Tetyana (23 November 2018). “Ukrainian health care system and its chances for successful transition from Soviet legacies”Global Health14 (116): 116. doi:10.1186/s12992-018-0439-5ISSN 1744-8603PMC 6260664PMID 30470237.
  333. ^ Ukraine. “Health in Ukraine. Healthcare system of Ukraine”. Europe-cities.com. Archived from the original on 16 October 2015. Retrieved 30 December 2010.
  334. ^ “‘We are dying out here’: Study hears Ukrainian voices on depopulation crisis”Phys.org. 27 April 2023. Retrieved 15 January 2024.
  335. ^ “What Went Wrong with Foreign Advice in Ukraine?”The World Bank Group. Archived from the original on 20 July 2009. Retrieved 16 January 2008.
  336. ^ “What do you need to know about the healthcare reform in Ukraine?”UNIAN. 19 October 2017. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
  337. ^ “Ministry of Health: Medical institutions will receive guidance on how to convert to enterprises”Ukraine Crisis Media Center. 24 April 2017. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
  338. ^ “What do you need to know about the healthcare reform in Ukraine?”Ukraine Crisis Media Center. 11 September 2017. Retrieved 24 January 2018.
  339. ^ “Constitution of Ukraine, Chapter 2, Article 53. Adopted at the Fifth Session of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on 28 June 1996”. Archived from the original on 15 April 1997.
  340. ^ “General secondary education”. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. Archived from the original on 16 October 2007. Retrieved 23 December 2007.
  341. ^ “Higher education in Ukraine; Monographs on higher education; 2006” (PDF). Retrieved 30 December 2010.
  342. ^ “System of Higher Education of Ukraine”. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. Archived from the original on 17 December 2007. Retrieved 23 December 2007.
  343. ^ “System of the Education of Ukraine”. Ministry of Education and Science of Ukraine. Archived from the original on 12 December 2007. Retrieved 23 December 2007.
  344. ^ “export.gov”www.export.gov. Archived from the original on 6 March 2022. Retrieved 6 March 2022.
  345. ^ “Міносвіти скасує “спеціалістів” і “кандидатів наук””life.pravda.com.ua. 11 July 2016. Archived from the original on 29 December 2016. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
  346. ^ “Global Innovation Index 2024 : Unlocking the Promise of Social Entrepreneurship”www.wipo.int. Retrieved 29 November 2024.
  347. ^ The Educational System of UkraineNational Academic Recognition Information Centre, April 2009, archived from the original on 12 July 2020, retrieved 7 March 2013
  348. Jump up to:a b “The language question, the results of recent research in 2012”Rating. 25 May 2012.
  349. ^ “Poll: Ukrainian language prevails at home”Ukrinform, UA, 7 September 2011, archived from the original on 9 July 2017, retrieved 7 January 2019
  350. ^ Timothy Snyder (21 September 2010). “Who’s Afraid of Ukrainian History?”The New York Review of Books.
  351. ^ “Poll: Over half of Ukrainians against granting official status to Russian language”Kyiv Post. 27 December 2012. Retrieved 8 January 2014.
  352. ^ Ставлення населення України до постаті Йосипа Сталіна [Attitude of the Ukrainian population to the figure of Joseph Stalin] (in Ukrainian). Kyiv International Institute of Sociology. 1 March 2013.
  353. Jump up to:a b “Ukraine. West-East: Unity in Diversity”Research & Branding Group. March 2010. Archived from the original on 8 January 2014. Retrieved 8 January 2014.
  354. ^ Malanchuk, Oksana (2005), “Social Identification Versus Regionalism in Contemporary Ukraine”, Nationalities Papers33 (3): 345–68, doi:10.1080/00905990500193204ISSN 0090-5992S2CID 154250784
  355. ^ Taras Kuzio (23 August 2011). “Soviet conspiracy theories and political culture in Ukraine: Understanding Viktor Yanukovych and the Party of Region” (PDF). taraskuzio.net. Archived from the original (PDF) on 16 May 2014.
  356. ^ Вибори народних депутатів України 2012 [The Elections of People’s Deputies of Ukraine 2012] (in Ukrainian). Central Election Commission of Ukraine. 28 November 2012. Archived from the original on 16 October 2012. Retrieved 8 March 2013.
  357. ^ “CEC substitutes Tymoshenko, Lutsenko in voting papers”. 30 August 2012. Archived from the original on 13 August 2014. Retrieved 6 November 2015.
  358. ^ Backes, Uwe; Moreau, Patrick (2008), Communist and Post-Communist Parties in EuropeVandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p. 396, ISBN 978-3-525-36912-8
  359. ^ Ukraine right-wing politics: is the genie out of the bottle?openDemocracy.net, 3 January 2011, archived from the original on 14 October 2017, retrieved 8 March 2013
  360. ^ Kuzio, Taras (17 October 2012), “Eight Reasons Why Ukraine’s Party of Regions Will Win the 2012 Elections”JamestownThe Jamestown Foundation
  361. ^ Kuzio, Taras (5 October 2007), UKRAINE: Yushchenko needs Tymoshenko as ally again (PDF), Oxford Analytica, archived from the original (PDF) on 15 May 2013
  362. ^ Sonia, Koshkina (15 November 2012). “Ukraine’s Party of Regions: A pyrrhic victory”EurActiv.
  363. ^ Rachkevych, Mark (11 February 2010). “Election winner lacks strong voter mandate”Kyiv Post. Archived from the original on 17 February 2010. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
  364. ^ Ostaptschuk, Markian (30 October 2012). “Shake-up in Ukraine”DW. Retrieved 13 December 2023.
  365. ^ “State Department of Ukraine on Religious”2003 Statistical report. Archived from the original on 4 December 2004. Retrieved 27 January 2008.
  366. ^ Lysenko, Tatiana (2014). The Price of Freedom. Lulu Publishing Services. p. 4. ISBN 978-1483405759.
  367. ^ “Culture in Ukraine | By Ukraine Channel”ukraine.com. Retrieved 24 March 2018.
  368. ^ “Interwar Soviet Ukraine”Encyclopædia Britannica. Archived from the original on 18 April 2008. Retrieved 12 September 2007. In all, some four-fifths of the Ukrainian cultural elite was repressed or perished in the course of the 1930s
  369. ^ “Gorbachev, Mikhail”. Encyclopædia Britannica (fee required). Archived from the original on 18 December 2007. Retrieved 30 July 2008. Under his new policy of glasnost (“openness”), a major cultural thaw took place: freedoms of expression and of information were significantly expanded; the press and broadcasting were allowed unprecedented candour in their reportage and criticism; and the country’s legacy of Stalinist totalitarian rule was eventually completely repudiated by the government
  370. ^ “UNESCO – Petrykivka decorative painting as a phenomenon of the Ukrainian ornamental folk art”ich.unesco.org. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  371. ^ “UNESCO – Tradition of Kosiv painted ceramics”ich.unesco.org. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  372. ^ “UNESCO – Cossack’s songs of Dnipropetrovsk Region”ich.unesco.org. Retrieved 4 March 2022.
  373. ^ Centre, UNESCO World Heritage. “Ukraine – UNESCO World Heritage Convention”UNESCO World Heritage Centre. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  374. ^ “Damaged cultural sites in Ukraine verified by UNESCO”UNESCO. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  375. ^ “Unesco adds Ukrainian city of Odesa to World Heritage List of endangered sites”The Art Newspaper – International art news and events. 2 February 2023. Retrieved 6 April 2023.
  376. ^ “Pysanky – Ukrainian Easter Eggs”University of North Carolina. Archived from the original on 25 January 2021. Retrieved 28 July 2008.
  377. ^ “Про затвердження Порядку ведення Національного переліку елементів нематеріальної культурної спадщини України”Офіційний вебпортал парламенту України (in Ukrainian). Retrieved 1 February 2023.
  378. ^ Marche, Stephen (4 December 2022). “‘Our mission is crucial’: meet the warrior librarians of Ukraine”The ObserverISSN 0029-7712. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  379. Jump up to:a b c d “Ukraine – Cultural Life – The Arts – Literature”Encyclopædia Britannica. Retrieved 8 January 2014.
  380. Jump up to:a b c “Ukraine – Literature”MSN Encarta. Archived from the original on 6 April 2008. Retrieved 3 July 2008.
  381. ^ “Ukrainian literature”Encyclopædia Britannica Online. 4 July 2023. Retrieved 11 March 2023.
  382. ^ Danylo Husar Sruk. “Literature”Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 17 January 2008.
  383. ^ Yuriy Lavrinenko (2004). Розстріляне відродження: Антологія 1917–1933 [The Executed Renaissance: Anthology 1917–1933] (in Ukrainian). Kyiv: Smoloskyl. Archived from the original on 13 December 2010.
  384. Jump up to:a b Ivan Katchanovski; Zenon E. Kohut; Bohdan Y. Nebesio; Myroslav Yurkevich (11 July 2013). Historical Dictionary of Ukraine (2 ed.). Scarecrow Press. pp. 29–. ISBN 978-0-8108-7847-1OCLC 851157266.
  385. ^ Kharchenko, Serhiy. “The Khrushchovkas”The Ukrainian Observer. Archived from the original on 6 February 2007.
  386. ^ “Ukrainian folk dress. Traditional clothes of Ukraine”. Ua-travelling.com. Archived from the original on 25 July 2013. Retrieved 8 January 2014.
  387. ^ “Podvyzhnytsi narodnoho mystetstva”, Kyiv 2003 and 2005, by Yevheniya Shudra, Welcome to Ukraine Magazine
  388. ^ “Traditional Ukrainian Embroidery”. Ukrainian Museum-Archives. Archived from the original on 8 January 2014. Retrieved 8 January 2014.
  389. ^ Рівненська обласна державна адміністрація – Обласний центр народної творчості [Rivne Regional State Administration – The Regional Centre for Folk Art] (in Ukrainian). Rv.gov.ua. Archived from the original on 26 January 2011. Retrieved 30 December 2010.
  390. ^ “ПІСНІ ТА ВИШИВКИ УЛЯНИ КОТ – Мистецька сторінка”. Storinka-m.kiev.ua. Retrieved 30 December 2010.
  391. ^ Risch, W.J. (2011). The Ukrainian West: Culture and the Fate of Empire in Soviet Lviv. Harvard historical studies. Harvard University Press. p. 44. ISBN 978-0-674-06126-2. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  392. ^ Sonevytsky, M. (2019). Wild Music: Sound and Sovereignty in Ukraine. Music / Culture. Wesleyan University Press. p. intro. ISBN 978-0-8195-7915-7. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  393. ^ Struk, D.H. (1993). Encyclopedia of Ukraine: Volume III: L-Pf. Heritage. University of Toronto Press, Scholarly Publishing Division. p. 1461. ISBN 978-1-4426-5125-8. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  394. ^ “Traditional Ukrainian songs and music”Ukrainian people (in Ukrainian). 16 May 2017. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  395. ^ Freedom HouseUkraine 2015 Freedom of the Press Archived 16 November 2018 at the Wayback Machine report
  396. ^ “Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2021 Country Report”Freedom House. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
  397. ^ “National Council”Національна рада України з питань телебачення і радіомовлення. Archived from the original on 9 March 2022. Retrieved 9 March 2022.
  398. ^ “BBCUkrainian.com | Про нас | Бі-Бі-Сі – зрозуміти світ”www.bbc.com. Retrieved 18 March 2022.
  399. ^ “The invasion of Ukraine is not the first social media war, but it is the most viral”The Economist. 26 March 2022. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 27 March 2022.
  400. ^ “’20 Days in Mariupol’ wins best documentary Oscar, a first for AP and PBS’ ‘Frontline'”AP News. 11 March 2024.
  401. ^ “Ukraine – Sports and recreation”Encyclopædia Britannica (fee required). Archived from the original on 15 January 2008. Retrieved 12 January 2008.
  402. ^ “Boxing Lessons learned from Dion’s Ukraine Visit”Viva Fitness. 14 September 2013.
  403. ^ Douglas, Steve (25 September 2021). “Usyk ends Joshua’s reign as heavyweight champ”Associated PressArchived from the original on 22 October 2021. Retrieved 25 September 2021.
  404. ^ “Pound-for-pound rankings: Vasiliy Lomachenko still No. 1”ESPN.com. Retrieved 18 May 2018.
  405. ^ International Olympic Committee. “Mr. Sergey BUBKA”Official website of the Olympic Movement. Retrieved 27 May 2010. … voted world’s best athlete on several occasions.
  406. ^ “Track and Field Athlete of the Year”. Trackandfieldnews.com. Archived from the original on 11 May 2011. Retrieved 30 January 2011.
  407. ^ “Legion XIII dominate Ukrainian season”. RLEF. 23 November 2017. Archived from the original on 1 December 2017. Retrieved 23 November 2017.
  408. ^ “Ukraine has a glorious cuisine that is all its own”The Economist. 5 March 2022. ISSN 0013-0613. Retrieved 14 April 2022.
  409. ^ “CCHM – Breads”www.cchm.ca. Retrieved 15 March 2022.
  410. ^ Stechishin, Savella. “Traditional Foods”. Encyclopedia of Ukraine. Retrieved 10 August 2007.
Mukesh Singh Profile He is an IITian, Electronics & Telecom Engineer and MBA in TQM with more than 15 years wide experience in Education sector, Quality Assurance & Software development . He is TQM expert and worked for numbers of Schools ,College and Universities to implement TQM in education sectors He is an author of “TQM in Practice” and member of “Quality circle forum of India”, Indian Institute of Quality, New Delhi & World Quality Congress . His thesis on TQM was published during world quality congress 2003 and he is also faculty member of Quality Institute of India ,New Delhi He is a Six Sigma Master Black Belt from CII. He worked in Raymond Ltd from 1999-2001 and joined Innodata Software Ltd in 2001 as a QA Engineer. He worked with the Dow Chemical Company (US MNC) for implementation of Quality Systems and Process Improvement for Software Industries & Automotive Industries. He worked with leading certification body like ICS, SGS, DNV,TUV & BVQI for Systems Certification & Consultancy and audited & consulted more than 1000 reputed organization for (ISO 9001/14001/18001/22000/TS16949,ISO 22001 & ISO 27001) and helped the supplier base of OEM's for improving the product quality, IT security and achieving customer satisfaction through implementation of effective systems. Faculty with his wide experience with more than 500 Industries (Like TCS, Indian Railways, ONGC, BPCL, HPCL, BSE( Gr Floor BOI Shareholdings), UTI, ONGC, Lexcite.com Ltd, eximkey.com, Penta Computing, Selectron Process Control, Mass-Tech, United Software Inc, Indrajit System, Reymount Commodities, PC Ware, ACI Laptop ,Elle Electricals, DAV Institutions etc), has helped the industry in implementing ISMS Risk Analysis, Asset Classification, BCP Planning, ISMS Implementation FMEA, Process Control using Statistical Techniques and Problem Solving approach making process improvements in various assignments. He has traveled to 25 countries around the world including US, Europe and worldwide regularly for corporate training and business purposes.
Back To Top