North Korean Troops Suffer Heavy Losses in Kursk: 40% Casualties in 3 Months

According to Western officials who spoke to the anonymity, North Korean forces have suffered devastating casualties in Russia’s western Kursk region during the past three months of fighting. An estimated 11,000 troops were deployed from the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) to aid Russian forces, but the toll has been staggering.

The officials reported that nearly 40% of the North Korean soldiers—around 4,000—have become battle casualties. This broad term encompasses those killed, wounded, missing, or captured in action. Of the 4,000 casualties, approximately 1,000 are believed to have been killed by mid-January alone.

The sheer scale of these losses has raised concerns within the DPRK, with officials acknowledging that such high casualty rates are unsustainable. The North Korean military, which is already under strain due to limited resources and the pressures of international sanctions, may struggle to replace the lost personnel, potentially affecting the country’s ability to continue its involvement in the conflict.

The rapid and severe losses signal a growing challenge for North Korean forces, and experts are questioning whether the country can maintain its presence on the battlefield in the long term. Given the severity of these casualties, North Korea might soon face tough decisions about whether to send reinforcements or reassess its involvement in the war.

As the conflict in Kursk rages on, the international community watches closely, with concerns about the sustainability of foreign military interventions and the long-term consequences for those involved.

The situation remains unclear regarding where the wounded are being treated and whether or when replacements will be sent to the front lines. However, the available data suggests that President Vladimir Putin’s ally, Kim Jong Un, is shouldering an extraordinarily high cost in supporting Russia’s efforts to expel Ukrainian forces from its territory. This move appears to be part of a strategy to strengthen Russia’s position ahead of potential ceasefire talks later this year.

In August, Ukraine launched a surprise offensive into the Russian oblast of Kursk, catching Russian border guards off guard. The attack was swift and effective, highlighting Ukraine’s tactical advantage. At the time, Kyiv made it clear that its goal was not to hold onto the territory seized but rather to use it as leverage in upcoming peace negotiations. This shift in tactics underscores Ukraine’s broader strategy of forcing Russia into a position where it would have to engage in serious talks, potentially altering the course of the conflict in the future.

As the conflict continues, the question of how and when the wounded will be treated, as well as the logistical challenges of maintaining a fighting force, remains critical. The consequences of these actions, both for the individuals involved and the broader geopolitical landscape, are still unfolding.

Since Ukraine’s initial success in Kursk, which saw swift territorial gains, the situation has shifted. Ukrainian forces have been steadily pushed back, a development that can be partially attributed to the arrival of North Korean troops in Russia in October. The deployment of these forces has significantly altered the balance of power on the front lines. Despite this, Ukraine still holds onto several hundred square kilometers of Russian territory and continues to inflict heavy losses on Russian forces.

The North Korean troops, reportedly from an elite unit known as the Storm Corps, have been thrust into the conflict with limited preparation and inadequate protection. Sources suggest that these troops have received minimal training, which raises concerns about their effectiveness in combat. In addition, reports indicate that they are being led by Russian officers, whose commands may be challenging for the North Koreans to follow due to language and cultural barriers.

Col. Hamish de Bretton-Gordon, a former British Army tank commander, highlighted the disparity in the training and leadership of these troops. “These are barely trained troops led by Russian officers whom they don’t understand,” he noted, emphasizing the challenges this presents for both the North Koreans and their Russian commanders. The lack of proper training and communication difficulties could prove to be a significant hindrance to the effectiveness of these forces in the ongoing conflict.

The situation on the front lines in Ukraine continues to evolve as the inclusion of North Korean troops has added a new dimension to the conflict. Reports from South Korean intelligence highlight the precarious position of these soldiers, who, according to some experts, are ill-prepared for the complexities of modern warfare. The North Koreans are being deployed in high-risk combat zones with limited training and resources, making them highly vulnerable.

According to military analysts, the North Korean soldiers are seen as “cannon fodder” by the Russian military, with little regard for their safety or wellbeing. The soldiers are reportedly being thrown into battle with minimal protection and without adequate understanding of modern combat tactics, particularly in dealing with sophisticated technologies like drones.

The use of First-Person-View (FPV) drones by the Ukrainian forces has become an increasingly effective tool in the conflict, especially in the southern regions of Ukraine, such as the Donbas area. These drones, which provide real-time video feeds to operators, allow Ukrainian forces to precisely target enemy positions with incredible accuracy. The drones have proven to be particularly effective against units that lack modern defensive technology, making the North Korean troops especially vulnerable to such attacks. The drones can target infantry from a distance, making it difficult for unprepared forces to respond.

Despite the dire circumstances, Gen Oleksandr Syrskyi, Ukraine’s top military commander, has warned that the presence of North Korean soldiers presents a significant challenge. While they may be poorly equipped and ill-prepared, their involvement in the conflict complicates Ukrainian efforts to push back Russian forces. North Korean soldiers could potentially overwhelm certain sectors of the front line, and the increasing number of these troops may pose strategic difficulties for Ukrainian forces already stretched thin by the ongoing conflict.

This situation underscores the growing complexity of the war as new alliances and military tactics shape the battlefield. The presence of foreign soldiers from North Korea, coupled with the continued use of drones and other modern technologies, makes for a volatile and unpredictable situation in the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

The general described a significant force of approximately 11,000 to 12,000 highly motivated and well-prepared soldiers who are executing offensive actions. According to the general, these soldiers operate using Soviet tactics, structured into platoons and companies, which enables them to execute coordinated and effective maneuvers. Their strength is largely derived from their numerical advantage, allowing them to rely on overwhelming force and unity in their operations. The strategy emphasizes the use of numbers to gain an upper hand in combat situations.

COURTESY: Kanal13

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