Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, the exiled Belarusian opposition leader, has fiercely rejected the upcoming weekend’s election, describing it as a “sham” rather than a legitimate democratic process. “This is a military-style operation; a performance staged by the regime to hold on to power,” she said, further condemning the election as a prearranged spectacle aimed solely at maintaining Alexander Lukashenko’s authoritarian grip on the country.

For the past three decades, Belarus has been under the leadership of Lukashenko, whose increasingly authoritarian rule has led to widespread repression of dissent and civil liberties. His regime has been marked by heavy control over the media, crackdown on opposition groups, and manipulation of the electoral process. Over time, Lukashenko has consolidated power, aided by his close ties with Russian President Vladimir Putin, who uses Belarus as a strategic ally in his ongoing invasion of Ukraine.

This Sunday, voters will face a ballot paper featuring the name of Lukashenko, once again seeking re-election, along with four other candidates who have been carefully selected to pose no real threat to his rule. These candidates, hand-picked by the regime, are considered mere pawns in a tightly controlled political charade that ensures Lukashenko’s continued hold on power. Independent observers and foreign election monitors have been barred from the process, eliminating any possibility of transparent oversight.

Opposition groups, including Tikhanovskaya’s movement, have long criticized the country’s elections as a farce, pointing to allegations of vote-rigging and suppression of opposition candidates. The absence of genuine competition, coupled with the heavy hand of state-controlled media and a lack of independent scrutiny, has led many Belarusians to view the vote as little more than a formality designed to legitimize an already entrenched dictatorship.

Tikhanovskaya, who fled Belarus after the violent suppression of protests following the 2020 elections, has called for international condemnation of the process and has urged Belarusians to reject the fraudulent elections. She maintains that true democracy and freedom will only be achieved by continuing to resist the regime and pushing for genuine reforms.

The tight controls and restrictions in Belarus have been put in place as a direct response to the massive protests that erupted after the 2020 presidential election. That year, Alexander Lukashenko underestimated the impact of allowing Svetlana Tikhanovskaya, a political novice and a woman, to run against him. He believed she posed no serious challenge. However, his assumption proved to be a catastrophic miscalculation.

Tikhanovskaya, who had entered the race in place of her husband, Sergei Tikhanovsky, after he was jailed by the regime, quickly gained widespread popularity. In the face of heavy state repression, she became the symbol of opposition to Lukashenko’s rule. Despite claims of a rigged election, where Lukashenko was declared the winner with 80% of the vote, Tikhanovskaya and her supporters boldly claimed victory. This sparked massive protests across the country, which rapidly grew in size and intensity, becoming the biggest challenge to Lukashenko’s nearly three-decade rule.

The regime responded with brutal force. Riot police deployed throughout the country cracked down on protesters, using mass arrests and violent tactics to suppress the movement. The streets ran with images of beaten demonstrators, as the government sought to quash any semblance of dissent. International outrage followed, and the European Union refused to recognize Lukashenko as the legitimate president.

In the aftermath, all of the key opposition figures, including Tikhanovskaya, were either imprisoned or forced into exile. Tikhanovskaya, now living abroad, has become a prominent voice for the Belarusian people, continuing to denounce the repression and call for a peaceful resolution. Those who remain in Belarus, including former protesters, live under constant threat and surveillance, with many too fearful to speak out.

As the current election approaches, Tikhanovskaya, while continuing to urge Belarusian citizens to reject what she calls a “sham” election, is cautious in her call for action. Recognizing the heightened risks under Lukashenko’s increasingly repressive regime, she is not encouraging large-scale protests on Sunday. Instead, she has called for Belarusians to remain safe, saying, “You have to keep safe until the real moment of possibility.”

Her message to the international community is clear: reject the results of the election and stand in solidarity with the Belarusian people. Despite the ongoing repression, Tikhanovskaya remains hopeful for a future where the regime’s grip on power will eventually falter, but she understands the importance of patience and strategic resistance.

“The regime is now intensifying the repression,” she warns, but she believes that one day, when the moment is right, the people of Belarus will be able to demand the freedom and democracy they have long been denied.

The fear that permeates Belarus is palpable, especially when speaking to its citizens. Many are reluctant to discuss politics openly, hesitant to share their true thoughts due to the harsh repercussions of speaking out against the regime. Some individuals even ask for their names to be changed, carefully choosing their words to avoid attracting attention. For those still inside Belarus, communication is done in secrecy, with encrypted messages that are deleted as soon as they are read. It’s clear that open political activism has been silenced under the tight grip of Alexander Lukashenko’s regime.

Bysol, a non-profit organization dedicated to helping those in danger, has reported a significant surge in applications for evacuation. The group now receives around 30 to 40 requests a month, highlighting the growing number of people seeking safety outside Belarus. Since 2020, Bysol has helped more than 1,500 people escape the repressive regime, also offering support to former political prisoners trying to rebuild their lives after their release.

Yana Zhuravleva, a veterinarian who became politically active during the 2020 protests, is one of the many individuals whose life was shattered by the regime. Before 2020, Yana had been focused on her work and had no strong political involvement. However, as the protests grew, she felt compelled to join the crowds, hoping for a change. That hope was quickly crushed when she was sentenced to three years in prison for a “gross violation of public order.”

Her experience in prison was a grim reflection of the authoritarian regime’s cruelty. “We would get punished for everything,” she recalls, describing the harsh conditions she faced. Roughly one in ten women in prison were there because of their involvement in the protests, and like them, Yana was branded as someone “inclined to extremism and destructive activity.”

Prison life was designed to break the spirit. Yana was denied access to the sports hall, her only letters came from relatives, and her visiting rights were severely restricted. Whenever she voiced her frustration, the answer was always the same: “Remember what you’re here for.” These words, repeated time and again, were a stark reminder of the regime’s power to silence dissent and crush any hope of change.

After her release and eventual move to Poland, Yana struggled to regain a sense of normalcy. She admitted that the emotional toll of her time in prison was overwhelming. “In prison, I barely cried. But when I was out, I suddenly wanted to sob all the time, and didn’t know why.” It took what she described as “titanic” strength to avoid sinking into deep depression, a sign of just how deep the scars of political repression run. For many like Yana, the battle for freedom does not end when they leave the prison walls – it continues in the silence of exile, as they try to rebuild their lives while carrying the trauma of the past.

The emotional toll of living under constant surveillance and repression in Belarus is immense. Many individuals who have been interrogated, threatened, or imprisoned report seeking psychological help to cope with the trauma. The pressure is unrelenting, as the state security apparatus hunts down anyone even remotely associated with the opposition. Those detained are coerced into giving up names of others involved in the resistance, adding to the climate of fear and mistrust that permeates the country.

One woman, who had previously monitored human rights violations in Belarus, shared her ongoing struggles. She has had to stop attending court hearings to avoid being spotted by the authorities. The mere act of attending a hearing could be construed as evidence of her association with Viasna, a banned human rights organization. If authorities could link her to Viasna, she could face charges as an “extremist.” Her cautious approach to supporting the opposition, while still trying to make a difference, highlights the suffocating climate of fear that has silenced many. “You have a very strong sense of helplessness when you see all this injustice,” she confided.

Viasna, the human rights group she once worked with, continues to document the plight of political prisoners in Belarus. As of now, the organization lists 1,256 individuals who are incarcerated for opposing the regime. While some prisoners have recently been granted amnesty, their release is often short-lived, as new prisoners are quickly added to the list. The cycle of repression continues, as the regime attempts to maintain its control through fear and intimidation.

For those who manage to escape the brutal system, life in exile offers no guarantee of peace. Many face the painful realization that returning to Belarus may not be possible for a long time. Natalia, who was detained twice for participating in the protests, made the difficult decision to stay in Belarus despite the risks. She explained that once someone is labeled as “repressed,” they become vulnerable to further harassment. Being listed in the police database means that authorities are always watching, making it difficult to find work or live a normal life.

Natalia’s story reflects the absurdity of the regime’s tactics. In 2023, she was arrested for something as trivial as walking her dog without a leash. Authorities claimed she had been aggressive, cursing loudly and waving her arms, but Natalia believes this was simply an excuse to detain her once again. She was held for ten days in a cramped cell, overcrowded with up to 14 people, and deprived of basic comforts. The lights stayed on constantly, and for over a week, she had to sleep on the cold, hard wooden floor.

The experience left Natalia shaken. “It really shook my sense of security, I became much more anxious,” she admitted. Although she is currently abroad, she plans to return soon to be with her cats. However, she knows that her absence has not gone unnoticed. Her neighbors recently informed her that a police officer visited her house, likely conducting a pre-election check on potential protesters. This visit underscores the reality for many in Belarus: even those who attempt to live quietly are not safe from the regime’s reach.

The psychological and emotional consequences of living under such intense surveillance and oppression are profound. For many, the constant fear, the lack of freedom, and the loss of security have become a daily reality. And as the regime tightens its grip in the lead-up to the election, it’s clear that the pressure-cooker atmosphere in Belarus shows no sign of easing anytime soon.

Svetlana Tikhanovskaya’s perspective on the ongoing repression in Belarus paints a stark picture of a regime entrenched in fear. She believes that Alexander Lukashenko and his allies are desperately trying to eliminate any potential for uprisings, driven by the trauma of the 2020 protests. The brutal crackdown on dissent following the contested elections three years ago left a deep scar, and Lukashenko remains acutely aware that many Belarusians have neither accepted nor forgiven him. They still yearn for change, but Tikhanovskaya acknowledges that this hope is not likely to manifest in the short-term.

For a period, many Belarusians hoped that the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia might create an opportunity to weaken both Putin and Lukashenko. Some even joined the frontlines, seeking a way to combat the authoritarianism they faced at home. But as Ukraine struggles to hold ground against Russia and with international dynamics shifting—particularly with President Donald Trump pushing for peace talks—the prospects for a broader regional uprising seem more distant.

Tikhanovskaya argues that the democratic world cannot afford to make concessions to Putin, as she sees Lukashenko as equally dangerous on the global stage. His complicity in Russia’s aggression, including allowing Russia to launch missiles at Ukraine from Belarusian soil and moving Russian tanks through the country, has made Belarus a key player in Putin’s efforts. Lukashenko has also facilitated the flow of migrants toward the Polish border, creating instability for the European Union. Tikhanovskaya warns that Lukashenko’s support of Putin’s nuclear ambitions in Belarus further escalates the risks for neighboring countries like Poland and Lithuania. “He and Putin are a pair, and they support other dictators,” she says. “He’s part of this chain of evil.”

Despite the evident strength of the Lukashenko regime, those who oppose him continue to find ways to resist, even if only symbolically. Yana, the former political prisoner, reflects on how the regime has crushed the potential for protest with brutal efficiency. She’s now trying to rebuild her life in Poland, seeking to return to her veterinary profession after enduring three years behind bars. While there is little immediate hope for dramatic political change, many Belarusians now focus on preserving their cultural heritage, particularly the Belarusian language, as an act of quiet defiance. It’s a cause that offers a small but significant form of resistance in a landscape dominated by fear.

Natalia, another opposition figure, confides that while many Belarusians feel there are no prospects for the future and experience a sense of depression, there are no regrets about the path they have taken. Their struggle continues, even if it is relegated to quieter, subtler actions. Tikhanovskaya, too, has experienced her own dramatic transformation since being thrust into the leadership of the opposition. Cut off from her homeland, her husband remains a political prisoner, isolated for almost two years. Despite this, Tikhanovskaya holds onto hope, firmly believing that the shift in Belarusian mentality that began in 2020 is irreversible. She may not know when or how change will come, but she is certain it will come.

As the regime strengthens its grip and Lukashenko’s hold on power appears unyielding, the opposition’s struggle becomes more about endurance than immediate victory. The repression, the fear, and the trauma of the past few years continue to define life in Belarus. Yet, Tikhanovskaya’s conviction that the desire for change is deeply ingrained within the Belarusian people remains a beacon of hope, even if it seems distant.

Courtesy: Times Now World

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