“Taiwan Investigates Widespread Possession of Chinese ID Cards After Viral Video Reveals Business Benefits”

A documentary video has sparked significant controversy in Taiwan after a Chinese businessman, Lin Jincheng, was filmed encouraging Taiwanese citizens to apply for Chinese ID cards. Lin, the head of a startup incubator for Taiwanese youth in China’s Fujian Province, unwittingly revealed in the video that possessing a Chinese ID would allow Taiwanese citizens to maintain their Taiwanese passport and citizenship. This claim contradicts Taiwan’s legal framework, raising concerns among Taiwanese authorities.

Lin outlined the potential benefits for Taiwanese individuals who applied for a Chinese ID, which included easier access to the Chinese market. He suggested that those with a Chinese ID could register companies in China, start cross-border e-commerce ventures, purchase property, and even access bank loans—privileges not readily available to foreign nationals. This offer was positioned as a major incentive for Taiwanese looking to capitalize on China’s economic opportunities.

In response to the video, Taiwanese authorities have launched an investigation to determine how many individuals might be secretly in possession of Chinese ID cards. The matter has raised alarm, as it hints at a potential loophole for Taiwanese citizens to circumvent legal restrictions and benefit from business advantages in China, which Taiwan has long resisted politically.

Yun Wang, an associate professor specializing in cross-strait relations at Taiwan’s National Chengchi University, explained that while Taiwan strongly opposes unification with China, many Taiwanese are still drawn to the economic prospects in the Chinese market. “There is significant interest in profiting from the Chinese market,” Wang said, adding that the Chinese Communist Party has effectively capitalized on this desire by offering economic incentives.

The video and its fallout have prompted debates about Taiwan’s sovereignty, economic interests, and the pressure some Taiwanese feel to engage with China despite political tensions. The incident highlights the complex relationship between Taiwan and China, where economic opportunities often intersect with deeply rooted political differences.

How are authorities responding?

Taiwanese authorities have reported that fewer than 10 individuals are currently under investigation for potentially holding Chinese IDs. If the suspicions are confirmed, their household registration in Taiwan would be revoked. This investigation follows the controversial video featuring Lin Jincheng, the head of a startup incubator in China’s Fujian Province, who suggested that Taiwanese citizens could apply for Chinese ID cards to gain access to economic benefits in China.

However, the Chinese government has yet to issue a direct response to the allegations surrounding the video and the potential legal implications for Taiwanese citizens holding Chinese IDs.

In the video, when Lin was asked about the process for obtaining a Chinese ID, he did not provide a clear, direct answer. He mentioned that the procedures for applying for the ID card vary across different regions in China and that the process can take longer in certain cities. For example, Lin claimed that in Xiamen, a port city in southeastern China, over 4,000 Taiwanese citizens had applied for the Chinese ID, with a waiting period of up to three months. However, this claim has not been independently verified.

The ongoing investigation in Taiwan highlights concerns over the potential impact on national identity and sovereignty, as well as the growing economic enticements for Taiwanese citizens to engage with China.

Why is it alarming for Taiwan?

The viral video in Taiwan, featuring Chinese businessman Lin Jincheng, is seen as just the “tip of the iceberg” in China’s broader efforts to use “united front” tactics to influence Taiwanese society and encourage closer integration with mainland China. These tactics are primarily aimed at politically influencing younger generations in Taiwan and aligning them more closely with Chinese interests.

In a related development, it was revealed that some Taiwanese YouTubers and influencers had received instructions from China’s United Front Work Department to promote Chinese government propaganda. This is part of a larger strategy by Beijing to exert influence over Taiwan’s media landscape and public opinion, especially among the youth.

Meanwhile, a recent report by Taiwan’s National Security Bureau highlighted China’s targeting of key groups within Taiwan, including temple organizations, gangsters, and retired military veterans, in an effort to establish spy networks and gather intelligence. These revelations reflect the growing complexity and scope of China’s efforts to influence Taiwan from within.

The tactic of offering Chinese ID cards, which surfaced in the viral video, represents a relatively new approach. Yun Wang, a cross-strait relations expert, noted that in the past, Taiwanese citizens visiting China were treated as foreigners. However, with the offer of Chinese ID cards, Taiwanese people are now being viewed as citizens, potentially opening up more opportunities for political and economic influence.

Despite this, Wang pointed out that China likely has concerns about the potential for Taiwanese authorities to exploit such tactics by sending spies to China for intelligence gathering. While China may offer “national treatment” to Taiwanese citizens applying for ID cards, it remains wary of the broader implications of these interactions. “Even though they are offering national treatment, I believe they are still guarding against Taiwanese,” Wang remarked, suggesting that China remains cautious about the risks associated with its outreach efforts.

China ‘buying off’ collaborators?

Chih-wei Yu, an associate professor in the Department of Public Safety at Taiwan’s National Police University, told DW that the Chinese government is strategically attempting to “buy off partners or local collaborators” within Taiwan. According to Yu, China doesn’t necessarily expect these individuals to take any significant actions on a regular basis. Instead, the goal is for them to align with China’s interests when the need arises or when Beijing requires their cooperation.

Taiwanese authorities have responded by warning citizens against falling into China’s trap, emphasizing that such tactics are designed to “confuse their sense of national identity and sovereignty.” This caution comes as China gradually lures Taiwanese citizens, offering benefits like Chinese IDs, with the aim of sowing doubt and creating divisions in Taiwan’s collective sense of identity.

While the Chinese government has remained relatively silent on the matter, the news has sparked heated discussions on Chinese social media. Many online commentators view the situation as a sign that China is making progress toward achieving “unification” with Taiwan, a self-governing island that Beijing claims as part of its territory.

However, scholar Yun Wang argues that granting Chinese IDs to Taiwanese citizens is unlikely to directly contribute to China’s goal of unification or weaken Taiwanese national identity. Wang suggests that China’s real objective may be to create “friction and division within Taiwanese society” by encouraging a small number of individuals to hold Chinese IDs, ultimately destabilizing Taiwan’s social cohesion. This strategy, according to Wang, could undermine unity and play a long-term role in Beijing’s broader efforts to influence Taiwan.

Courtesy: 民視英語新聞 Taiwan News Formosa TV

References

• ^ Gold, Thomas B. (March 1987). “The Status Quo is Not Static: Mainland-Taiwan Relations”. Asian Survey. 27 (3): 300–315. doi:10.2307/2644806. JSTOR 2644806.
• ^ Blanchard, Ben; Lee, Yimou (3 January 2020). “Factbox: Key facts on Taiwan-China relations ahead of Taiwan elections”. Reuters. Archived from the original on 6 April 2020. Retrieved 7 June 2020.
• ^ Green, Leslie C. (1993). The Contemporary Law of Armed Conflict. Manchester University Press. p. 79. ISBN 9780719035401. Retrieved 24 August 2021.
• ^ Zhang, Qiyun. (1959) An outline history of Taiwan. Taipei: China Culture Publishing Foundation
• ^ Sanchze-Mazas (ed.) (2008) Past human migrations in East Asia : matching archaeology, linguistics and genetics. New York: Routledge.
• ^ Brown, Melissa J. (2004) Is Taiwan Chinese? : the impact of culture, power, and migration on changing identities. Berkeley: University of California Press
• ^ Lian, Heng (1920). 臺灣通史 [The General History of Taiwan] (in Chinese). OCLC 123362609.
• ^ Teng, Emma J. (23 May 2019). “Taiwan and Modern China”. Oxford Research Encyclopedias. doi:10.1093/acrefore/9780190277727.013.155. ISBN 978-0-19-027772-7. Retrieved 25 July 2023.
• ^ Morris, Andrew (2002). “The Taiwan Republic of 1895 and the Failure of the Qing Modernizing Project”. In Stephane Corcuff (ed.). Memories of the Future: National Identity issues and the Search for a New Taiwan. New York: M.E. Sharpe. pp. 4–18. ISBN 978-0-7656-0791-1.
• ^ Hsiao, Frank S. T.; Sullivan, Lawrence R. (1979). “The Chinese Communist Party and the Status of Taiwan, 1928-1943”. Pacific Affairs. 52 (3): 446. doi:10.2307/2757657. JSTOR 2757657.
• ^ van der Wees, Gerrit (3 May 2022). “When the CCP Thought Taiwan Should Be Independent”. The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 8 November 2023. Retrieved 9 November 2023.
• ^ Whitman, Alden. “The Life of Chiang Kai-shek: A Leader Who Was Thrust Aside by Revolution”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on 11 February 2001. Retrieved 24 February 2017.
• ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e} Tsang, Steve Yui-Sang Tsang. The Cold War’s Odd Couple: The Unintended Partnership Between the Republic of China and the UK, 1950–1958. [2006] (2006). I.B. Tauris. ISBN 1-85043-842-0. p 155, p 115-120, p 139-145
• ^ Qi, Bangyuan. Wang, Dewei. Wang, David Der-wei. [2003] (2003). The Last of the Whampoa Breed: Stories of the Chinese Diaspora. Columbia University Press. ISBN 0-231-13002-3. pg 2
• ^ “戡亂暨臺海戰役” [Counter-insurgency Campaign and Battle of the Taiwan Strait] (in Chinese (Taiwan)). 國軍歷史文物館. Archived from the original on 28 December 2011. Retrieved 10 November 2021.
• ^ Zhang, Ben (2017). 1950年上海大轰炸 [1950 Shanghai Bombing] (in Chinese) (1st ed.). ISBN 9787552019704.
• ^ MacFarquhar, Roderick. Fairbank, John K. Twitchett, Denis C. [1991] (1991). The Cambridge History of China. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-24337-8. pg 820.
• ^ Kaufman, Victor S. (2001). “Trouble in the Golden Triangle: The United States, Taiwan and the 93rd Nationalist Division”. The China Quarterly. 166 (166): 440–456. doi:10.1017/S0009443901000213 (inactive 1 November 2024). JSTOR 3451165. S2CID 154621512.
• ^ Bush, Richard C. [2005] (2005). Untying the Knot: Making Peace in the Taiwan Strait. Brookings Institution Press. ISBN 0-8157-1288-X.
• ^ Chen, Jian (1992). “China’s Changing Aims during the Korean War, 1950–1951”. The Journal of American-East Asian Relations. 1 (1): 8–41. JSTOR 23613365.
• ^ Nam, Kwang Kyu (2020). “U.S. Strategy and Role in Cross-Strait Relations: Focusing on U.S.-Taiwan Relations”. The Journal of East Asian Affairs. 33 (1): 155–176. JSTOR 45441015.
• ^ “14,000 Who Chose Freedom”. Taiwan Today. 1 January 1964. Archived from the original on 20 September 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ Chang, Cheng David (2011). To return home or “Return to Taiwan” : conflicts and survival in the “Voluntary Repatriation” of Chinese POWs in the Korean War (PhD). University of California, San Diego. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ “The first anti-communist heroes”. Taipei Times. 17 January 2016. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b Zhao, Suisheng (2023). The Dragon Roars Back: Transformational Leaders and Dynamics of Chinese Foreign Policy. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press. p. 35. ISBN 978-1-5036-3415-2. OCLC 1332788951.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b O’Shaughnessy, Hugh (24 November 2007). “Kinmen: The island that Chairman Mao couldn’t capture”. The Independent. Archived from the original on 16 August 2021. Retrieved 16 August 2021.
• ^ “Details of Chiang Kai-shek’s attempts to recapture mainland to be made public”. South China Morning Post. 22 April 2009. Archived from the original on 21 October 2019.
• ^ Wang, Guangci (20 April 2009). “Project National Glory. Makung Naval Battle Defeat. Waking up from the dream of retaking the mainland”. United Daily News (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 22 April 2009.
• ^ “Taiwan President rejects ‘peace treaty’ with China to avoid compromising national sovereignty”. Taiwan News. 20 February 2019. Retrieved 23 July 2023.
• ^ “The Defectors’ Story”. Taiwan Today. 1 July 1961. Retrieved 23 July 2023.
• ^ “Justin Lin faces arrests if he returns: MND”. Taipei Times. 15 March 2012. Retrieved 23 July 2023.
• ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f g h i j k l m n o p q r s t u v w x y} Chen, Dean P. (2024). “Xi Jinping and the Derailment of the KMT-CCP “1992 Consensus””. In Fang, Qiang; Li, Xiaobing (eds.). China under Xi Jinping: A New Assessment. Leiden University Press. ISBN 9789087284411.
• ^ Cabestan, Jean-Pierre (2000). “The Relations Across the Taiwan Strait: Twenty Years of Development and Frustration”. China Review: 105–134. JSTOR 23453363.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b Sheng, Lijun (2002). China and Taiwan: Cross-strait Relations Under Chen Shui-bian. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. pp. 7–8. ISBN 1-84277-318-6.
• ^ Jump up to:^{a b c d e f} Zhao, Suisheng (2024). “Is Beijing’s Long Game on Taiwan about to End? Peaceful Unification, Brinksmanship, and Military Takeover”. In Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping’s Era: Beijing’s Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan’s Internal and External Dynamics. London and New York: Routledge. doi:10.4324/9781003521709. ISBN 9781032861661.
• ^ “Hijacked Plane Will End 2 Chinas’ 40-Year Silence : Taiwan to Negotiate on Aircraft”. Los Angeles Times. 13 May 1986. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ “Plane hijacked to China returns to Taiwan”. UPI. 23 May 1986. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ Ger, Yeong-kuang (2015). “Cross-Strait Relations and the Taiwan Relations Act”. American Journal of Chinese Studies. 22: 235–252. JSTOR 44289169.
• ^ “Cross-strait reunions celebrated”. Taipei Times. 12 May 2007. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ “国务院关于鼓励台湾同胞投资的规定”. flk.npc.gov.cn (in Chinese). Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ “Provisions of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China for Encouraging Taiwan Compatriots to Invest in the Mainland”. www.lawinfochina.com. Archived from the original on 21 December 2022. Retrieved 22 December 2022.
• ^ Chou, Hui-ching (7 December 2018). “How the ‘1992 Consensus’ Colors Taiwan’s Fate”. Commonwealth Magazine. Archived from the original on 6 July 2021. Retrieved 8 January 2022.
• ^ Chiu, Hungdah (1994). “The Koo-Wang Talks and Intra-Chinese Relations”. American Journal of Chinese Studies. 2 (2): 219–262. JSTOR 44288492.
• ^ Jacobs, J. Bruce; Liu, I-hao Ben (2007). “Lee Teng-Hui and the Idea of ‘Taiwan'”. The China Quarterly. 190: 375–393. doi:10.1017/S0305741007001245. JSTOR 20192775. S2CID 154384016.
• ^ “Taiwan’s Lee speaks at Cornell”. UPI. 9 June 1995. Retrieved 23 September 2023.
• ^ Ming, Chu-cheng (1996). “Political Interactions Across the Taiwan Straits”. China Review: 175–200. JSTOR 23453144.
• ^ Porch, Douglas (1999). “The Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996: Strategic Implications for the United States Navy”. Naval War College Review. 52 (3): 15–48. JSTOR 44643008.
• ^ Scobell, Andrew (2000). “Show of Force: Chinese Soldiers, Statesmen, and the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis”. Political Science Quarterly. 115 (2): 227–246. doi:10.2307/2657901. JSTOR 2657901.
• ^ Cabestan, Jean-Pierre (1999). “Wang Daohan and Koo Chen-fu Meet Again: A Political Dialogue… of the Deaf?”. China Perspectives. 21 (21): 25–27. JSTOR 24051197.
• ^ Hu, Weixing (2000). “‘Two-state’ Theory versus One-China Principle: Cross-strait Relations in 1999”. China Review: 135–156. JSTOR 23453364.
• ^ Sheng, Lijun (2001). “Chen Shui-bian and Cross-Strait Relations”. Contemporary Southeast Asia. 23 (1): 122–148. JSTOR 25798531.
• ^ “Su Chi admits the ‘1992 consensus’ was made up”. Taipei Times. 22 February 2006. Retrieved 23 September 2023.
• ^ Cheng, Allen T. (14 July 2000). “Did He Say ‘One China’?”. Asiaweek. Archived from the original on 30 July 2021. Retrieved 11 March 2021.
• ^ Lin, Syaru Shirley (29 June 2016). Taiwan’s China Dilemma. Stanford University Press. pp. 96–98. ISBN 978-0804799287.
• ^ “Taiwan Lifts Restrictions on Investment in China”. The New York Times. 8 November 2001. Retrieved 23 September 2023.
• ^ “Taiwan – timeline”. BBC News. 9 March 2011. Archived from the original on 9 December 2011. Retrieved 6 January 2012.
• ^ Wang, Vincient Wei-cheng (2002). “The Chen Shui-Bian Administrations MainlandPolicy: Toward a Modus Vivendi or ContinuedStalemate?”. Politics Faculty Publications and Presentations: 115.
• ^ Glaser, Bonnie (30 November 2010). “China’s Taiwan Policy in the Wake of ‘One Country on Each Side'”. The Journal of the National Committee on American Foreign Policy. 24 (6): 515–524. doi:10.1080/10803920216379. S2CID 154365745.
• ^ “China Outplays Taiwan in Cricket Diplomacy”. ABC News. 10 February 2009. Retrieved 18 May 2022.
• ^ “Mainland scrambles to help Taiwan airlines”. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 3 April 2016.
• ^ Robinson, Dan (16 March 2005). “US House Criticizes China Bill on Taiwan Secession”. Voice of America. Archived from the original on 2 April 2005. Retrieved 17 March 2005.
• ^ Hammond, Ken (2023). China’s Revolution and the Quest for a Socialist Future. New York, NY: 1804 Books. ISBN 9781736850084.
• ^ Sisci, Francesco (5 April 2005). “Strange cross-Taiwan Strait bedfellows”. Asia Times. Archived from the original on 12 May 2008. Retrieved 15 May 2008.
• ^ Zhong, Wu (29 March 2005). “KMT makes China return in historic trip to ease tensions”. The Standard. Archived from the original on 2 June 2008. Retrieved 16 May 2008.
• ^ Hong, Caroline (30 April 2005). “Lien, Hu share ‘vision’ for peace”. Taipei Times. Retrieved 3 June 2016.
• ^ “Taiwanese opposition leader in Beijing talks”. The Guardian. Associated Press. 29 April 2005.
• ^ Hong, Caroline (28 March 2005). “KMT delegation travels to China for historic visit”. Taipei Times. Retrieved 18 November 2014.
• ^ “Decisive victory for Ma Ying-jeou”. Taipei Times. 23 March 2008. Archived from the original on 3 December 2013. Retrieved 10 April 2013.
• ^ “晤諾貝爾得主 馬再拋兩岸互不否認” [Meeting Nobel laureates, Ma again speaks of mutual non-denial]. Liberty Times (in Chinese). 19 April 2008. Archived from the original on 25 May 2008. Retrieved 2 June 2008.
• ^ “Taiwan and China in ‘special relations’: Ma”. China Post. 4 September 2008. Archived from the original on 6 September 2008.
• ^ Lampton, David M. (2024). Living U.S.-China Relations: From Cold War to Cold War. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield. p. 230. ISBN 978-1-5381-8725-8.
• ^ Fuh-sheng, John; Lin, Yi-Tzu (2024). “Butter or Guns: Taiwan’s Economic Policy Toward China”. In Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping’s Era: Beijing’s Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan’s Internal and External Dynamics. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781032861661.
• ^ “Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet”. Xinhuanet. 27 March 2008. Archived from the original on 29 March 2008. Retrieved 15 May 2008.
• ^ “Chinese, U.S. presidents hold telephone talks on Taiwan, Tibet”. Consulate-General of the People’s Republic of China in Vancouver. 26 March 2008. Archived from the original on 2 January 2022.
• ^ Hille, Kathrin (3 April 2008). “Hopes rise for Taiwan-China dialogue”. Financial Times. Archived from the original on 6 January 2022. According to a US account of the talks, Mr Hu said: It is China’s consistent stand that the Chinese mainland and Taiwan should restore consultation and talks on the basis of ‘the 1992 consensus’, which sees both sides recognise there is only one China, but agree to differ on its definition.
• ^ “Siew and Hu meet at forum in Hainan”. Taipei Times. 13 April 2008. Retrieved 11 November 2023.
• ^ “China’s Hu wants improved relations with Taiwan”. France 24. 28 May 2008. Retrieved 11 November 2023.
• ^ “China leader calls for cross-strait talks”. UPI. 29 May 2008. Retrieved 11 November 2023.
• ^ “吳胡共識 速兌現陸客觀光及包機”. The Liberty Times (in Chinese). 29 May 2008. Retrieved 11 November 2023.
• ^ 海峡两岸包机会谈纪要（全文） [Cross-Strait charter flights neogitation memorandum (full text)] (in Chinese). Xinhua News Agency. 13 June 2008. Archived from the original on 13 February 2009. Retrieved 15 June 2008.
• ^ 海峡两岸关于大陆居民赴台湾旅游协议（全文） [Cross-Strait agreement on mainland residents visiting Taiwan for tourism (full text)] (in Chinese). Xinhua News Agency. 13 June 2008. Archived from the original on 13 February 2009. Retrieved 15 June 2008.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b Yu, Sophie; Macartney, Jane (16 December 2008). “Direct flights between China and Taiwan mark new era of improved relations”. The Times. London. Archived from the original on 25 May 2010. Retrieved 4 June 2009.
• ^ “Taiwan opens up to mainland Chinese investors”. The Times. London. 1 May 2009. Archived from the original on 8 May 2009. Retrieved 4 May 2009.
• ^ “China unveils 31 measures to promote exchanges with Taiwan”. focustaiwan.tw. 16 June 2013. Archived from the original on 3 December 2013.
• ^ “Taiwan, Chinese ministers meet in groundbreaking first”. focustaiwan.tw. 6 October 2013. Archived from the original on 24 December 2013.
• ^ Video on YouTube
• ^ “MAC, TAO ministers to meet today”. Archived from the original on 22 February 2014.
• ^ “MAC Minister Wang in historic meeting”. Taipei Times. 12 February 2014. Archived from the original on 3 March 2016.
• ^ “China and Taiwan Hold First Direct Talks Since ’49”. The New York Times. 12 February 2014. Archived from the original on 4 April 2016. Retrieved 3 April 2016.
• ^ “China-Taiwan talks pave way for leaders to meet”. The Sydney Morning Herald. 12 February 2014. Archived from the original on 9 May 2014.
• ^ “First minister-level Chinese official heads to Taipei for talks”. Japan Times. 25 June 2014. ISSN 0447-5763. Archived from the original on 27 June 2014. Retrieved 4 June 2016.
• ^ J. Michael Cole, The Diplomat. “Hundreds of Thousands Protest Against Trade Pact in Taiwan”. The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 1 April 2016. Retrieved 3 April 2016.
• ^ “Taiwan presidential hopefuls reheat decade-old China trade deal debate”. Focus Taiwan. 26 June 2023. Retrieved 3 November 2023.
• ^ Chou, Chih-chieh (13 October 2014). “Beijing seems to have cast off the 1992 Consensus”. Want China Times. Archived from the original on 3 November 2014.
• ^ Huang, Jing (2017). “Xi Jinping’s Taiwan Policy: Boxing Taiwan In with the One-China Framework”. In Dittmer, Lowell (ed.). Taiwan and China: Fitful Embrace (1 ed.). University of California Press. p. 245. JSTOR 10.1525/j.ctt1w76wpm.16.
• ^ Huang, Cary (5 November 2015). “Xi’s a mister, so is Ma: China and Taiwan have an unusual solution for an old problem”. South China Morning Post. Retrieved 12 November 2015.
• ^ Chiao, Yuan-Ming (7 November 2015). “Cross-strait leaders meet after 66 years of separation”. China Post. Archived from the original on 10 November 2015. Retrieved 3 June 2016.
• ^ “China and Taiwan leaders hail historic talks”. BBC. 7 November 2015. Retrieved 3 November 2023.
• ^ “Hotline established for cross-strait affairs chiefs”. Archived from the original on 4 March 2016. Retrieved 14 January 2016.
• ^ “Elections: Madam President”. Taipei Times. 17 January 2016. Retrieved 3 November 2023.
• ^ “Minister of justice heads to China on historic visit”. 29 March 2016. Archived from the original on 7 April 2016. Retrieved 3 April 2016.
• ^ Tai, Ya-chen; Chen, Chun-hua; Huang, Frances (17 January 2016). “Turnout in presidential race lowest in history”. Central News Agency. Archived from the original on 19 January 2016. Retrieved 17 January 2016.
• ^ Romberg, Alan D. (1 March 2016). “The “1992 Consensus”—Adapting to the Future?”. Hoover Institution. Retrieved 10 March 2021.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b “Tsai’s inauguration speech ‘incomplete test paper’: Beijing”. Taipei Times. 21 May 2016. Archived from the original on 7 June 2020. Retrieved 20 May 2020.
• ^ Wong, Yeni; Wu, Ho-I; Wang, Kent (26 August 2016). “Tsai’s Refusal to Affirm the 1992 Consensus Spells Trouble for Taiwan”. The Diplomat. Archived from the original on 4 October 2017. Retrieved 4 October 2017.
• ^ “Full text of President Tsai’s inaugural address”. Central News Agency. 20 May 2016. Archived from the original on 19 May 2020. Retrieved 20 May 2020.
• ^ Hernández, Javier C. (25 June 2016). “China Suspends Diplomatic Contact With Taiwan”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on 30 April 2020. Retrieved 20 May 2020.
• ^ Goh, Sui Noi (4 February 2020). “Cross-strait chill freezes out Taiwan in its efforts to deal with coronavirus outbreak”. The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 7 June 2020. Retrieved 20 May 2020.
• ^ “Former president Ma to visit Hong Kong – Focus Taiwan”. June 2016. Archived from the original on 4 June 2016. Retrieved 7 August 2016.
• ^ Ramzy, Austin (14 June 2016). “Taiwan Bars Ex-President From Visiting Hong Kong”. The New York Times. Archived from the original on 23 June 2016. Retrieved 7 August 2016.
• ^ “Full text of former President Ma Ying-jeou’s video speech at SOPA”. Central News Agency. Archived from the original on 24 July 2016. Retrieved 7 August 2016.
• ^ “Local gov’t officials hold meeting with Beijing”. Archived from the original on 23 September 2016.
• ^ “Local government heads arrive in Beijing for talks – Taipei Times”. 18 September 2016. Archived from the original on 19 September 2016.
• ^ “Kuomintang News Network”. Archived from the original on 24 September 2016.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b c d Xin, Qiang (2024). “Selective Engagement: Mainland China’s Dual-Track Taiwan Policy”. In Zhao, Suisheng (ed.). The Taiwan Question in Xi Jinping’s Era: Beijing’s Evolving Taiwan Policy and Taiwan’s Internal and External Dynamics. London and New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781032861661.
• ^ “President Tsai calls for new model for cross-strait ties | ChinaPost”. ChinaPost. 3 October 2017. Archived from the original on 4 October 2017. Retrieved 4 October 2017.
• ^ “Tsai renews call for new model on cross-strait ties – Taipei Times”. taipeitimes.com. 4 October 2017. Archived from the original on 3 October 2017. Retrieved 4 October 2017.
• ^ Jump up to:^a b hermesauto (18 October 2017). “19th Party Congress: Any attempt to separate Taiwan from China will be thwarted”. The Straits Times. Archived from the original on 18 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
• ^ 习近平：我们有足够能力挫败”台独”分裂图谋_新改革时代. news.ifeng.com. Archived from the original on 19 October 2017. Retrieved 19 October 2017.
• ^ “With Chinese Tourism Down, Taiwan Looks to Lure Visitors From Southeast Asia”. The New York Times. 17 May 2017. Archived from the original on 17 May 2017. Retrieved 11 November 2023.
• ^ “China bans tour groups to Vatican, Palau to isolate Taiwan – Taiwan News”. 23 November 2017. Archived from the original on 27 November 2017. Retrieved 18 December 2017.
• ^ “China’s Hybrid Warfare and Taiwan”. The Diplomat. 13 January 2018. Archived from the original on 14 October 2019. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
• ^ “With Odds Against It, Taiwan Keeps Coronavirus Corralled”. NPR. 13 March 2020. Archived from the original on 21 March 2020. Retrieved 14 March 2020.
• ^ “‘Fake news’ rattles Taiwan ahead of elections”. Al-Jazeera. 23 November 2018. Archived from the original on 14 December 2018. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
• ^ “Analysis: ‘Fake news’ fears grip Taiwan ahead of local polls”. BBC Monitoring. 21 November 2018. Archived from the original on 14 December 2018. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
• ^ “Fake news: How China is interfering in Taiwanese democracy and what to do about it”. Taiwan News. 23 November 2018. Archived from the original on 14 December 2018. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
• ^ “China’s hybrid warfare against Taiwan”. The Washington Post. 14 December 2018. Archived from the original on 14 October 2019. Retrieved 16 September 2019.
• ^ “President Tsai issues statement on China’s President Xi’s “Message to Compatriots in Taiwan””. english.president.gov.tw. 2 January 2019.