“Despite Proximity to Mainland, China Has Never Conquered Taiwanese Islands, Suffering Two Decisive Losses”

In his recent New Year speech, Chinese President Xi Jinping made a strong statement, asserting that “no one can stop the reunification” of Taiwan with China. His words were backed by a show of force as the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) conducted military drills near Taiwan’s territory, specifically around the Kinmen and Matsu Islands. The timing of these maneuvers seemed to reinforce China’s growing pressure on Taiwan and send a message to the democratic world about its growing military capabilities.

The islands of Kinmen and Matsu hold strategic importance as they are Taiwan’s sovereign territories, situated just 5.3 nautical miles (10 km) and 10 nautical miles (19 km) away from mainland China. Despite their proximity to the Chinese coast, these islands remain firmly under Taiwanese control. In stark contrast, they are located 150 nautical miles (280 km) and 114 nautical miles (211 km) from Taiwan’s main landmass.

The People’s Liberation Army Navy’s military exercises in these regions were seen as a deliberate demonstration of China’s strength, aimed at intimidating Taiwan and signaling to the global community China’s determination in its territorial claims. The drills highlighted the ongoing tension in the Taiwan Strait, where Beijing views Taiwan as part of its territory, despite Taiwan’s self-governance and independence.

These provocations come in the wake of heightened international attention on Taiwan, with global powers such as the United States and its allies continuing to show support for Taiwan’s democratic system and independence. While Taiwan’s forces have remained resilient in defending its sovereignty, Beijing’s military presence and rhetoric continue to intensify, further complicating the regional security landscape.

Despite being situated just off the coastline of mainland China, the Taiwanese islands of Kinmen and Matsu have never fallen under Beijing’s control in battle. Interestingly, China has suffered two decisive military defeats in its attempts to capture these territories. The strategic importance of these islands, located only a few kilometers from China’s coast but far from Taiwan’s main island, has made them focal points in the ongoing tension across the Taiwan Strait. Despite China’s proximity and military strength, Taiwan has successfully defended its sovereignty over these islands, further cementing its resistance to Beijing’s claims.

PRC vs ROC

The Taiwan Strait, the body of water separating China and Taiwan, connects the South China Sea to the East China Sea, serving as a crucial and often contested boundary between the two nations.

Before 1949, China was known as the Republic of China (ROC), a nation founded on democratic values. The Kuomintang (KMT) Party, established in 1912 and championed by its founder Sun Yat-sen, advocated for democratic centralism. Under the leadership of Chiang Kai-shek, a co-founder of the party, the ROC faced a civil war against the communist forces led by Mao Zedong.

The civil war culminated in 1949 with the victory of Mao’s communist forces, leading to the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland. The defeated Kuomintang retreated to Taiwan, where they continued to uphold the ideals of the Republic of China. Taiwan, officially known as the Republic of China, remained a democratic nation, while the mainland became a communist state.

For the past 76 years, this division has persisted. Despite numerous attempts by the communist forces of the PRC to overthrow Taiwan’s government and eliminate its democratic ideals, Taiwan has managed to maintain its sovereignty and political system. These attempts have been unsuccessful, and the resilience of Taiwan’s democracy remains a testament to its enduring commitment to freedom and self-governance.

China, now recognized as a global superpower with immense economic and military influence, continues to harbor ambitions of reunifying Taiwan with the mainland. Under the leadership of President Xi Jinping, who heads the Chinese Communist Party, these aspirations have intensified. Xi Jinping’s vision of reunification echoes the long-held goals of the Chinese Communist Party, but with a much stronger emphasis on achieving what Mao Zedong, the founder of the People’s Republic of China, could not accomplish during his tenure.

Mao’s attempts to bring Taiwan under communist rule were unsuccessful, and despite his efforts, the island remained firmly in the hands of the Kuomintang, which fled there after the civil war. Now, Xi Jinping, who has positioned himself as a central figure in Chinese politics, aims to fulfill the long-standing ambition of reunification by leveraging China’s growing military and economic power.

His rhetoric, particularly in speeches such as his recent New Year address, underscores this determination. While Taiwan’s political status remains a sensitive issue, Xi’s administration has made it clear that reunification remains a central objective, one that will be pursued by any means necessary, as part of China’s broader strategy to restore its perceived historical territorial integrity.

Xi Jinping’s vision for Taiwan is rooted in a deeply held belief in the concept of “One China,” which asserts that Taiwan is an inseparable part of China. This principle has been a cornerstone of Chinese policy since the civil war, and Xi has made it clear that no country or external force will prevent China from achieving reunification. His government has ramped up both diplomatic and military pressure on Taiwan, with an increasing number of military exercises near Taiwanese airspace and waters, and an assertive diplomatic strategy aimed at isolating Taiwan on the global stage.

Xi’s approach is significantly more assertive than his predecessors. While former leaders maintained a policy of peaceful unification, Xi has made clear that Taiwan’s integration into China will not necessarily be voluntary, if diplomatic efforts fail. His government has invested heavily in modernizing China’s military capabilities, which now include advanced air and naval forces capable of launching strikes on Taiwan, as well as cyber warfare and disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining Taiwan’s democratic institutions.

Internally, Xi has worked to consolidate power within the Communist Party, positioning himself as the central figure of China’s 21st-century rise. He is often compared to Mao Zedong for his ambition to restore China’s greatness and his desire to complete what he sees as the unfinished business of the Chinese revolution. His personal leadership style, which emphasizes control and loyalty, has also fueled his desire to secure Taiwan’s reunification as part of his legacy, ensuring that his name will be associated with the completion of this long-standing goal.

Internationally, Xi faces significant opposition. The United States, Japan, and other democracies have been vocal in their support for Taiwan, reinforcing the island’s status as a key player in the Indo-Pacific region. The U.S., in particular, has maintained a policy of “strategic ambiguity,” offering support to Taiwan while not formally recognizing its independence, which has helped maintain a fragile peace in the region. However, Xi’s increasing assertiveness has raised concerns about the possibility of military conflict, especially as China’s military presence in the region grows more pronounced.

Taiwan, on its part, has remained resolute in its commitment to self-governance. The people of Taiwan continue to reject Beijing’s calls for reunification under the “One Country, Two Systems” framework, a model that was used for Hong Kong but has been widely criticized for its erosion of freedoms there. Taiwanese leaders have consistently emphasized that the island’s democratic system, economic prosperity, and way of life are non-negotiable.

As Xi Jinping seeks to fulfill the unification dreams of his predecessors, the situation in the Taiwan Strait remains one of the most pressing geopolitical issues of the 21st century. The balance of power in the region will be shaped by the choices Taiwan makes, the responses from the international community, and how Beijing continues to pursue its goals, whether through diplomatic pressure, economic leverage, or potential military action. The outcome will not only impact China and Taiwan but also the broader global order, particularly as the U.S. and other nations continue to navigate their relationships with both Beijing and Taipei.

THE BATTLE OF KINMEN

Towards the end of the Chinese Civil War, when victory over mainland China seemed imminent, Mao Zedong’s Communist Party set its sights on Taiwan as the final stronghold of the Republic of China (ROC). This objective was driven by a deep-seated hatred for the Kuomintang (KMT) and its democratic ideals. The Communist Party’s ideology could not tolerate the existence of a competing government that espoused a different vision of governance and values. The presence of the ROC on Taiwan represented a constant reminder of the Kuomintang’s resistance and the potential for counter-revolutionary movements that could threaten the Communist Party’s hold on power.

Mao’s vision was clear: Taiwan must be brought under Communist control, and doing so was not just about territorial expansion, but also about securing the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party. As long as the Republic of China existed, even in exile on Taiwan, it provided a potential rallying point for anti-communist forces and could serve as a launching pad for uprisings or the spread of competing ideologies. For Mao, the reunification of Taiwan with the mainland was a matter of national unity and ideological supremacy.

However, the task was far from simple. Taking Taiwan would require not only an overseas military operation but also a direct confrontation with a well-established and determined government. The logistical and military challenges of invading Taiwan, which lies some 150 nautical miles (280 km) from the Chinese mainland, made such a direct assault highly complicated and risky.

To address this, Mao Zedong devised a more strategic approach. Instead of immediately launching a full-scale invasion of Taiwan, he focused on the smaller islands and territories closer to the mainland, which were part of the Republic of China’s holdings. Among these, the Kinmen and Matsu Islands stood out as key military and symbolic targets. These islands, located only 5.3 nautical miles (10 km) and 10 nautical miles (19 km) from mainland China, were seen as crucial stepping stones for controlling Taiwan itself. By capturing these territories, the Communist Party hoped to weaken Taiwan’s defensive position and gradually increase pressure on the island.

The Communist Party’s obsession with these islands was not just about territorial expansion, but about sending a message to the Taiwanese people and the international community that the ROC’s presence on Taiwan would not be tolerated. Mao’s focus on Kinmen and Matsu reflected the Communist Party’s strategic thinking and its desire to make Taiwan’s eventual conquest more achievable. However, despite several attempts, the Communist forces were unable to secure these islands from Taiwanese control, resulting in decisive defeats that would become part of Taiwan’s military history.

This failure to capture the Kinmen and Matsu Islands marked the beginning of a long-standing stalemate between Taiwan and the People’s Republic of China (PRC). While Beijing has not given up on its goal of reunification, the situation has evolved, with Taiwan developing its own distinct political system and increasingly becoming a symbol of resistance to Communist rule.

The Chinese government’s ongoing desire to take over Taiwan, and especially the islands such as Kinmen and Matsu, is deeply rooted in Mao Zedong’s original vision of eradicating the Republic of China and cementing the Communist Party’s dominance. The rhetoric of taking Taiwan “at all costs” remains a central tenet of Chinese policy, driven by both strategic and ideological imperatives. However, the challenges of overcoming Taiwan’s resilience, as well as the growing international support for its sovereignty, suggest that the path to reunification is far from assured.

Kinmen, consisting of two large islands and thirteen smaller islets, presented itself as a critical strategic objective for the Chinese Communist Party in their quest to reunify Taiwan. As the closest of Taiwan’s territories to mainland China, the islands were seen as the first major stepping stone to achieving their ultimate goal. Greater Kinmen, the largest island, became the focal point of Beijing’s military planning. However, its geography and natural defenses made it a much more challenging target than the Chinese leadership had initially assumed.

The island’s eastern side is dominated by rugged, mountainous terrain, which made it difficult for any enemy forces to land or advance. The western side, facing mainland China, had sandy beaches that could serve as potential landing points for an invasion force. The Chinese military found these beaches logistically advantageous, as they offered relatively easy access from the mainland. However, the terrain still posed significant challenges, and the Taiwanese forces were prepared to turn these natural advantages to their benefit.

To secure Kinmen, the Chinese Army devised a two-phase strategy. The first phase called for an initial assault of roughly 10,000 soldiers who would land on the island and establish a foothold by setting up a garrison. The plan was to hold the position until reinforcements—another 10,000 soldiers—arrived. This was based on the assumption that the Taiwanese forces, who were estimated to be roughly equal in number, would be demoralized following the fall of mainland China and would easily succumb to the Chinese assault. The Communist leadership believed that the collapse of the Republic of China on the mainland would be a significant blow to Taiwanese morale, making them easier to defeat.

However, the Chinese military miscalculated Taiwan’s resolve and the strength of its defenses. The Taiwanese leadership, fully aware of the strategic importance of Kinmen, anticipated a potential invasion and took steps to fortify the island against such a threat. The coastline, where an amphibious landing could occur, was heavily fortified with nearly 7,500 landmines, making any attempt at landing a costly endeavor. The Taiwanese forces had turned the beaches into a deathtrap for any invading forces.

Beyond the beaches, the island was further protected with a series of strategically placed landmines, traps, and hundreds of bunkers designed to create a formidable defense in depth. The Taiwanese military had transformed Kinmen into a well-fortified fortress, making it clear that any attempt to take the island by force would meet with fierce resistance.

When the Chinese forces made their initial assault, they found themselves in a difficult and costly battle. The landing forces were met with fierce opposition from the Taiwanese defenders, who not only had the advantage of prepared positions but also had the will to defend their territory. The initial Chinese assault was thwarted by the Taiwanese forces, who inflicted significant casualties on the invading troops. The Chinese military’s hopes of swiftly overpowering Taiwan’s defenses were dashed as they faced unexpected resistance on the shores of Kinmen.

In the face of such a well-prepared defense, the Chinese forces were forced to reconsider their strategy. Reinforcements were delayed, and the logistics of maintaining a prolonged assault became increasingly difficult. The beaches, once thought to be easy targets for an amphibious landing, turned into a deadly obstacle for the advancing Chinese troops. Despite the Chinese military’s numerical advantage, the strength of the Taiwanese defense ensured that Kinmen would remain firmly in Taiwanese hands.

The Battle of Kinmen became a key turning point in the conflict, demonstrating the resilience and preparedness of the Taiwanese forces. It also exposed the limits of China’s military strategy, as they had underestimated Taiwan’s commitment to its sovereignty and the difficulty of overcoming the island’s formidable defenses. Mao Zedong’s initial hopes of quickly conquering Kinmen and using it as a launchpad for further military action against Taiwan were thwarted, marking the beginning of a long and enduring stalemate across the Taiwan Strait.

The Battle of Kinmen, officially known as the Battle of Guningtou, began on October 25, 1949, with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) attempting to wrest control of the island from Taiwan. China’s objective was clear: to secure Kinmen in just three days and establish a foothold from which they could launch further assaults on Taiwan. However, Taiwan was far more prepared than China had anticipated.

The Taiwanese forces had bolstered their defenses in anticipation of such an attack. They had strengthened their infantry units, fortified their positions with land mines and traps, and most notably, enhanced their armored divisions. Taiwan had two tank regiments, equipped with modern US-made tanks, which gave them a significant advantage over the Chinese forces.

As the battle unfolded, the Chinese forces found themselves at a severe disadvantage. The beaches of Kinmen, which had been carefully fortified with land mines, traps, and anti-amphibious weapons, became a killing field for the invading troops. The amphibious transport vessels that carried the Chinese soldiers were damaged by these defenses and became stranded on the beaches. This failure to return to the mainland meant that the next wave of reinforcements could not be deployed as planned.

The Chinese Army had also underestimated the resilience and firepower of the Taiwanese forces. As the Chinese attempted to land, they were met with devastating counterattacks from Taiwan’s armored divisions and artillery. The Taiwanese military, equipped with US-made machine guns and tanks, inflicted heavy casualties on the advancing Chinese troops. Taiwanese infantrymen, using superior weaponry and fortifications, held their positions and repelled the Chinese assault with fierce determination.

While China had hoped to gain control of Kinmen quickly, the artillery fire from the mainland proved largely ineffective. The Chinese Navy’s boats, which were supposed to provide critical logistical support, were damaged by Taiwanese air and naval forces, preventing them from effectively supplying their troops. By the end of the first day of battle, China had already suffered a disastrous defeat. Over half of its soldiers had been killed or wounded, and more than 70 percent of its ammunition and transport had been destroyed. With their boats and amphibious vessels rendered useless, the Chinese troops were effectively cut off from reinforcements, isolated on the beaches of Kinmen.

The Taiwanese forces, bolstered by their success on the first day, further reinforced their positions. They used the momentum to cut off the Chinese forces in the Guningtou area, ensuring that no further supplies or reinforcements could reach the isolated troops. The tactical brilliance of the Taiwanese forces, combined with the strategic advantage of the island’s natural defenses, allowed them to turn the tide in their favor. The Chinese forces were caught in a logistical nightmare, unable to sustain their offensive or regroup for a second assault.

In the days that followed, the situation for the Chinese troops grew even more dire. With no effective way to bring in reinforcements or evacuate the wounded, the PLA was forced to retreat, leaving behind a demoralized and defeated force. The Battle of Guningtou was a decisive victory for Taiwan, and it marked a significant blow to China’s hopes of rapidly conquering Taiwanese territories.

This battle was a testament to the determination and resilience of the Taiwanese military. Despite being outnumbered and facing a much larger enemy, the Taiwanese forces demonstrated their ability to defend their sovereignty, protect their territory, and inflict a crushing defeat on one of the world’s most powerful military forces. The Battle of Guningtou is remembered as a turning point in Taiwan’s defense against Chinese aggression and as a symbol of the island’s continued resolve to remain free and independent.

The second day of the Battle of Guningtou saw the arrival of approximately 1,000 Chinese reinforcements, but by then, the tide had already turned in Taiwan’s favor. The Taiwanese forces, now on the offensive, used their superior firepower to strike back decisively. The addition of US-made M5A1 Stuart light tanks bolstered their infantry, and with these tanks providing critical support, Taiwan’s forces were able to push the Chinese forces out of Guningtou, a key strategic location that had previously been under communist control.

By the end of the second day, the Chinese troops were in disarray. The island’s supply lines had been cut off, and the communist soldiers had run out of food and essential supplies. The following morning, Taiwanese forces launched a final, overwhelming assault. The communist forces, already weakened by days of battle and isolated from reinforcements, were quickly overpowered. More than 5,000 Chinese soldiers were captured and taken as prisoners of war. The victory was a massive blow to China’s military ambitions and marked a decisive moment in Taiwan’s defense.

Taiwan not only retained control of Kinmen but also decisively defeated the Chinese forces on Guningtou. The loss of this key territory was a humiliating defeat for Mao Zedong and the newly established People’s Republic of China, which had only just been declared earlier that month. The failure to capture Kinmen and Guningtou marked a pivotal moment in the early stages of the Taiwan Strait conflict and solidified Taiwan’s determination to remain independent.

Despite this victory, China’s attempts to subdue Taiwan were far from over. Throughout the 1950s and beyond, multiple invasions were attempted by China, but each one ended in failure. Taiwan, with the support of the United States, successfully repelled these attacks, despite Beijing’s growing influence and military strength. The United States played a crucial role in defending Taiwan, especially as China’s military power grew. However, Beijing never directly confronted the US military, as it was well aware of the risks of engaging in direct conflict with Washington.

Despite the clear defeat suffered by China, Taiwan’s sovereignty remains a contentious issue. Beijing continues to view Taiwan as a renegade province that must be brought under Chinese control “at all costs.” The Chinese government has repeatedly stated that it will not renounce the use of force to reunify Taiwan with the mainland. In recent years, China has ramped up military drills around Taiwan, with the frequency and scale of these exercises continuing to increase, including the most recent maneuvers around the New Year. The situation remains tense, and Taiwan’s defense capabilities are under constant scrutiny as the world watches the unfolding geopolitical struggle in the Taiwan Strait.

Courtesy: Happy Earth

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