Two recent books, from different perspectives, both conclude that the prospects for improved India-Pakistan bilateral ties in the near future remain bleak.

Article 370, in August 2019, leading to increased tensions and a deteriorating security situation along the border. Despite this, Prime Minister Modi’s government has maintained a hardline stance toward Pakistan, often framing the issue of terrorism as a major obstacle to dialogue. Pakistan, on the other hand, has struggled with political instability, where internal divisions between the civilian government and the military complicate any potential for sustained peace efforts.

This complex domestic landscape in both countries suggests that the prospects for a resumption of meaningful dialogue remain uncertain. Clary and Lambah’s analysis implies that peace initiatives are unlikely without strong, centralized leadership in both nations capable of making difficult, politically risky decisions. Given the fractured political systems in Pakistan and the lack of significant changes in India’s stance, the road to peace appears challenging.

Further complicating matters is the increasing militarization of the relationship, particularly with the continuing arms race and the potential for miscalculation along the border. Both nations continue to modernize their nuclear arsenals, and the Kashmir issue remains unresolved, often cited as the core of the conflict. While the 2003 cease-fire did demonstrate that dialogue and peace are possible when strong leadership aligns, the geopolitical environment has shifted, and the internal dynamics in both countries are less conducive to reconciliation at present.

The upcoming elections in both India and Pakistan could further impact the diplomatic landscape. With political uncertainty in Pakistan and the likelihood of continued political dominance by the BJP in India, it is plausible that both countries will focus more on domestic concerns than on bilateral peace efforts in the immediate term. As such, the window for substantive dialogue may remain closed until a shift in political leadership or a new crisis provides an impetus for engagement.

The contentious issue of Jammu and Kashmir has long been a flashpoint in India-Pakistan relations, and its significance was amplified when India revoked the region’s special status in August 2019. This move, which was widely criticized by Pakistan and parts of the international community, effectively altered the political landscape of the region and marked a new low in bilateral ties. Pakistan strongly condemned the action, viewing it as a violation of international law, and escalated diplomatic efforts to garner global support against India’s decision. This move further strained relations and led to heightened military tensions, undermining any potential for meaningful dialogue.

COURTESY: India Today

In addition to the Kashmir issue, the role of terrorism in India-Pakistan relations continues to be a major obstacle to peace. Terrorist attacks emanating from Pakistan-based groups, such as the 2001 Indian Parliament attack and the 2008 Mumbai attacks, have been pivotal in scuttling peace initiatives. Despite public condemnations, Pakistan’s alleged support or toleration of these groups has consistently derailed any progress towards dialogue. The persistence of these security concerns fuels mistrust between the two nations and makes it difficult for leaders to pursue conciliatory measures without facing domestic backlash.

Another factor influencing the prospects for dialogue between India and Pakistan is the evolving regional security environment. India’s increasing focus on its role as a rising global power, its deepening security ties with the United States, and its growing defense capabilities have changed the calculus of regional geopolitics. Pakistan, in turn, has relied on its strategic relationship with China, particularly through the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), to balance its security concerns vis-à-vis India. This evolving strategic landscape, characterized by shifting alliances and regional rivalries, complicates efforts at reconciliation.

The economic disparity between India and Pakistan also plays a significant role in shaping their bilateral relations. India’s growing economy, which has become one of the largest in the world, stands in stark contrast to Pakistan’s struggling economy, which faces challenges such as inflation, high levels of debt, and dependence on foreign aid. The economic gap between the two countries exacerbates political tensions and impacts the prospects for collaboration. India, with its much larger market and economy, has little incentive to engage in economic cooperation with Pakistan, especially when its own national security concerns remain unresolved.

COURTESY: Hindustan Times

Challenges to the Peace Process

Despite the challenges, there have been attempts to revive the peace process over the years. Key initiatives such as the 2003 cease-fire agreement (CFA) and the back-channel talks have shown that when strong leadership is in place, progress can be made. However, the absence of sustained leadership in Pakistan has hindered efforts to make lasting peace. Pakistan’s political instability, with shifting coalitions and the influence of the military over foreign policy, makes it difficult to maintain a consistent approach to India.

Moreover, the domestic political situation in both countries significantly affects their foreign policy. In India, the centralization of foreign policy under Prime Minister Modi’s leadership has allowed for decisive actions, but also has created challenges in terms of building long-term, bipartisan support for peace with Pakistan. In Pakistan, the fragmentation of power between the military and civilian leadership, coupled with internal political instability, has led to an incoherent and inconsistent foreign policy. The lack of centralized authority in Pakistan, especially in matters relating to India, has made it difficult for Pakistan’s leadership to engage in meaningful peace negotiations.

Prospects for the Future

Looking forward, the prospects for India-Pakistan dialogue largely depend on domestic political changes within both countries. As Clary and Lambah point out, strong leadership is essential for driving peace initiatives. However, in the current political climate, where both countries are facing domestic turmoil and rising nationalism, the likelihood of any major breakthroughs appears slim. In India, Prime Minister Modi’s approach has been largely focused on strengthening national security and asserting India’s regional dominance, which has led to limited space for engagement with Pakistan. In Pakistan, the ongoing political instability, coupled with the military’s heavy influence over foreign policy, makes it difficult to see any significant shift toward reconciliation with India in the near future.

The looming elections in both countries add further uncertainty to the situation. In India, the likely re-election of Prime Minister Modi in 2024 will likely result in a continuation of the current foreign policy, which emphasizes security concerns over diplomatic engagement with Pakistan. In Pakistan, the recent elections and the formation of a coalition government, with no clear majority or leadership, suggest that political fragmentation will continue, making it difficult to implement a coherent foreign policy strategy toward India.

Moreover, the increasing involvement of other regional and global powers, such as the United States, China, and Russia, adds another layer of complexity to the India-Pakistan relationship. The growing geopolitical competition between China and India, particularly in the context of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), complicates the dynamics of peacebuilding. The United States, which has historically played a role in facilitating dialogue between India and Pakistan, faces its own challenges in balancing relations with both countries, especially given its strategic partnership with India and its concerns over terrorism emanating from Pakistan.

COURTESY: India Today

Conclusion

In conclusion, the future of India-Pakistan dialogue remains uncertain. The centralization of foreign policy decision-making, as argued by both Clary and Lambah, has played a crucial role in past peace efforts, particularly during the 2003 cease-fire agreement. However, the absence of strong, centralized leadership in Pakistan and the growing complexity of regional and global geopolitics make it unlikely that the two countries will engage in meaningful dialogue in the short term. While the potential for peace remains, it is contingent on the emergence of strong leadership on both sides and the resolution of underlying political, security, and economic challenges. Until these conditions are met, the prospects for sustained dialogue between India and Pakistan will remain distant.

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