Some analysts believe Pakistan need not be concerned, while others warn that India’s growing influence in Afghanistan could worsen Islamabad’s strained relations with Kabul.

When the Taliban took over Kabul in August 2021, it marked a significant turning point in the political and military dynamics of Afghanistan and the surrounding region. Imran Khan, then-Prime Minister of Pakistan, notably referred to the Taliban’s return to power as a moment when the group had “broken the shackles of slavery.” His statement highlighted the sentiment that the Taliban’s victory symbolized a form of liberation from foreign control and influence, particularly in the aftermath of the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Khan’s words resonated with a segment of the Pakistani population, who viewed the Taliban’s resurgence as a triumph of resistance against the perceived dominance of Western powers in the region.

The Taliban’s ascension to power was not only a defining moment for Afghanistan but also a key development for Pakistan’s geopolitical aspirations. For decades, Pakistan had been regarded as the Taliban’s primary supporter and a patron of the group, providing both logistical and military support. This alliance was rooted in Pakistan’s quest for “strategic depth”—a doctrine which sought to ensure that Pakistan could maintain a friendly government in Afghanistan as a buffer against India, its primary regional rival.

The idea of “strategic depth” was designed to secure Pakistan’s national security by ensuring that, in the event of conflict with India, Afghanistan would act as a cushion for Pakistan, providing strategic maneuverability and acting as a defensive barrier. The Taliban, with their ideological alignment and mutual interests with Pakistan, represented a means to strengthen Pakistan’s position in the region.

With the Taliban regaining control of Afghanistan, Pakistan’s influence over its neighbor was seen to increase significantly. Islamabad’s long-standing support for the Taliban positioned it as a central player in any future Afghan governance structure, especially as the Taliban aimed to consolidate power. The relationship between Pakistan and the Taliban was also framed within the context of Pakistan’s desire to extend its influence and counterbalance the presence of foreign powers, particularly the U.S. and India, in the region.

However, while the Taliban’s victory was seen as a boost to Pakistan’s influence, it also came with challenges. The evolving relationship between the two countries has been complex, marked by moments of cooperation but also tension. For instance, Pakistan faced international pressure to ensure that the Taliban would respect human rights and prevent Afghanistan from becoming a haven for terrorism. Moreover, Pakistan had to navigate its relationships with other regional players, such as China, Russia, and Iran, who also had stakes in the outcome of the Afghan conflict.

In conclusion, the Taliban’s return to power in Afghanistan in 2021 not only reshaped the political landscape of the country but also bolstered Pakistan’s regional ambitions. The event was emblematic of Pakistan’s strategy to exert influence in Afghanistan, maintain regional stability, and counterbalance its rivals. However, as the situation evolved, Pakistan had to carefully manage its relations with the Taliban and other international stakeholders to ensure that it would maintain its desired position of influence in the region.

Pakistan’s strategic doctrine of “strategic depth” has long been centered around maintaining a friendly government in Afghanistan, with the Taliban serving as a key ally in Islamabad’s regional ambitions. The idea was to ensure that Afghanistan would act as a buffer state, offering Pakistan maneuverability and defense against India, its traditional adversary. By supporting the Taliban, Pakistan sought to enhance its security and counterbalance India’s influence in the region.

However, three years after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, this calculation has increasingly been viewed as a failure. Instead of solidifying Pakistan’s regional position, the country finds itself frustrated by deteriorating relations with Kabul. The Taliban, far from being an unwavering ally of Pakistan, has shown signs of pursuing a foreign policy that is at odds with Islamabad’s interests. Tensions have flared over issues such as cross-border terrorism, Pakistan’s security concerns, and Afghanistan’s reluctance to curb militant groups operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. These strains have left Pakistan’s officials disgruntled, as their hope of using the Taliban as a strategic asset appears to have backfired.

In a surprising turn of events, the Taliban has been warming up to an unlikely partner: India. This shift has been particularly jarring for Pakistan, as it had long viewed Afghanistan as a key battleground for regional influence, especially in countering India’s strategic presence in the region. In December 2024, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri met with the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai. This meeting marked the highest-profile public engagement between India and the Taliban since their return to power, signaling a dramatic thaw in relations. The encounter followed a series of steps taken by both sides that suggest a break from the deep-seated animosity and distrust that had characterized their interactions for over a quarter of a century.

This shift in Taliban diplomacy is not just a diplomatic anomaly but a significant realignment in regional geopolitics. India, which had been critical of the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan, has found new avenues for engagement, particularly in the areas of humanitarian aid, trade, and infrastructure development. India has also been keen to gain influence in Afghanistan to counter Pakistan’s role in the region and to extend its footprint in Central Asia.

The thaw between the Taliban and India represents a dramatic break from the past, where Pakistan’s support for the Taliban had been seen as the main pillar of its influence in Afghanistan. The evolving situation suggests that Pakistan’s reliance on the Taliban as a strategic tool may no longer guarantee the same regional dominance it once envisioned. Moreover, this shift could have lasting implications for Pakistan’s foreign policy and its position in the complex triangle of Afghanistan, India, and regional powers.

Ultimately, the Taliban’s rapprochement with India exposes the fragility of Pakistan’s strategic depth doctrine and underscores the unpredictable nature of geopolitics in South Asia. While Pakistan is left grappling with the fallout of its failed calculations, the dynamics of the region appear to be shifting, with the Taliban playing a pivotal role in determining Afghanistan’s future and its relationships with neighboring powers.

If the growing thaw in relations between the Taliban and India leads to an expansion of Indian influence in Afghanistan, it could significantly strain ties between Islamabad and Kabul. Iftikhar Firdous, co-founder of The Khorasan Diary, a portal that tracks regional security issues, warned that this shift could exacerbate tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan. Firdous emphasized that the rivalry between Pakistan and India, particularly in the context of Afghanistan, could escalate, leading to further complications for the region.

He highlighted that the Afghan people, who are heavily reliant on Pakistan’s borders for trade, aid, and movement, could bear the brunt of this geopolitical tug-of-war. Pakistan has long played a pivotal role in Afghanistan’s economy and logistics, given their shared border and extensive trade ties. Any shift in Afghanistan’s foreign alliances, especially with India, could disrupt these flows, potentially impacting the daily lives of the Afghan population.

The potential for increased Indian influence in Afghanistan could lead to Pakistan feeling more isolated and threatened in the region. Islamabad might view this as a challenge to its long-held strategic position in Afghanistan, prompting a defensive posture that could further complicate its relationship with Kabul. This tension could also strain the already fragile security situation in Afghanistan, which continues to grapple with internal conflicts, humanitarian crises, and the lingering presence of extremist groups.

Ultimately, as Firdous pointed out, it is the Afghan people who will bear the consequences of this evolving power struggle. The shifting alliances and foreign interventions could deepen Afghanistan’s instability, which has already been a source of immense suffering for its citizens. With a complex mix of regional rivalries, shifting allegiances, and fragile governance, the future of Afghanistan remains uncertain, and its people may find themselves at the mercy of larger geopolitical forces that are out of their control.

Old friend, new partner

From the 1980s onward, Pakistan has been a key player in the geopolitical dynamics of Afghanistan, primarily through its support for various insurgent groups, including the Taliban. This backing dates back to the Soviet-Afghan War in the 1980s, when Pakistan played a crucial role in supporting the Afghan mujahideen in their fight against the Soviet Union. The mujahideen were composed of Afghan resistance fighters, and Pakistan’s involvement was motivated by its desire to counter Soviet influence in the region, as well as to gain strategic depth against its archrival, India.

During the Cold War, Pakistan, with the backing of the United States and Saudi Arabia, provided military, financial, and logistical support to the mujahideen. This involvement laid the groundwork for Pakistan’s future relationship with Afghanistan, as the country became a central hub for training and equipping fighters, while also fostering deep ideological and political connections with various Afghan groups. Many of the Taliban’s leaders, who would later emerge as the dominant force in Afghanistan, were part of this broader network of militant activity supported by Pakistan.

In the years that followed, particularly in the 1990s, Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan took a more defined shape with its direct backing of the Taliban, a group that had formed from the remnants of the mujahideen. The Taliban, largely composed of Pashtun fighters, sought to impose a strict interpretation of Islamic law and to unite Afghanistan after years of civil war. Pakistan saw the Taliban as a means of securing a friendly regime in Kabul that would align with its interests, particularly its desire for “strategic depth” in its rivalry with India.

Pakistan’s support for the Taliban during their rise to power in the 1990s was not just ideological but also logistical. Many of the Taliban’s leaders found shelter in Pakistan, particularly in the city of Quetta, and were provided with training, arms, and resources. This close relationship allowed Pakistan to exert significant influence over the Taliban’s policies and actions, further strengthening Islamabad’s position in the region.

This support continued well into the early 2000s, even after the U.S.-led invasion of Afghanistan in 2001. Despite being a key ally in the War on Terror, Pakistan’s ties to the Taliban remained strong, as Islamabad viewed the group as a means of maintaining its influence in Afghanistan and countering India’s growing presence in the region. The Taliban’s leaders, including Mullah Omar, remained sheltered in Pakistan, further cementing the notion that Pakistan was a primary backer of the Afghan group.

The U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, which ousted the Taliban from power, led to increased pressure on Pakistan to sever its ties with the group. However, despite this external pressure, Pakistan continued to provide covert support to the Taliban, viewing them as a counterbalance to the U.S.-backed Afghan government in Kabul and as a tool to exert influence in Afghanistan’s political future.

Through the first two decades of the 21st century, Pakistan remained a central figure in the geopolitics of Afghanistan. While it faced international criticism for its continued support of the Taliban, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan’s strategic calculus remained unchanged. The Taliban’s resurgence in 2021, with their return to power in Kabul, demonstrated the enduring nature of this relationship, which has had profound implications for regional security, Pakistan’s foreign policy, and the stability of Afghanistan.

In conclusion, from the 1980s to the early 21st century, Pakistan’s backing of the mujahideen during the Soviet-Afghan War and its continued support for the Taliban played a central role in shaping Afghanistan’s political landscape. The close ties between Pakistan and the Taliban, including sheltering key leaders, provided Islamabad with significant influence over Afghanistan’s governance and security, a relationship that continues to impact the region to this day.

India, in stark contrast to Pakistan, has consistently viewed the Taliban as a proxy for Pakistan’s strategic ambitions, particularly in its rivalry with India. When the Taliban first came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, India quickly recognized the threat posed by the group. Concerned about the potential for the Taliban to act as a strategic ally of Pakistan in its efforts to expand influence in the region, India took a clear stance against the Taliban. This sentiment was amplified by the Taliban’s strict interpretation of Islamic law and its perceived hostility towards India, particularly regarding issues of regional security and terrorism.

In response to the Taliban’s rise, India closed its embassy in Kabul, signaling its disapproval of the group’s governance and its concern over the safety of Indian nationals in Afghanistan. This decision was also motivated by India’s fear that the Taliban’s control of Afghanistan would serve Pakistan’s interests in undermining Indian influence in the region.

India’s distrust of the Taliban only deepened over the years, particularly in light of a series of attacks on Indian diplomatic missions and consulates in Afghanistan. The Taliban and its allies, particularly the Haqqani network, were widely suspected of being behind these attacks. These incidents included the bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009, as well as assaults on Indian consulates in Jalalabad (2013), Herat (2014), and Mazar-i-Sharif (2015). These attacks not only targeted Indian personnel but also symbolized the Taliban’s broader strategy to undermine India’s presence and influence in Afghanistan, especially given India’s significant investments in the country’s reconstruction and development.

The repeated targeting of Indian missions and the rising violence in Afghanistan cemented India’s view of the Taliban as a destabilizing force, aligned with Pakistan’s strategic objectives. This perception was further fueled by the Taliban’s close ties to the Haqqani network, a militant group with a history of operating in the region and targeting Indian interests. India saw the Haqqani network as a key player in Pakistan’s wider efforts to exert influence over Afghanistan and limit India’s role in the country.

India’s relations with Afghanistan during the Taliban’s rule were therefore defined by hostility and mistrust. India continued to support the Afghan government, providing development aid, humanitarian assistance, and security training. This support, however, was often at odds with the interests of Pakistan, which saw India’s growing influence in Afghanistan as a direct challenge to its own position.

The return of the Taliban to power in 2021, following the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, placed India in a difficult position. While India was concerned about the return of a regime that had targeted its interests in the past, it also recognized the necessity of engaging with the new Afghan reality. The Taliban’s resurgence prompted India to re-evaluate its approach, but its historical distrust of the group remains a significant obstacle to any meaningful diplomatic engagement.

In conclusion, India’s view of the Taliban has been shaped by a long history of conflict and competition with Pakistan, as well as the Taliban’s repeated attacks on Indian diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. The group’s return to power has only reaffirmed India’s concerns, and its relations with Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, are likely to remain fraught with challenges, given the deep-seated mistrust and divergent strategic interests.

Yet, a decade later, those equations no longer stand. The geopolitical landscape in Afghanistan has dramatically shifted, and the dynamics between India, Pakistan, and the Taliban have undergone significant changes. The situation in Afghanistan, particularly after the U.S. withdrawal and the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, has forced all regional players to reassess their strategies and alliances.

For India, the immediate response to the Taliban’s return was one of caution and wariness, given the history of attacks on Indian assets and personnel in Afghanistan. However, as time has passed, India has adopted a more pragmatic approach. India recognizes that it can no longer afford to completely sideline the Taliban, given the group’s entrenched control over Afghanistan. Instead, India has sought to engage with the Taliban on a limited, pragmatic basis, focusing on humanitarian aid, counterterrorism, and regional stability. This shift has been symbolized by the diplomatic interactions that have taken place, including the meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and the Taliban’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai in 2023, marking the highest-profile engagement between the two sides in years.

For Pakistan, the shift has been less favorable. The Taliban’s rise was originally seen as a strategic victory for Pakistan, providing it with a friendly neighbor that could serve as a buffer against India. However, the Taliban’s increasing engagement with India, especially following the recent diplomatic thaw, has raised concerns in Islamabad. Pakistan’s primary aim has always been to maintain influence in Afghanistan to counterbalance India’s presence in the region. The prospect of Afghanistan growing closer to India, both diplomatically and economically, challenges Pakistan’s long-standing position and its “strategic depth” strategy.

The Taliban, for its part, has demonstrated a more nuanced approach than in the past. While still maintaining close ties with Pakistan, it has been careful to balance its relations with India, a key regional power. The changing realities in Afghanistan, including economic difficulties and humanitarian challenges, have pushed the Taliban to seek a broader range of international support, including from India. This pragmatism has been underscored by India’s willingness to provide humanitarian assistance and its growing engagement in the country’s reconstruction, despite the complexities of dealing with the Taliban.

In this new context, the historical equations that once defined the relationships between Pakistan, India, and the Taliban are no longer as clear-cut. India’s role in Afghanistan is evolving, as it seeks to expand its influence and counter Pakistan’s traditional dominance. The Taliban, in turn, is navigating the delicate balance between its historical ties with Pakistan and its need for broader international engagement. Pakistan, once the undisputed patron of the Taliban, now finds itself facing the possibility of losing its strategic advantage in Afghanistan, as the country inches closer to India in ways that were previously unimaginable.

This shifting dynamic is reflective of the changing geopolitical realities in the region. The old equations, rooted in the Cold War-era alliances and post-9/11 geopolitics, are no longer applicable. The future of Afghanistan, and its role in the broader South Asian and Central Asian geopolitical sphere, will depend on how these new relationships evolve and how the major regional powers navigate their competing interests.

In December 2024, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated dramatically, with both countries exchanging strikes on each other’s territories. This conflict came at a time when Pakistan was grappling with its deadliest year of violence since 2016, particularly in the context of attacks against its law enforcement agencies. The spike in violence was attributed in large part to insurgent groups, including the Pakistani Taliban, also known by the acronym TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan), which has long been active along the porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan.

Pakistan accused the Afghan Taliban of harboring TTP militants within Afghan territory, thereby allowing them to launch cross-border attacks into Pakistan. Islamabad’s frustration grew as the Afghan Taliban, while officially claiming neutrality, appeared reluctant or unwilling to crack down on TTP militants who were using Afghanistan as a safe haven. This situation aggravated the already tense relations between the two countries.

In retaliation, Pakistan launched military strikes targeting Afghan bases believed to be housing TTP militants. The Pakistani government’s justification for these strikes was rooted in the assertion that Afghan territory was being used to launch attacks against Pakistan’s security forces and civilians, and that these operations were necessary for self-defense and national security. Pakistan’s military forces were focused on eliminating the TTP’s infrastructure in Afghanistan and curbing the group’s ability to destabilize Pakistan further.

The exchange of strikes between the two nations also underscored the challenges Pakistan faces in maintaining security within its own borders while dealing with the shifting power dynamics in Afghanistan. The Taliban’s return to power in Kabul had disrupted the fragile balance that existed between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with Pakistan’s strategic interests being undermined by the continued presence of TTP militants in Afghanistan.

For Afghanistan, the situation was increasingly complicated. The Afghan Taliban, still consolidating its control over the country, found itself caught between its historical ties to the Pakistani Taliban and the need to assert its own sovereignty and legitimacy. On one hand, it had a long-standing relationship with the TTP, given shared ideological and militant roots, but on the other hand, it faced mounting international pressure to crack down on cross-border insurgency and to avoid further destabilizing Afghanistan’s relations with Pakistan.

The escalation of violence between Pakistan and Afghanistan highlighted the broader regional instability caused by the Taliban’s resurgence in Afghanistan. It raised critical questions about the future of Afghanistan’s internal security and its relations with neighboring countries. As the situation evolved, it became clear that the geopolitical ramifications of Afghanistan’s internal power shifts were far-reaching, with significant consequences for Pakistan’s security policies and its regional strategy.

Ultimately, the December 2024 clashes were a reflection of the growing rift between Pakistan and Afghanistan, marked by competing interests, historical ties, and unresolved security issues. The situation underscored the fragility of regional peace and the ongoing struggle to achieve stability in Afghanistan after the Taliban’s return to power.

Meanwhile, India appeared to have recalibrated its approach toward Afghanistan, taking a more pragmatic and diplomatic stance in response to the changing realities on the ground following the Taliban’s return to power. While India had initially been hesitant to engage with the Taliban, given its historical antagonism and concerns over terrorism, it gradually recognized the need for practical diplomacy in order to safeguard its interests in the region.

India’s shift was partly driven by the understanding that Afghanistan’s new political reality, under Taliban rule, required some level of engagement to address key concerns such as humanitarian aid, counterterrorism efforts, and regional stability. As the Taliban consolidated power in Kabul, India began to explore avenues for cooperation, despite the complex dynamics at play. The need to engage with the Taliban was also influenced by the fact that India had longstanding interests in Afghanistan, including significant investments in infrastructure projects and development aid, which it wanted to protect amidst the new political landscape.

One notable step in India’s recalibration was the high-profile meeting between Indian Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai in 2023. This marked the highest-profile public engagement between New Delhi and the Taliban since the latter’s return to power. The meeting was viewed as a significant diplomatic shift, signaling India’s willingness to engage with the Taliban under specific circumstances, including humanitarian and regional security concerns.

Despite India’s cautious approach, it has engaged in humanitarian efforts to address the dire needs of the Afghan population, especially in the wake of the ongoing economic and humanitarian crises. India provided medical supplies, food assistance, and other forms of aid to Afghanistan, showcasing its commitment to the welfare of the Afghan people, irrespective of the political leadership in Kabul.

Additionally, India has worked to ensure its regional security interests by maintaining a watchful eye on the Taliban’s relationships with groups like the Haqqani Network and other militant factions, which have historically posed a threat to Indian interests. India has also continued to be wary of the Taliban’s potential role in harboring terrorist groups that might target Indian assets or personnel in the region.

The recalibration of India’s approach to Afghanistan reflects a broader recognition that regional diplomacy cannot be entirely shaped by historical enmities. While India continues to be cautious and critical of the Taliban’s ideology and its past actions, it also understands that engaging diplomatically is essential for managing the complex realities of regional geopolitics. India’s evolving strategy appears to be guided by the need to protect its interests in Afghanistan, prevent the further destabilization of the region, and position itself as a constructive player in a new and unpredictable geopolitical environment.

In this context, India’s engagement with the Taliban is a delicate balancing act, navigating the tension between pragmatism and its traditional stance on terrorism and human rights. How this recalibration plays out in the long term will be crucial in shaping India’s future role in Afghanistan and the broader South Asian geopolitical landscape.

The first significant meeting between India and the Taliban took place in Kabul in November 2024, signaling a noteworthy shift in India’s diplomatic engagement with the Afghan group. JP Singh, the joint secretary of India’s Ministry of External Affairs overseeing the Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran desk, met with Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob, the acting Defence Minister of Afghanistan and a prominent figure in the Taliban leadership.

This meeting marked a significant step in India’s recalibrated approach toward Afghanistan. For India, engaging directly with Taliban officials, particularly at the level of a senior government representative like Mullah Yaqoob, was a notable departure from its previous stance of non-engagement after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021. The Indian government, long critical of the Taliban due to its ties with militant groups and its repressive policies, had been cautious in its diplomatic outreach. However, the escalating security concerns, humanitarian needs, and the changing geopolitical context made it increasingly apparent that some form of dialogue was necessary to protect Indian interests in the region.

The meeting with Mullah Yaqoob focused on a variety of critical issues. One of the primary concerns for India was the stability and security of Afghanistan and the broader region, especially given the persistent threat from terrorist groups like the TTP (Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan) operating along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border. India, which had historically been a target of cross-border terrorism from groups operating in Afghanistan, wanted assurances that Afghan soil would not be used as a safe haven for such elements.

Additionally, the meeting likely addressed Afghanistan’s dire humanitarian crisis, with India signaling its continued willingness to provide aid and assistance. India has been one of the major donors of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan, supplying medical supplies, food, and other forms of aid, and it was important for New Delhi to discuss ways to ensure the effective delivery of this aid amidst the Taliban’s control.

The engagement also signaled India’s growing recognition that the Taliban, despite its controversial past, is a critical player in Afghanistan’s political future. This pragmatic shift was partly driven by India’s long-term strategic interests in the region, including its involvement in infrastructure projects and its broader efforts to maintain influence in South and Central Asia, especially as China’s presence in the region grows.

For the Taliban, the meeting was an important step in legitimizing its government on the international stage. Although it continues to face challenges in gaining recognition from many countries, including India, this engagement with India represented a potential opening for broader diplomatic recognition and engagement with regional powers. The Taliban had, for a long time, been isolated diplomatically and was eager to demonstrate that it could engage constructively with major regional players.

This meeting between India and the Taliban in November 2024 was indicative of the shifting dynamics in the region, where the rigid lines of previous alliances are increasingly giving way to more pragmatic, interest-driven diplomacy. As Afghanistan’s political landscape continues to evolve, India’s engagement with the Taliban will likely play an important role in shaping its future strategy in the region, while also impacting the broader geopolitical balance in South Asia.

A week after the meeting between JP Singh and Mullah Mohammad Yaqoob in Kabul, the Taliban took another significant step in its engagement with India by nominating Ikramuddin Kamil as their envoy to New Delhi. This move, while still short of formal recognition, reflected the Taliban’s intention to establish a diplomatic presence in India, signaling its desire for deeper ties and engagement with the country despite the lack of official recognition of its government by India.

India, while cautiously engaging with the Taliban for pragmatic reasons, has refrained from formally recognizing the current regime in Kabul. India has maintained its stance of non-recognition of the Taliban government, citing concerns over issues such as human rights, particularly the treatment of women and minorities, and the Taliban’s historical ties with terrorist groups. However, the nomination of a Taliban envoy to New Delhi indicated that the group was actively seeking to break through the diplomatic isolation it had faced since taking power in August 2021.

The appointment of Ikramuddin Kamil as envoy was also a part of the Taliban’s broader diplomatic efforts to gain legitimacy on the international stage. While several countries, including India, have yet to recognize the Taliban government, the nomination of an envoy reflects the group’s continued push to establish official channels of communication and secure diplomatic recognition.

For India, the move posed a delicate challenge. While it had engaged with the Taliban diplomatically on specific issues, including humanitarian aid and regional security, the formal recognition of the Taliban government remained a complex issue. India’s cautious approach to formal recognition was driven by several factors, including its concerns about the Taliban’s commitment to counterterrorism efforts, the protection of human rights, and the long-standing strategic rivalry with Pakistan, which has been a major supporter of the Taliban.

Nonetheless, the Taliban’s move to nominate an envoy to New Delhi was seen as a sign of the evolving dynamics in Afghanistan and the region. It underscored the Taliban’s desire to engage with key regional players, including India, in an attempt to stabilize Afghanistan and secure international support for its government.

While India has not taken steps to officially recognize the Taliban government, the appointment of an envoy could pave the way for further diplomatic exchanges and negotiations, particularly on issues such as security, regional stability, and economic cooperation. India’s engagement with the Taliban, while cautious, will likely continue to be guided by its broader strategic interests in Afghanistan and the region, balancing pragmatic diplomacy with its longstanding concerns about the Taliban’s policies and affiliations.

The nomination of Ikramuddin Kamil also highlighted the shifting nature of international relations in Afghanistan, with the Taliban increasingly seeking recognition and support from countries like India, which has historically been averse to direct engagement with the group. The evolving relationship between India and the Taliban will be closely watched by regional and global powers, as it could have significant implications for the future of Afghanistan and South Asian geopolitics.

Following the meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in early December 2024, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul released a statement describing India as a “significant regional and economic partner.” This was a significant development, as it underscored the Taliban’s efforts to shift its foreign policy toward more diplomatic engagement with key regional players, including India, despite the lack of formal recognition.

The statement marked a notable shift in the tone of the Taliban’s foreign policy, signaling a more pragmatic approach to regional diplomacy. It highlighted the growing importance of India in Afghanistan’s economic and regional outlook, particularly given India’s historical engagement in infrastructure development, humanitarian aid, and trade relations with Afghanistan. The Taliban’s acknowledgment of India as a “significant regional and economic partner” was a clear signal that, despite the ongoing political and security challenges, the group was eager to foster constructive relationships with neighboring countries, particularly those with economic leverage.

For India, this acknowledgment presented a mixed but important development. While India had refrained from officially recognizing the Taliban government, its increasing diplomatic engagement reflected a shift in strategy. India has long been involved in development projects in Afghanistan, including building roads, schools, and dams, and has been a key player in providing humanitarian aid. The statement from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Kabul suggested that the Taliban recognized the importance of maintaining these ties, especially in light of Afghanistan’s pressing economic and humanitarian needs.

India’s role as a “significant regional and economic partner” was also underscored by the broader regional dynamics. India, despite its strategic rivalry with Pakistan, had significant interests in the stability of Afghanistan, particularly regarding its regional security and counterterrorism priorities. A stable and peaceful Afghanistan, where terrorist groups are not given sanctuary, is crucial to India’s long-term security interests. Additionally, India has long viewed Afghanistan as a potential partner in the broader context of South Asian and Central Asian regional connectivity, particularly in terms of trade and energy transit.

This diplomatic shift did not mean that India was prepared to grant full recognition to the Taliban or ignore its concerns over human rights violations, especially regarding women and minority groups. However, the growing acknowledgment of India’s importance by the Taliban was a reflection of the changing geopolitical environment and the Taliban’s need to seek out support and recognition from key regional powers.

Ultimately, this exchange highlighted the evolving nature of Afghanistan’s foreign relations post-Taliban takeover, with the country seeking to balance its strategic relations with Pakistan, India, and other regional actors. For India, it was a clear indication that the country’s diplomatic engagement with Afghanistan would continue to focus on regional security, economic cooperation, and humanitarian support, while carefully navigating the complexities of the Taliban’s rule. The continued interactions, like the meeting between Misri and Muttaqi, may pave the way for further diplomatic dialogues and practical cooperation in the future.

‘Geography does not change’

Some Pakistani analysts argue that Islamabad has no immediate reason to worry about the evolving diplomatic engagement between India and the Taliban, particularly in the wake of the meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi. These analysts contend that while the diplomatic overtures between India and the Taliban are noteworthy, they do not necessarily signal a major shift in the regional balance of power that would jeopardize Pakistan’s strategic interests in Afghanistan.

The rationale behind this view rests on several factors:

1. Limited Scope of Engagement: Some analysts believe that while the meeting between Misri and Muttaqi was significant, it is unlikely to translate into a dramatic change in India’s relationship with the Taliban in the near future. They argue that the Taliban’s deep-rooted ties with Pakistan, especially in terms of military and ideological support, remain strong, and that India’s engagement with the Taliban may remain limited to pragmatic issues like humanitarian aid and regional security concerns, rather than a comprehensive partnership.
2. The Taliban’s Dependence on Pakistan: Analysts point out that despite its diplomatic outreach to India, the Taliban’s survival and governance depend heavily on Pakistan’s support, both politically and economically. Pakistan continues to serve as the Taliban’s primary ally, providing sanctuary, logistical support, and strategic backing. Islamabad remains the Taliban’s most important partner for trade, supply routes, and military assistance, which analysts argue will keep Afghanistan in Pakistan’s orbit.
3. India’s Cautious Approach: While India has increased its engagement with the Taliban, some experts suggest that India remains cautious about fully embracing the group due to concerns over its extremist affiliations, human rights violations, and the broader geopolitical implications. India’s focus may primarily remain on providing humanitarian aid and promoting regional stability, rather than seeking to replace Pakistan as the Taliban’s primary external partner. This, analysts argue, limits the potential for any significant shift in the strategic balance in favor of India.
4. Pakistan’s Leverage over the Taliban: Pakistan has historically used its leverage over the Taliban to ensure its interests are prioritized, including in matters related to counterterrorism and border security. Islamabad’s close relationship with the Taliban leadership gives it a degree of influence that India cannot easily match. As such, some analysts maintain that Pakistan’s position as the dominant external player in Afghanistan remains unchallenged, at least for now.
5. Regional Context: The broader regional context, particularly Pakistan’s longstanding rivalry with India, complicates any assumptions that India could easily increase its influence in Afghanistan at the expense of Pakistan. Some Pakistani analysts view the Taliban’s outreach to India as part of a broader diplomatic strategy to balance its relationships with multiple regional powers. They argue that the Taliban is unlikely to fully shift allegiances, given the deep historical, ideological, and practical ties with Pakistan.

Despite these reassurances, there are still underlying concerns within Pakistan about the potential long-term implications of India’s growing diplomatic presence in Afghanistan. If India succeeds in expanding its influence in Afghanistan, particularly in sectors like trade, infrastructure, and humanitarian aid, it could gradually challenge Pakistan’s regional dominance and lead to greater competition for influence in Kabul. For now, however, some analysts believe that Pakistan retains the upper hand in its relationship with the Taliban and has little reason to be overly concerned about India’s recent engagements.

Asif Durrani, a former Pakistani special representative to Afghanistan, provided a measured perspective on the growing diplomatic engagement between India and the Taliban, highlighting the depth of the relationship between Pakistan and Kabul compared to India’s relatively recent re-engagement. Durrani noted that Pakistan and Afghanistan share a long-standing, multifaceted relationship, forged over decades of strategic and economic ties, especially since the rise of the Taliban in the 1990s. This deep connection, according to Durrani, cannot be easily overshadowed by India’s return to the Afghan fold after the Taliban’s takeover.

Durrani emphasized that while India had withdrawn from Afghanistan following the Taliban’s first ascension to power in 1996, it has now re-engaged with Kabul after reassessing mutual business and diplomatic opportunities. He acknowledged that both India and Afghanistan are sovereign nations, free to pursue their respective interests and establish diplomatic relations without interference from any external party.

According to Durrani, Pakistan’s stance on this diplomatic shift will largely depend on whether these relations between India and Afghanistan align or conflict with Islamabad’s strategic interests. Pakistan is unlikely to object to the growing India-Afghanistan ties unless they begin to undermine Pakistan’s security or economic concerns in the region.

The statement reflects a pragmatic view, suggesting that Pakistan’s priority remains safeguarding its core interests in Afghanistan, including its desire for strategic depth and its concerns regarding cross-border terrorism, particularly related to groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). As long as India’s engagement with the Taliban does not challenge Pakistan’s influence or exacerbate tensions along the border, Durrani suggested that Islamabad may not take strong action against the evolving India-Afghanistan relations.

However, Durrani’s comments also underscore the delicate balance in regional geopolitics, where Pakistan’s long-standing influence in Afghanistan could face potential challenges if India’s engagement grows stronger over time. As the situation develops, Pakistan’s focus will likely remain on ensuring that its relationship with the Taliban continues to serve its strategic interests, particularly in relation to its rivalry with India.

Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United Nations, the United States, and the United Kingdom, echoed the sentiment expressed by Asif Durrani, emphasizing Pakistan’s historically deep ties with Afghanistan. She underscored that Pakistan has long maintained a strategic, political, and security relationship with Kabul, which goes beyond the recent shifts in diplomatic engagement involving India and the Taliban.

Lodhi pointed out that Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan is built on shared historical, cultural, and geopolitical interests, and it is unlikely to be easily displaced by India’s re-engagement with the Taliban. Like Durrani, she acknowledged that both India and Afghanistan, as sovereign nations, have the right to forge their own diplomatic ties. However, Lodhi added that Pakistan’s primary concern would arise if India’s growing influence in Afghanistan began to encroach upon its own strategic interests in the region, particularly regarding security and counterterrorism efforts.

Lodhi’s remarks highlighted Pakistan’s longstanding goal of securing “strategic depth” in Afghanistan, which has been a central element of its foreign policy, especially concerning its rivalry with India. She implied that Pakistan would continue to monitor the situation closely, but as long as India’s presence in Afghanistan remains within non-adversarial bounds, Pakistan may not react strongly to the developments.

Her comments reflect a broader understanding within Pakistan’s political and diplomatic circles: while India’s diplomatic outreach to Afghanistan is a new development, it does not yet pose an existential challenge to Pakistan’s influence in the region. Instead, Lodhi and Durrani seem to suggest that Pakistan’s focus will remain on ensuring its core interests are safeguarded, while allowing India and Afghanistan to engage as long as it does not disrupt the existing regional balance or harm Pakistan’s security concerns.

Maleeha Lodhi further emphasized the enduring geographical realities that continue to shape Afghanistan’s relationship with Pakistan, regardless of the diplomatic shifts involving India. She pointed out that Afghanistan, as a landlocked country, remains heavily reliant on Pakistan for trade and transit routes, particularly for access to international markets. This geographical dependence, she argued, does not change simply because India is now seeking closer ties with Kabul.

Lodhi highlighted the practical reality that Afghanistan, due to its landlocked position, requires access to Pakistani ports and infrastructure to facilitate its trade with the rest of the world. This dependency on Pakistan for key transit routes, such as the Karachi port, remains a significant factor in Afghanistan’s economic and logistical landscape, regardless of any diplomatic overtures from India.

Her statement underscores a critical aspect of regional dynamics: while Afghanistan’s sovereignty allows it to establish diplomatic relations with any nation, including India, the geographical and economic factors that bind Afghanistan and Pakistan together cannot be easily overlooked. Even as India expands its presence and influence in Afghanistan, Pakistan’s strategic role as a key trade partner and transit hub for Afghanistan’s access to global markets remains firmly entrenched.

In this context, Lodhi’s remarks reflect a pragmatic acknowledgment that geography continues to play a crucial role in shaping Afghanistan’s foreign relations, even as political alliances and diplomatic ties evolve. As long as Afghanistan remains geographically positioned between Pakistan and its trading partners, the centrality of Pakistan in Afghanistan’s trade and commerce will persist, despite shifting diplomatic dynamics.

While Afghanistan’s geography remains a constant, much else has indeed changed in recent years, particularly with regard to its political landscape and regional relationships. The return of the Taliban to power in 2021 marked a dramatic shift in the country’s governance and international relations. The collapse of the Afghan government and the subsequent withdrawal of U.S. and NATO forces left a power vacuum that the Taliban quickly filled. This shift has altered not only Afghanistan’s internal dynamics but also its external relationships, particularly with neighboring countries like Pakistan and India.

The Taliban’s return has disrupted long-standing geopolitical alignments. For decades, Pakistan maintained significant influence over the Taliban, largely seeing the group as a strategic ally that could help Pakistan maintain “strategic depth” in its rivalry with India. However, as Afghanistan’s political landscape changed with the Taliban’s resurgence, so too did the regional dynamics.

India, which had historically been suspicious of the Taliban, has begun to recalibrate its approach, engaging diplomatically with the Taliban in recent months. This shift is significant, as it represents a departure from the long-standing view of Afghanistan as a battleground for influence between Pakistan and India. India’s engagement with the Taliban, while still cautious, is also driven by practical considerations, including the desire to ensure its security and economic interests in the region, especially as the geopolitical environment evolves.

The changing relationships between Pakistan, India, and Afghanistan have added complexity to the region’s already volatile dynamics. While Pakistan still holds considerable influence over Afghanistan’s transit trade and security, its traditional role as the dominant external actor in Afghan affairs is increasingly challenged by India’s growing diplomatic presence in Kabul.

Moreover, the challenges of the ongoing security situation, particularly with groups like the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) operating from Afghan soil, further complicate the situation. These developments have led to a recalibration of Pakistan’s foreign policy, as it seeks to balance its interests in Afghanistan with its broader regional objectives.

Thus, while Afghanistan’s geographical reality remains unchanged, the shifting political landscape, the return of the Taliban, and the evolving diplomatic ties between Kabul, Islamabad, and New Delhi signify a new era of regional competition and cooperation. The key question for Afghanistan, Pakistan, and India moving forward will be how these dynamics evolve in a way that ensures stability in the region, even as new alliances and partnerships take shape.

Despite India’s substantial investment in Afghanistan over the past two decades, amounting to more than $3 billion, the primary trade route for the Afghan government remains the Pakistani border. This enduring reliance on Pakistan for trade and transit underscores the geographical reality that Afghanistan, as a landlocked country, has few alternatives for accessing global markets. However, this essential route has become increasingly fraught with tension, particularly as Pakistan faces rising security concerns linked to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

The TTP, a militant group operating from Afghan soil, has been a major source of instability for Pakistan. Islamabad has repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of harboring TTP fighters, leading to growing fears that cross-border attacks will intensify. These attacks have already led to significant losses, particularly for Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies, which have faced their deadliest year of violence since 2016. As a result, Pakistan has been conducting military operations targeting TTP bases in Afghanistan, further straining relations between the two countries.

The escalating security situation along the border has put the Afghan government in a difficult position, as it relies on Pakistan not only for trade but also for crucial logistical and economic support. While Afghanistan’s political ties with India are growing stronger, especially with the recent diplomatic engagement, the economic realities and Pakistan’s strategic role in facilitating Afghan trade cannot be easily overlooked.

This situation has created a delicate balancing act for Afghanistan. While it seeks to diversify its international partnerships, including those with India, it remains dependent on Pakistan for its trade and transit needs. The tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan, fueled by security concerns related to the TTP, add an additional layer of complexity to Afghanistan’s foreign policy.

In this context, the growing tensions along the Afghan-Pakistani border, exacerbated by the rise of TTP attacks, present a significant challenge to regional stability. Both Pakistan and Afghanistan are navigating a difficult relationship, where economic dependencies are coupled with security concerns that threaten to destabilize the already fragile regional dynamics.

The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), founded in 2007, shares ideological roots with the Afghan Taliban, and has long been engaged in a violent insurgency against the Pakistani state. Its primary objective has been to impose a strict interpretation of Sharia law in Pakistan and challenge the government’s authority. The TTP has waged a relentless campaign of violence, targeting both civilians and security forces, with a particular focus on law enforcement personnel.

In recent years, the group has grown increasingly bold, launching hundreds of attacks across Pakistan. Data from last year revealed that the TTP was responsible for more than 600 attacks, which led to approximately 1,600 fatalities, including nearly 700 law enforcement officers. These attacks have had a devastating impact on Pakistan’s security forces, undermining public confidence in the ability of the state to maintain control over certain regions, particularly in the tribal areas and along the Afghan border.

Most of these attacks have been claimed by the TTP, signaling a high level of organization and determination within the group. The TTP has also exploited the porous Afghan-Pakistani border, operating from safe havens within Afghanistan, which has complicated efforts by Pakistan’s military to contain the insurgency. The Afghan Taliban’s return to power in 2021 further fueled these concerns, as Pakistan accuses the Taliban of harboring TTP fighters and providing them with sanctuary. This has exacerbated the tension between the two countries, as Pakistan increasingly views the Taliban’s support for the TTP as a direct threat to its national security.

The rise in TTP violence and the group’s continued use of Afghanistan as a base of operations have made cross-border relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan highly volatile. Islamabad has launched several military operations aimed at targeting TTP strongholds in Afghanistan, but these efforts have been complicated by the Taliban’s control of the region and their reluctance to take action against their ideological allies.

The TTP’s ongoing insurgency is not only a significant security challenge for Pakistan but also a major factor shaping the broader regional dynamics. As the group continues its violent campaign, the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains tense, with security concerns overshadowing any potential economic or diplomatic cooperation between the two nations.

In response to the escalating violence attributed to the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Pakistan has held multiple meetings with Afghan authorities, seeking to address the security concerns stemming from cross-border militant activity. One notable example occurred in December, when Mohammad Sadiq, Pakistan’s special representative for Afghanistan, visited Kabul after a deadly TTP attack that killed 16 Pakistani soldiers.

The visit was part of ongoing diplomatic efforts by Pakistan to urge the Afghan Taliban to take stronger action against the TTP, which continues to operate from sanctuaries within Afghanistan. Pakistan has repeatedly accused the Afghan Taliban of harboring TTP militants, despite the Taliban’s assurances that they would not allow Afghan soil to be used for attacks against neighboring countries. These talks have often been fraught with tension, as Pakistan seeks more concrete measures to dismantle TTP networks operating in Afghanistan, while Afghanistan, under Taliban rule, is navigating its own internal priorities and international relations.

The deadly TTP attack that prompted the December meeting highlighted the urgency of the situation, with Pakistan pushing for decisive steps to curb the growing violence. Islamabad has emphasized that without addressing the TTP threat, the stability of the region could be further jeopardized, and the security situation in both Pakistan and Afghanistan would remain unstable.

Despite these diplomatic efforts, the response from the Afghan Taliban has been mixed, with some reports suggesting a reluctance to take harsh measures against the TTP, given the group’s ideological alignment with the Taliban’s own goals. The complex nature of these relations has left both sides grappling with the challenge of balancing security concerns with political realities.

As the TTP continues its attacks, the tension between Pakistan and Afghanistan over this issue is likely to remain a significant point of contention in their bilateral relations. The outcome of these talks and the ability of both countries to cooperate on counterterrorism efforts will have important implications for regional stability in the coming years.

During Mohammad Sadiq’s visit to Kabul in December, which was part of Pakistan’s efforts to address security concerns related to the TTP, tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan escalated further. While Sadiq was in Kabul, Pakistan’s military launched airstrikes in Bermal, a district located on the Afghan side of the border. These airstrikes targeted areas believed to be harboring TTP militants, who were allegedly operating from Afghan territory.

The strikes, however, resulted in significant civilian casualties, with Afghan officials reporting that at least 46 people were killed, including women and children. The Afghan government vehemently denied the accusation that it was sheltering armed groups, including the TTP, and condemned the Pakistani airstrikes as a violation of Afghanistan’s sovereignty. This tragic loss of life further inflamed tensions, with many in Afghanistan accusing Pakistan of exacerbating an already fragile situation.

In response to Pakistan’s airstrikes, the Afghan Taliban retaliated within days. They claimed responsibility for targeting “several points” in Pakistan, signaling their readiness to defend Afghan territory against external attacks. This counterstrike from the Taliban underscored the increasingly volatile nature of the border relationship between the two countries, as each side blamed the other for its security issues.

This sequence of events highlighted the deepening security crisis between Pakistan and Afghanistan, with both nations caught in a cycle of escalating violence and distrust. The military strikes, civilian casualties, and subsequent retaliation by the Taliban added to the already tense environment, complicating diplomatic efforts and raising questions about the future of bilateral relations.

For Pakistan, the airstrikes were part of an ongoing military campaign against the TTP, which Islamabad views as a direct threat to its national security. However, the heavy civilian toll and the Afghan Taliban’s retaliatory actions suggest that military solutions are unlikely to resolve the tensions. The incident serves as a reminder of the delicate balance both countries must strike when dealing with cross-border militant threats while avoiding further harm to civilian populations and diplomatic relations.

Maleeha Lodhi, Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United Nations, United States, and the United Kingdom, highlighted the reappointment of Mohammad Sadiq as Pakistan’s special representative to Afghanistan as a sign of Pakistan’s efforts to repair and reset its diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. According to Lodhi, this move underscores a broader intention to re-engage diplomatically with Kabul after a year marked by intense tensions, particularly over the TTP insurgency and cross-border militancy.

Lodhi emphasized that improved relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan are a strategic imperative for both nations. For Pakistan, stabilizing ties with Afghanistan is crucial for national security, as the country continues to face the challenge of militancy emanating from the Afghan border, particularly from groups like the TTP. A more stable relationship with Kabul could help mitigate the threat posed by these militant groups and ensure greater security along the porous border.

For Afghanistan, the importance of repairing ties with Pakistan lies in the economic and trade benefits that cooperation with its eastern neighbor offers. Afghanistan is landlocked and depends heavily on Pakistan for trade routes and transit access. Furthermore, the humanitarian and security challenges facing Afghanistan, including the economic collapse and ongoing insurgencies, make good relations with Pakistan essential for regional stability and assistance.

Given these mutual interests, Lodhi suggested that both nations recognize the importance of resetting their diplomatic relations in order to move away from the heightened tensions that have plagued the relationship in recent months. While the path to stability and cooperation remains challenging, particularly given the complexities of cross-border militancy and the Taliban’s governance, both sides seem to acknowledge that a more constructive engagement could offer significant long-term benefits.

Lodhi’s statement reflects the broader view that despite the ongoing challenges, both Pakistan and Afghanistan must find ways to work together in the face of shared regional and security concerns.

The meeting between India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri and Afghanistan’s acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi last week involved a topic that could add another layer of complexity to Pakistan’s relationship with the Afghan Taliban: the development of Iran’s Chabahar port by India.

Chabahar, a strategic deep-water port located in southeastern Iran, has been a focal point of India’s regional connectivity strategy. India has invested significantly in the development of this port, aiming to create a trade route that bypasses Pakistan, particularly for goods moving between India and Afghanistan. This project is part of India’s broader efforts to increase its influence in Central Asia and the Gulf region, offering Afghanistan an alternative route for trade that does not rely on Pakistan’s ports or land routes.

For Pakistan, the development of Chabahar is viewed with suspicion. Pakistan has long been concerned about India’s growing influence in Afghanistan and the potential for Chabahar to undermine Pakistan’s strategic dominance in the region. The port provides India with a direct link to Afghanistan, enabling the landlocked country to bypass Pakistan entirely for trade with India and other regional players. This further complicates Pakistan’s position, as it seeks to maintain its leverage over Afghanistan while also managing its geopolitical competition with India.

The issue of Chabahar could introduce friction in Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban, as Islamabad seeks to balance its longstanding strategic ties with Kabul while also addressing its concerns about India’s role in Afghanistan. Although the Taliban has not expressed direct opposition to Chabahar, the growing economic and trade ties between India and Afghanistan through this route could complicate the Taliban’s interactions with Pakistan, which is trying to maintain its influence over Kabul.

The development of Chabahar port thus adds another dimension to the already complex regional dynamics, involving not only Pakistan and Afghanistan but also Iran and India. As these competing interests play out, the situation remains fluid, and the outcome of these diplomatic exchanges will likely shape the future of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

Courtesy: TIMES NOW

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