Svitlana, a 42-year-old woman living near Kyiv, speaks with unwavering resolve about her loyalty to Ukraine. “I never considered betraying my country, not for a second,” she asserts. “My husband would’ve never forgiven me.”

For more than two years, Svitlana had been anxiously waiting for news of her husband, Dima, a dedicated army medic who had been captured by Russian forces. During this agonizing period, she lived in uncertainty, hoping for his safe return.

Then, one day, she received a phone call that shook her world. The voice on the other end made a chilling proposition: If she committed treason against Ukraine, Dima might be treated better in his Russian prison, or possibly even released early.

Despite the painful temptation of possibly saving her husband, Svitlana’s loyalty to her country remained unshakable. She knew that betraying Ukraine was not an option, and she would not compromise her values or her husband’s honor.

Svitlana recounts the disturbing phone call she received from a Ukrainian number that, at first, seemed unremarkable. “I picked up, and the man introduced himself as Dmitry,” she says. “He spoke in a Russian accent.” What followed was a chilling proposition.

Dmitry outlined several illegal acts she could carry out: setting fire to a military enlistment office, sabotaging a military vehicle, or even tampering with Ukrainian Railways’ electrical systems. The most sinister request was to reveal the locations of Ukraine’s vital air defense units — essential to protecting the country from Russian aerial threats.

As Dmitry made his demands, Svitlana’s mind raced back to the Ukrainian government’s advice for families in such situations: stall, gather evidence, and report it. She immediately started taking screenshots of the messages, later showing them to the BBC.

The Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) instructed Svitlana to continue the conversation and buy time while they investigated. So, she pretended to comply, saying she would set fire to a local railway line.

Sitting in her living room, where air raid sirens intermittently blare in the distance, Svitlana plays audio recordings for me. These are from two calls she made with Dmitry through the Telegram app, where he gave explicit instructions on how to make and plant a Molotov cocktail.

“Pour in a litre of lighting fluid and add a bit of petrol,” Dmitry tells her during one call. “Go to a railway junction. Make sure there are no security cameras. Wear a hat – just in case.”

He also coached her on how to avoid being tracked, advising her to put her phone on airplane mode once she was 1-2 km away from the target. “Do you know what a relay box is? Take a photo of it. This should be the target for her arson attack,” he added.

To prove she completed the task, Dmitry instructed her to write the date on a piece of paper and take a photo with it. As an incentive, he promised to arrange a phone call with her husband, or even have a parcel delivered to him in prison.

Despite the mounting pressure, Svitlana never wavered in her loyalty to Ukraine. She reported every step to the authorities, ensuring that Dmitry’s attempts to manipulate her would not succeed.

Svitlana’s resolve was tested when the SBU confirmed that Dmitry was indeed in Russia, and advised her to sever all contact with him. She did, telling Dmitry that she had changed her mind.

That’s when the threats escalated. “He said they’d kill my husband, and I’d never see him again,” Svitlana recalls. “For days, he kept calling, saying: ‘Your husband is being tortured, and it’s your fault!’”

When I ask how concerned she was that Dmitry might carry out his threats, Svitlana’s eyes moisten. “My heart ached, and I could only pray: ‘God, please don’t let that happen.’”

Svitlana’s emotions were torn between two conflicting thoughts. “One part of me said, ‘This person has no connection with the prisoners.’ But the other part asks, ‘What if he really can do it? How would I live with myself?’”

Her distress was palpable, grappling with the possibility of losing her husband while holding onto the belief that she had done the right thing.

In a statement to the BBC, the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) made it clear that cooperating with Russian agents “will in no way ease the plight of the prisoner; on the contrary, it may significantly complicate their chances of being exchanged.”

The authorities urged all relatives of captured soldiers to immediately report any approaches by Russian agents, assuring that those who come forward would be “protected” and treated as victims. However, the SBU warned that if relatives agreed to sabotage or engage in espionage, they could face charges of treason, with a maximum punishment of life imprisonment.

The SBU regularly publicizes the arrests of Ukrainians who allegedly commit arson or disclose military locations to Russia. Pro-Kremlin media is rife with videos that claim to show Ukrainians committing acts of sabotage, like torching army vehicles or attacking railway infrastructure.

While some perpetrators may be motivated by money from suspected Russian agents, it is also believed that there are individuals driven by desperation, particularly relatives trying to secure the release of their loved ones held in Russian captivity.

Petro Yatsenko, who works with the Ukrainian military’s Headquarters for the Treatment of Prisoners of War (PoWs), revealed that about 50% of all PoW families are contacted by Russian agents. He emphasizes the vulnerability of these families, noting that many are in desperate situations and may be willing to do anything to help their loved ones. However, Yatsenko and his team are working to educate them that cooperating with Russia will not benefit the prisoners’ situation.

Yatsenko explains that while an act like setting fire to a military vehicle might not cause significant damage to the Ukrainian Armed Forces, it poses a serious risk by destabilizing societal unity. More crucially, disclosing the location of air defence systems or other vital military assets is a substantial threat to Ukraine’s security.

Although the Ukrainian authorities do not disclose the exact number of PoWs, estimates suggest there are over 8,000 Ukrainians in captivity. Ukrainian intelligence sources shared with the BBC that the cases of relatives collaborating with Russia are relatively few.

In response to allegations of using PoW families as leverage, the Russian government denied the claims in a statement to the BBC. Russia asserts that it treats Ukrainian prisoners humanely, fully complying with the Geneva Convention. The Russian statement also accused Ukraine of using similar tactics, alleging that Ukrainian handlers are pressuring Russian citizens to commit acts of sabotage and arson within Russia, targeting critical infrastructure and civilian facilities.

Svitlana’s husband, Dima, was released from captivity just over three months ago, and the couple is now joyfully reunited, spending quality time with their four-year-old son, Vova.

When asked how she felt when Dima was finally freed, Svitlana beams with happiness, saying, “There were tears of joy like I’ve never cried before. It felt like I had snatched my love from the jaws of death.”

Dima shared with her that the Russians did not act on their threats to harm him in retaliation for her refusal to cooperate. Svitlana was relieved, and when she told Dima about the calls she had received from Russian agents, he was shocked.

“He asked me how I held up,” Svitlana recalls with a wink. “Well, as I always say, I’m an officer’s wife.”

Courtesy: Will Vernon

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