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Summary
- Putin and Xi speak on video call
- Putin and Xi propose developing ties further
- Xi tells Putin about call with Trump, Kremlin says
- Putin talks to Xi about Ukraine, says Kremlin
MOSCOW/BEIJING, Jan 21 (Reuters) – In a significant video call on Tuesday, Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping discussed a range of key global issues, including strategies to build relations with newly-inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump, the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, and Russia’s strong support for China’s stance on Taiwan.
The call, which lasted an hour and 35 minutes, came a day after Trump took office as the 45th President of the United States. Putin and Xi reportedly agreed to continue enhancing the strategic partnership between Russia and China, which has raised concerns in the West about the growing influence of the two countries in global geopolitics.
During the discussion, the leaders also focused on the war in Ukraine, exploring prospects for a potential peace agreement to end the nearly three-year-long conflict. While no specific details were revealed about the peace proposals, both leaders reiterated their desire to see an end to the hostilities and voiced their continued support for each other’s positions on international matters.
On the sensitive issue of Taiwan, Putin reaffirmed Moscow’s unwavering support for Beijing, emphasizing that Russia stood firmly behind China’s policy regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty. Both leaders expressed concerns over U.S. involvement in Taiwan, and the potential for heightened tensions in the region.
The video call between Xi and Putin underscored the increasingly close ties between Russia and China, particularly in the face of what both nations perceive as Western interference in their internal affairs. The growing partnership, characterized by military cooperation, trade agreements, and shared political goals, is seen as a challenge to U.S.-led global influence.
As Trump begins his presidency, the leaders of Russia and China are positioning themselves to strengthen their bilateral relations, with an eye on securing more favorable diplomatic and economic terms from Washington while advancing their own strategic agendas on the world stage. The alignment of Russia and China on several key global issues signals a new phase of cooperation between the two nations, with the potential to reshape international relations in the years to come.
In conclusion, the discussion between Putin and Xi highlighted the shared interests between the two powers, with both leaders setting the stage for further collaboration amid evolving global challenges, particularly the uncertainty surrounding U.S. foreign policy under President Trump.
China and Russia declared a “no limits” partnership in February 2022 when Russian President Vladimir Putin visited Beijing, just days before he sent tens of thousands of troops into Ukraine, marking the beginning of a war that has since drawn global condemnation. The declaration of this partnership underscored the growing alignment between the two nations, which has continued to strengthen amid tensions with the West.
In a recent video call between Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping, the two leaders reinforced their deepening ties, exchanging warm pleasantries as “dear friends.” Xi, speaking from the Great Hall of the People in Beijing, shared with Putin details of a call he had held with newly-inaugurated U.S. President Donald Trump. The conversation, according to Xi, covered various topics, including the popular social media platform TikTok, trade relations, and the sensitive issue of Taiwan.
The call, which lasted over an hour and a half, highlighted not only the personal rapport between the two leaders but also their shared interests in challenging the U.S. and its global influence. The leaders discussed how to build relations with Trump’s administration, with both Putin and Xi acknowledging the unpredictable nature of U.S. foreign policy under Trump.
Xi’s mention of his conversation with Trump regarding TikTok is notable, as the app has become a point of contention between the U.S. and China, with concerns raised over privacy and national security. Additionally, trade relations between the two powers have remained a key area of focus, especially as both China and Russia face growing Western sanctions.
Regarding Taiwan, Xi reiterated Beijing’s firm stance on the island, with Putin again offering Moscow’s full support for China’s sovereignty claims over Taiwan. The leaders emphasized their mutual opposition to what they see as foreign interference in their internal affairs, especially from the U.S.
The timing of this call, shortly after Trump’s inauguration, is symbolic of the growing geopolitical tensions between the U.S., China, and Russia. Putin’s increasing references to China as an “ally” further signal the shift in global power dynamics, with Russia and China seeking to counterbalance U.S. influence, particularly in areas such as military strategy, economic cooperation, and political alignment.
Both leaders, speaking from their respective residences – Putin from his Novo-Ogarevo estate outside Moscow and Xi from Beijing – demonstrated a strong and united front, reflecting their shared objectives and the strategic importance of their partnership. The “no limits” partnership, first articulated in 2022, continues to define the bilateral relationship between Russia and China, and their collaboration remains a key factor in shaping the geopolitical landscape in the years to come.
Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin have expressed a readiness to build relations with the United States based on mutual respect and shared benefits, Kremlin foreign policy aide Yuri Ushakov revealed. This indication came following the inauguration of Donald Trump as U.S. President. Ushakov noted that both Russia and China are open to dialogue with the new U.S. administration, particularly regarding the ongoing conflict in Ukraine.
“The Russian and Chinese leadership have indicated a willingness to build relations with the United States on a mutually beneficial, mutually respectful basis, if the Trump team shows genuine interest in this,” Ushakov told reporters in Moscow. “It was also emphasized that we are ready for dialogue with the new U.S. administration on the Ukrainian conflict.”
Putin, according to Ushakov, seeks a long-term resolution to the Ukraine crisis rather than a short-term ceasefire. However, the Russian president’s position remains firm: any peace deal must take Russia’s interests into account. Ushakov clarified that while Putin has expressed a desire for peace, no specific proposals for a call between Putin and Trump have been received yet.
Trump, on his part, has signaled a tough stance on China, making clear his intentions to address issues with Beijing. As for Ukraine, Trump has suggested that Putin should take steps to end the war, stating that the ongoing conflict is detrimental to Russia. In his inauguration remarks, Trump hinted at a willingness to engage with Putin on finding a resolution to the war, with the belief that it was not in Russia’s interest to continue the conflict.
Meanwhile, Xi has also reiterated his call for negotiations to resolve the war in Ukraine, accusing the U.S. of exacerbating the conflict by supplying weapons to Kyiv. Despite Beijing’s alignment with Russia on various issues, Xi emphasized that Ukraine, like all countries, should have the right to seek a resolution that aligns with its interests.
The U.S. response to these overtures remains to be seen, but the possibility of dialogue between Washington, Moscow, and Beijing is a developing story with significant global implications, particularly in light of the ongoing war in Ukraine and tensions over Taiwan.
Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University, has referred to the relationship between Xi Jinping’s China and Vladimir Putin’s Russia as “the most significant undeclared alliance in the world.” In his 2023 paper titled The Most Significant Undeclared Alliance in the World, Allison delves into the growing strategic partnership between China and Russia, a bond that has increasingly shaped global geopolitics.
Allison emphasized Xi’s potential role in bringing about a resolution to the war in Ukraine, one of the key promises made by Donald Trump during his presidential campaign. According to Allison, Xi’s involvement could be pivotal in achieving the “early end” of the conflict, a result Trump has expressed interest in during his tenure. “Xi will play a decisive role in the early end of the war in Ukraine that Trump has promised – and that I’m betting will happen,” Allison remarked, suggesting that China’s influence on Russia could be a key factor in resolving the war.
Allison’s statement highlights the growing interconnectedness of China and Russia, which, while not formally declared as an alliance, has evolved into one of the most significant partnerships in international relations. As both nations face mounting pressure from the West, their collaboration has become an important dynamic in shaping global power structures, with implications for the war in Ukraine, Taiwan, and broader international affairs.
In the wake of Donald Trump’s inauguration, the relationship between Russian President Vladimir Putin and Chinese President Xi Jinping remains a cornerstone of global diplomacy, driven by shared geopolitical objectives and a mutual desire to challenge Western influence.
Trump, who has previously lauded Xi as a “good poker player” and described his rapport with Putin as “great,” emphasized his warnings to the Russian leader during his first term. He had cautioned that the U.S. would take action if Russia advanced further into Ukraine. However, as tensions surrounding Ukraine persist, Putin and Xi’s strategic vision appears increasingly aligned, particularly when it comes to presenting the West as a declining force.
Putin expressed this joint worldview during the video call with Xi, underscoring their shared advocacy for a “more just multi-polar world order” and indivisible security in the Eurasian region. The leaders of Russia and China aim to reshape global power dynamics, with their countries working closely to ensure security and influence, often in opposition to Western dominance.
Both countries also recognize the importance of their economic partnership. China is the largest consumer of Russian energy and the biggest single oil export market for Russia. Putin emphasized their continued collaboration, particularly in advancing nuclear technologies like fast neutron reactors and nuclear fuel reprocessing, reinforcing the deepening ties between the two.
On Taiwan, Russia’s support for China is unwavering. Moscow reiterated its commitment to the “one-China principle,” a stance that aligns with Beijing’s claims over Taiwan, which China regards as an inseparable part of its territory. Xi reaffirmed in his New Year’s address that China’s “reunification” with Taiwan is inevitable, despite Taiwan’s democratic governance and its insistence that only its people can determine their future. This ongoing dispute highlights a critical area where Russia and China share strategic interests and seek to counterbalance U.S. influence.
The timing of the video call between Putin and Xi had been arranged before Trump’s inauguration, showcasing a continuing focus on strengthening bilateral ties. As the U.S. identifies China as its principal competitor and Russia as a major threat, the alliance between Beijing and Moscow is seen as a key counterbalance to Western global leadership.
Courtesy: SAMAA TV
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